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INTRODUCTION

J

USTICE William J. Brennan, Jr. was fond of describing the
Constitution as “a charter of human rights and human dignity.”1
It was, in his view, “a bold commitment by a people to the ideal of
dignity protected through law.”2 Throughout his tenure on the
United States Supreme Court, Justice Brennan attempted to translate this vision into doctrinal reality. What is perhaps most striking
about his jurisprudential oeuvre is how human dignity served as a
unifying theme in his opinions across otherwise disparate areas of
the law.3
To describe his quest to elevate human dignity in the Court’s decisionmaking as striking, however, is not to say that it has been enduring. With the ascendancy of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts,
human dignity has become a value most often invoked defiantly in
dissent.4 This is not to suggest that the Burger and Rehnquist
1

William J. Brennan, Jr., My Life on the Court, in Reason & Passion: Justice Brennan’s Enduring Influence 17, 18 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds.,
1997).
2
Id.
3
See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 474 U.S. 1050, 1053 (1986) (Brennan & Stevens,
JJ., mem.), granting cert. to 702 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985) (“[A] truly free society is one in
which every citizen—guilty or innocent—is treated fairly and accorded dignity and
respect by the State.”); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (finding in
the context of equal protection that sex discrimination “both deprives persons of their
individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide participation in political,
economic, and cultural life”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970) (holding
under the doctrine of procedural due process that “[f]rom its founding the Nation’s
basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within
its borders”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State.”).
4
See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 672 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“[S]tate-compelled, state-monitored collection and testing of urine, while
perhaps not the most intrusive of searches, is still ‘particularly destructive of privacy
and offensive to personal dignity.’”) (quoting Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 1122
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Courts were (or are) callous; but, at least as a descriptive matter,
for a number of years dignity became a seldom-expressed value in
constitutional decisionmaking.
Dignity is once again in vogue at the Court, but it is probably fair
to say that Justice Brennan would not approve. The Court’s recent
focus has been not on human dignity, but on the dignity of the
states. In a series of recent decisions expanding the states’ immunity from suits by individuals seeking monetary relief,5 the Court
has explained that the “preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their
status as sovereign entities.”6 One is tempted, of course, to treat
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“[P]artial or complete decapitation of the person, as blood sprays uncontrollably, obviously violates human dignity.”); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 675 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he death penalty is wholly inconsistent with the constitutional
principle of human dignity . . . .”), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428
(2002); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 302 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Nancy Cruzan is entitled to choose to die with dignity.”); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 548–49 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[F]ew decisions
are ‘more basic to individual dignity and autonomy’ . . . than the right to make the
uniquely personal, intimate, and self-defining decision whether to end a pregnancy.”)
(quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986)); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 697 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he requirement that a finder of facts must hear the testimony offered
by those whose liberty is at stake derives from deep-seated notions of fairness and
human dignity.”); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 232 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“‘The restraints and the punishment which a criminal conviction entails do not place
the citizen beyond the ethical tradition that accords respect to the dignity and intrinsic
worth of every individual.’”) (quoting United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d
701, 712 (7th Cir. 1973)).
5
In light of the Court’s discussion in recent state sovereign immunity cases, it is
perhaps no longer appropriate to describe the states’ immunity as Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, ___,
122 S. Ct. 1864, 1871 (2002) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope
of the States’ sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity.”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“The phrase [“Eleventh
Amendment immunity”] is convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for
the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms
of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution’s structure, its history, and
the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity from
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.”).
6
S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1874.
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such language simply as what it appears to be: a rhetorical device
intended to underscore a substantive justification for the decisions
reached by the Court. Indeed, this not-so-subtle anthropomorphization of the states has raised only a few scholarly eyebrows,7 and
has (at least until now) typically been somewhat cavalierly dismissed as a rhetorical flourish without substantive content or implication.8
But with each state sovereign immunity decision, it becomes
more difficult to dismiss the language of state dignity as mere
rhetoric. In the Court’s most recent word on the subject—Federal
Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,9
which held that state sovereign immunity bars an independent federal agency from adjudicating a private party’s complaint against a
nonconsenting state—the Court rejected the United States’ argument that the state’s financial integrity was not threatened by the
adjudication in question. The Court asserted that “the primary
function of sovereign immunity is not to protect State treasuries, . . . but to afford the States the dignity and respect due sovereign entities.”10

7

See, e.g., Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New
Federalism, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 245, 246 (2000) (arguing that the dignity rationale elevates form over substance in the state sovereign immunity doctrine); Evan H.
Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc.
Sci. 81 (2001) (offering an expressivist account of the Court’s dignity rationale);
Daniel A. Farber, Pledging A New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New
Federalism, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1133, 1136 (2000) (explaining the implications of
a doctrine premised on state dignity); Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1121, 1127, 1129 (2000) (analogizing the Court’s dignity rationale
to late-nineteenth-century attempts to personify corporations).
8
See, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139,
151 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling the dignity rationale “embarrassingly insufficient”) [hereinafter PRASA]; Farber, supra note 7, at 1144 n.60 (“Living as I do
in a state where the current governor is best known nationally for his earlier career as
a boa-wearing professional wrestler, perhaps it is not surprising that the idea of inherent state dignity does not strongly resonate for me.”); Sherry, supra note 7, at 1127
(“Not since extending the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations
has the Court so anthropomorphized an abstract entity.”).
9
122 S. Ct. 1864, 1874 (2002).
10
Id. at 1879; see also id. at 1877 (“While state sovereign immunity serves the important function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving ‘the States’ ability to
govern in accordance with the will of their citizens,’ the doctrine’s central purpose is
to ‘accord the States the respect owed them as’ joint sovereigns.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 750–51)).
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Much of the recent commentary about the Court’s state sovereign immunity cases has been critical.11 But even those commentators who have defended the Court’s “federalism revival”12 in general,13 and its sovereign immunity decisions in particular,14 have not
attempted to defend the Court’s increasingly odd focus on the dignitary interests of the states. Why, then, does the Court continue
not only to invoke the arguably oxymoronic concept of state dignity, but also to rely on the states’ dignity as the “central,”15 “preeminent,”16 and “primary”17 justification for its expansion of the
states’ immunity from suit?
This Article suggests a tentative answer to this puzzle, although
that answer plainly falls short of justifying the Court’s current state
sovereign immunity doctrine. The concept of state dignity may
11

See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1201
(2001) (arguing that sovereign immunity is an anachronistic doctrine inconsistent with
the principles of the American legal system); William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh
Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 843 (2000) (arguing that
the Court has not translated the Constitution into a workable federal structure); Vicki
C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 953 (2000) (arguing that the Court’s sovereign immunity case law “deserves the condemnation and resistence of scholars”); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in
Search of a Theory, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1011 (2000) (arguing that state sovereign
immunity decisions fail to promote any coherent conception of state autonomy);
Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 1 (arguing that state sovereign immunity is a poor way to protect state sovereignty).
12
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 429, 431 (2002).
13
See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 135 (2001) (“We are cognizant, of course, of
the danger of equating the rights of individuals and the rights of states. Indeed, we
would be the first to concede that states’ rights have no independent value; their
worth derives entirely from their utility in enhancing the freedom and welfare of individuals.”).
14
See Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. Rev.
485, 495 n.33 (2001) (“From time to time the Court has adverted to sovereign immunity as serving to protect the ‘dignity’ of the states. It should not be assumed that such
rhetoric is the basis of the immunity . . . . Sovereign immunity is based upon raw
power, which in the case of the United States is distributed by the Constitution; ‘dignity’ has nothing to do with it. The Founding Fathers were not beguiled by such a notion.”).
15
S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1877.
16
Id. at 1874.
17
Id. at 1879.
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sound strange to the ears of a domestic public-law scholar, but the
concept in fact has a well-established historical pedigree and wellestablished meaning in the law-of-nations doctrine of foreign state
sovereign immunity. In focusing on state dignity in its state sovereign immunity cases, the Court has invited attention to this related,
but distinct, line of cases.
The Court has long held that U.S. courts will not entertain a private suit against a foreign nation absent clear authorization from
Congress. This rule is premised on the theory that all sovereign nations are of equal status, or “dignity.” Each nation is wholly sovereign within its borders, according to this theory, and the submission
of one sovereign state to the authority and jurisdiction of another
would be inconsistent with the “equal rights” and “absolute independence” of the former.18 Recognition of the equal “dignity”—
that is, the equal rank and importance—of the foreign sovereign
thus depends on the forum nation’s courts’ declining to assert jurisdiction over the foreign nation. Because absolute adherence to
this rule, however, would effectively diminish the sovereignty of
the forum nation by preventing it from exercising absolute authority within its borders, the Court has long recognized the power of
Congress to override the presumptive immunity of the foreign sovereign. The Court will exercise jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign, however, only if it is clear that Congress intended to abrogate
the foreign state’s immunity.
In referring to a foreign state’s dignity in the context of foreign
state sovereign immunity, the Court has sought to underscore two
important points. First, the sovereign nations of the world enjoy
equal status on the world stage; it would be necessarily inconsistent
with that equality of status for one nation to assert sovereign authority over another nation. Second, there is a particular imperative of judicial non-intervention in matters of international relations, which are more appropriately left to the political branches.
Because entertaining a suit against a foreign state could have profound (and negative) consequences for foreign relations, the Court
has long required that such an assertion of jurisdiction be clearly
authorized by Congress.

18

The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–37 (1812).
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When the Court invokes the concept of state dignity in the state
sovereign immunity cases, therefore, it does not write on a clean
slate; to the contrary, the concept has an established meaning, with
established implications, in the doctrine of foreign state sovereign
immunity. By invoking state dignity to support its view of state
sovereign immunity, the Court thus appears to have drawn on foreign state sovereign immunity doctrine. There is, of course, no way
to know for sure what the Court actually intends when it invokes
the concept in its state sovereign immunity decisions, and it is fruitless—not to mention arguably inappropriate—to attempt to psychoanalyze the Justices to determine what exactly they mean when
they refer to “state dignity.” But by relying on a concept with an
established doctrinal meaning, the Court naturally invites an assessment whether the concept is apposite in the context in which
the Court has invoked it.
What is the import of the Court’s recent reliance on state dignity
in its decisions concerning the domestic-law doctrine of state sovereign immunity? More important, does it make sense for the
Court to describe state dignity as the central justification for state
sovereign immunity doctrine? This Article offers two principal observations. First, there is a serious question whether the concept of
sovereign dignity has any application in the context of state sovereign immunity. Second, assuming that the concept is apposite, the
doctrinal consequence ought to be that Congress has authority to
abrogate the states’ immunity
When the Court refers to state dignity in a foreign state sovereign immunity case, it refers to the status relationship among
wholly sovereign nations. The question in those cases is whether it
is consistent with the inherent equality—the equal status or “dignity”—of sovereigns for one to subject the other to jurisdiction in
its courts. At first blush, there is nothing particularly striking about
invoking a concept drawn from the doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity in the obviously related context of state sovereign
immunity. Indeed, the Court has long borrowed principles from international law in other contexts that implicate the relations among
the states. But although the relationship among the several states
resembles the relationship among sovereign nations, it is another
thing altogether to suggest that the states stand in the same relation
to the federal government as does a foreign nation. Whatever one
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can say about the extent of the powers retained by the states, they
plainly are not fully sovereign nations within the meaning of international law.
Yet in invoking the law-of-nations concept of state dignity to defeat attempts by Congress to subject the states to suit for violations
of federal law, the Court has effectively suggested that the states
stand in relation to the federal government as does a foreign nation. In other words, the Court has suggested that the states’ status
with respect to the federal government is effectively the same as
the relationship of, say, France to the federal government.
This is a dubious premise. Even assuming that the Court’s analogy is appropriate, the logical doctrinal consequence of borrowing
the notion of state dignity from foreign state sovereign immunity
doctrine would be that Congress enjoys the power to subject the
states to suit, at least in federal court. The foreign state sovereign
immunity cases make clear that Congress, even if not the courts
acting sua sponte, has authority to override the presumptive immunity of foreign states in U.S. courts. Sovereign dignity and the
essential independence and equality of sovereign nations may be
enough to create a strong presumption of immunity, but ultimately
Congress retains authority to abrogate that immunity.
Under current state sovereign immunity doctrine, however,
Congress can abrogate the states’ immunity only when it acts to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court has construed
even that authority increasingly narrowly. The ironic result of the
Court’s apparent attempt to import the language of customary international law decisions to the federalism debate, therefore, is that
the Court now provides more protection to American states than it
does to foreign states. Under current doctrine, the equal status of a
wholly sovereign nation does not shield it from amenability to suit
when Congress so decrees, but the status of the several states,
which plainly are not wholly sovereign nations, erects a virtually
absolute bar to Congress’s authority to subject them to suit.19

19

See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) (construing narrowly Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its Article
I powers).
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Of course, our federal system is unique, and analogies drawn
from doctrines governing the relations among sovereign nations
may simply be inapposite. In our constitutional system, it is plain
that the states retain some attributes of sovereignty, and the Court
is charged with the difficult task of determining precisely which attributes. Even if the states are not wholly sovereign entities, perhaps it is as reasonable to say that immunity from suit is one of the
sovereign prerogatives that the states retained when they joined
the Union as it is to say that, for example, the power to tax is one
such retained prerogative.
But far from justifying the Court’s recent decisions, this point ultimately demonstrates the tenuousness of the Court’s dignity rationale. According to the Court, the task in the state sovereign immunity cases is to determine what attributes of sovereignty the
states retained at the ratification. But even if one thinks—as the
Court suggests by relying on the state-dignity rationale—that the
states retained the immunity of wholly sovereign nations from suit
before other sovereign’s courts, that immunity presumably would
be only as potent as that enjoyed by wholly sovereign nations.
Congress, however, has authority to abrogate that immunity with a
clear statement of intent. It is difficult to see how the states could
have retained a power that they—like even wholly sovereign nations—never enjoyed in the first place.
Moreover, if analogies drawn from the law governing the relations among sovereign nations are inapposite in our federal system,
it is perplexing that the Court has chosen to rely on the notion of
state dignity to support this doctrine of federalism. As matters currently stand, the Court appears to have made an assertion about
state dignity that bears no relationship to the doctrinal and historical meaning of that term. Further, if state dignity does not mean in
this context what it means in the context from which it was drawn,
then the Court has some obligation to explain precisely why it
should mean something different here. The Court’s attempts thus
far, however, have been inadequate.
The Court’s recent attention to state sovereign immunity has
been accompanied by a rich scholarly literature that exhaustively
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details the relevant constitutional history and doctrinal debates.20
Those accounts, however, generally have not made a serious effort
to assess the Court’s reliance on the notion of state dignity. Part I
accordingly begins with an overview of the recent ascendancy of
state dignity as an apparent basis for decision in state sovereign
immunity cases. The Article continues, in Part II, with an overview
of the doctrine from which the notion of state dignity derives: foreign state sovereign immunity under the law of nations. That survey, especially when viewed in conjunction with the overview in
Part III of mid-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century state sovereign immunity decisions, demonstrates that the Court’s most recent doctrinal and rhetorical experiment is not without some precedential pedigree; it suggests that it would be more accurate to say
that the current Court’s efforts represent a renaissance for the language of state dignity.
Part IV considers the implications for state sovereign immunity
doctrine of the Court’s implicit reliance on foreign state sovereign
immunity cases. The Article concludes that the Court has been “jurisprudentially ambivalent.” In invoking the dignity of the states,
the Court has suggested both that the states ought to be treated as
fully sovereign nations—a debatable proposition, at best—and that
the states ought to be treated better than fully sovereign nations—
certainly an odd proposition, given the undisputed constitutional
limitations on the sovereign authority of the states.

20

In addition to those articles cited supra note 11, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425 (1987); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of
Suit Upon the States, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1203 (1978); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
Stan. L. Rev. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity,
98 Yale L.J. 1 (1988); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh
Amendment, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1342 (1989); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and
the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 61 (1989); Caleb Nelson,
Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1559
(2002).
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I. STATE DIGNITY IN RECENT STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CASES
A. Identifying the Symptoms
Judge William Fletcher recently observed that the Eleventh
Amendment, despite being ratified over 200 years ago, did not
forcefully appear on the judicial and academic radar screen until
the 1970s. In the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has decided
more cases involving the Eleventh Amendment than it did in the
preceding 170-odd years.21 The last seven years have marked even
more dramatic doctrinal change. In that time, the Court has held
that Congress lacks authority under Article I to abrogate the
states’ immunity from suit both in federal court22 and in state
court.23 The Court also has significantly narrowed Congress’s authority to abrogate the states’ immunity pursuant to its power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.24 It is during this period that
the Court has increasingly relied on the states’ dignitary interests
to justify expansion of the doctrine.
To be sure, as discussed below, the references to state dignity
have not been without precedent, even within the context of state
sovereign immunity. But they have increased in frequency and import in recent years, and the Court has used such references to
mark a new front in the battle over the appropriate balance between state and federal power. The first modern reference to state
dignity in a state sovereign immunity case was in 1993, in Puerto
Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.
(“PRASA”).25 PRASA held that a district court order denying a
claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.26 Whether such an order
21

See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 844.
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72–73.
23
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
24
See Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, 531 U.S. at 374; Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536 (1997) (holding that in passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Congress
exceeded its authority under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
by violating the principles of federalism and the separation of powers).
25
506 U.S. 139 (1993).
26
Id. at 147. The collateral order doctrine is a judicially created exception to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2001), which generally permits appeals only from “final decisions of
the district courts.” In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., the Court held that
an order that is not the complete and final judgment in a case within the meaning of
22
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would “not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of
the case,” and whether it would be “too late effectively to review”
the order after final judgment, turned on the nature of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.27 If the Eleventh Amendment merely immunizes states from liability for damages, then an interlocutory order denying a claim of immunity would not be appealable; a state
could appeal from an adverse final judgment and raise the Eleventh Amendment as a grounds for reversal.28 If, on the other hand,
the Eleventh Amendment confers immunity from suit, then its
value would “for the most part [be] lost as litigation proceeds past
motion practice.”29
The Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment provides
immunity from suit, which would effectively be worthless if the
state had to wait for a final judgment to appeal the denial of immunity. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim to the contrary,
noting that, in the words of a nineteenth-century decision concerning the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity, “[t]he very object and purpose of the 11th Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial
tribunals at the instance of private parties.”30 The Court explained
that “[t]he Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States,
although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty,” and
thus that it “accords the States the respect owed them as members
of the federation.”31
If the Court had stopped there, its reference to state dignity, although perhaps a bit foreign to the ears of most modern watchers

Section 1291 will nevertheless be immediately appealable if it “fall[s] in that small
class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the
cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated.” 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
27
PRASA, 506 U.S. at 143 (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546).
28
See, e.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1988).
29
PRASA, 506 U.S. at 145; cf. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (holding
that an order denying qualified immunity is an appealable collateral order).
30
PRASA, 506 U.S. at 146 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505
(1887)). In re Ayers held that a suit seeking to restrain the Attorney General of Virginia from bringing suits to recover taxes from persons who had previously paid with
a state bond issue was, in effect, a suit against the state and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 123 U.S. at 507. See infra notes 277–86 and accompanying text.
31
PRASA, 506 U.S. at 146.
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of the Court, would have seemed entirely innocuous. Indeed, the
Court’s entire point—perhaps debatable,32 but certainly not unreasonable33—was that it was the very act of being subjected to a suit
for damages that was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. But the
Court had more to say about the states’ dignity: “While application
of the collateral order doctrine in this type of case is justified in
part by a concern that States not be unduly burdened by litigation,
its ultimate justification is the importance of ensuring that the States’
dignitary interests can be fully vindicated.”34 Whatever one thinks of
the actual holding in the case with respect to the collateral order
doctrine,35 the Court’s insistence that the “ultimate justification” of
sovereign immunity is to vindicate “the States’ dignitary interests”36
was surely surprising to most commentators. Indeed, although Justice Stevens’ dissent focused mostly on a quibble with the majority
over whether Eleventh Amendment immunity truly was analogous
to an official’s qualified immunity,37 he felt compelled to add that

32

See id. at 150 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] defense based on the Eleventh
Amendment, even when the Amendment is read at its broadest, does not contend
that the State or state entity is shielded from liability for its conduct, but only that the
federal courts are without jurisdiction over claims against the State or state entity.
Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment bars [a] respondent from seeking recovery in a
different forum.”) (citation omitted). But cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999)
(holding that Congress lacks authority under Article I to subject a state to suit in its
own courts without its consent).
33
See PRASA, 506 U.S. at 145 (noting that “the value to the States of their Eleventh
Amendment immunity, like the benefit conferred by qualified immunity to individual
officers, is for the most part lost as litigation proceeds past motion practice”); id. at
147–48 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that “I continue to believe that the Court’s
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as embodying a broad principle of state
immunity from suit in federal court simply cannot be reconciled with the federal system envisioned by our Basic Document and its Amendments,” but “a district court’s
denial of a claim of immunity [in the narrow class of cases that fall] under the Eleventh Amendment should be appealable immediately”) (citation omitted).
34
Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
35
See, e.g., id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Whether the assertion of an
Eleventh Amendment claim is well founded—a matter not before us in this case—is a
question separate from the question whether the Eleventh Amendment interests are
‘too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.’”) (citation omitted) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Life Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
546 (1949)).
36
Id. at 146.
37
See id. at 149–50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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he found the Court’s dignity rationale “embarrassingly insufficient.”38
The Court elaborated on PRASA’s reference to state dignity in
its decision in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., in which
it described the protection of state dignity as one of the two principal justifications for the Eleventh Amendment.39 In that case, the
Court held that the Port Authority—a bi-state railway authorized
by Congress under the Interstate Compact Clause40—was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection.41 The Court reasoned that
neither of the “Eleventh Amendment’s twin reasons” argued in favor of immunity.42 First, because pursuant to the particular arrangement among New York, New Jersey, and Congress the “[d]ebts
and other obligations of the Port Authority are not liabilities of the
two founding States, and the States do not appropriate funds to the
Authority,”43 permitting suit would not threaten the solvency of the
states.44 Second, “[s]uit in federal court is not an affront to the dignity of a Compact Clause entity, for the federal court, in relation to
such an enterprise, is hardly the instrument of a distant, disconnected sovereign.”45 To the contrary, “the federal court is ordained
by one of the entity’s founders.”46
The rhetoric of state dignity did not have a profound effect on
the substance of the doctrine, however, until the Court’s decision
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.47 The Court held in Seminole Tribe that Congress lacks authority under Article I to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court.48 In so concluding, the Court expressly overruled Pennsyl38

Id. at 151 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
513 U.S. 30, 39–40 (1994).
40
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
41
Hess, 513 U.S. at 32–33.
42
Id. at 47.
43
Id. at 37.
44
Id. at 48–50.
45
Id. at 41 (emphasis added); see also id. at 47 (finding “[n]o genuine threat to the
dignity of New York or New Jersey” in allowing the claims to proceed); id. at 52 (stating that permitting the suit “does not touch the concerns—the States’ solvency and
dignity—that underpin the Eleventh Amendment”).
46
Id. at 41.
47
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
48
Seminole Tribe involved a suit by an Indian tribe to compel the State of Florida to
negotiate in good faith with the tribe over the formation of a compact to permit gam39
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vania v. Union Gas Co.,49 in which a plurality of the Court had recognized Congress’s power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause.50 The tribe argued that “one consideration weighing in favor of finding the power to abrogate here is that the Act authorizes
only prospective injunctive relief rather than retroactive monetary
relief.”51 Previous case law had established that, when the state is
the real party in interest, a suit within the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment is barred regardless of the character of the relief
sought.52 There nevertheless was some merit to the tribe’s contention. In light of the Court’s prior decisions establishing that the
Eleventh Amendment was not a complete bar to the exercise of
subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving states,53 Congress
arguably had authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause54 to
provide a remedy for state transgressions of validly imposed federal law; surely the character and scope of that remedy were rele-

ing activities on tribal land. Id. at 51–52. The tribe sued under a provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2721 (2000), that purported to abrogate the states’ immunity from suit. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (2000).
49
491 U.S. 1 (1989).
50
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
51
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58.
52
In Cory v. White, for example, the Court had explained that “[i]t would be a novel
proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the
State itself simply because no money judgment is sought.” 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982). The
proposition is not, however, quite as novel as the Court suggested. Indeed, under the
doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a suit against a state official seeking
prospective injunctive relief to “end a continuing violation of federal law” is not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985); see
also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665–66 (1974) (holding that Young applies only
to actions for prospective injunctive relief). See generally Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-27, at 555–66 (3d ed. 2000) (providing an overview of the
relevant caselaw).
53
See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 675–76 (1999) (noting that states can consent to suit in federal court); cf. Nelson,
supra note 20, at 1615–17 (arguing that in cases covered by the text of the Eleventh
Amendment, the states cannot consent to suit in federal court, but that in cases not
covered by the text of the Amendment, states enjoy “personal jurisdiction”-type immunity and “therefore can consent to suits”).
54
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).
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vant considerations in deciding whether in fact it was “necessary
and proper.”55
The Court, however, concluded that if the “relief sought . . . is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment,” then “it follows a fortiori . . . that the type of relief
sought is irrelevant to whether Congress has power to abrogate
States’ immunity.”56 In support for this conclusion, the Court followed Hess and PRASA, observing that the “Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in order to ‘preven[t] federal-court
judgments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury’; it also serves
to avoid ‘the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process
of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.’”57 Once
again, therefore, the Court invoked the states’ dignitary interests to
justify the states’ broad immunity from suit; but in Seminole Tribe,
unlike PRASA and Hess, the Court relied on the states’ dignitary
interests to justify a broad expansion of the doctrine.
The Court again cited the states’ dignitary interests as a basis for
decision in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho.58 The case involved a dispute between an Indian tribe and the state of Idaho
over ownership of the banks and submerged lands of Lake Coeur
d’Alene.59 The tribe filed suit in federal court seeking both a declaration that its ownership of the land to the south of the lake extended to the disputed areas and an injunction preventing state officials from regulating the lands or otherwise violating the tribe’s
right of quiet enjoyment.60 The tribe’s claims of ownership were
based on federal law—specifically, the tribe claimed a “beneficial
55

The Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress “to avail itself of experience,
to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.”
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415–16 (1819); see also id. at 421
(“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”); cf. Nelson, supra note 20, at 1629 (arguing that “the Necessary and Proper
Clause might well be thought to give Congress the requisite authority to abrogate the
states’ traditional exemptions from suit”).
56
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added).
57
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hess, 513 U.S. at 48, and PRASA, 506 U.S. at
146).
58
521 U.S. 261 (1997).
59
Id. at 264.
60
Id.
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interest, subject to the trusteeship of the United States, in the beds
and banks of all navigable watercourses and waters . . . within the
original boundaries of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, as defined
by” an 1873 Executive Order.61
The tribe contended that because the suit sought only prospective injunctive relief to remedy an ongoing violation of federal law,
the doctrine of Ex Parte Young62 was applicable and thus that the
Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit.63 The Court, however,
disagreed. The Court observed that the Eleventh Amendment
would bar a quiet title suit against the state in federal court.64 Because the “declaratory and injunctive relief the Tribe seeks is close
to the functional equivalent of quiet title in that substantially all
benefits of ownership and control would shift from the State to the
Tribe,”65 the Court reasoned that the suit, even though against state
officials, should be barred, as well.66
Given the Court’s prior precedent, this holding seemed perfectly
reasonable.67 Indeed, although the tribe’s allegations placed the suit
neatly within the letter of the Ex Parte Young doctrine as interpreted by the Court,68 it is difficult to conceive of a remedy that
would have more directly affected the state’s sovereign interests
than a request permanently to divest the state of some of its territory. But as in PRASA and Seminole Tribe, the Court did not rest
solely on such functional considerations. Instead, the Court explained that “the immunity is designed to protect” the “dignity and
respect afforded a State,”69 and thus that the “dignity and status of
61

Id. (citing Exec. Order of Nov. 8, 1873, reprinted in 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs:
Laws and Treaties 837 (1904)).
62
209 U.S. 123 (1908); see discussion infra notes 278, 285–86 and accompanying text.
63
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 281.
64
Id. at 281–82 (citing Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 223 (1897)).
65
Id. at 282.
66
Id. at 282–88.
67
See Tribe, supra note 52, § 3-27, at 565 (discussing Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s “seemingly sensible result”).
68
As Justice Souter noted in dissent:
a federal court has jurisdiction in an individual’s action against state officers so
long as two conditions are met. The plaintiff must allege that the officers are
acting in violation of federal law, and must seek prospective relief to address an
ongoing violation, not compensation or other retrospective relief for violations
past. The Tribe’s claim satisfies each condition.
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 298–99 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
69
Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
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its statehood allow Idaho to rely on its Eleventh Amendment immunity and to insist upon responding to these claims in its own
courts, which are open to hear and determine the case.”70 The
Court also expressed concern that permitting the suit to proceed
would cause “offense to Idaho’s sovereign authority and its standing in the Union,”71 and Justice Kennedy, in a portion of the opinion joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, defended “the wisdom
and necessity of considering, when determining the applicability of
the Eleventh Amendment, the real affront to a State of allowing a
suit to proceed.”72
State dignity played an even more prominent role in the Court’s
decision in Alden v. Maine.73 Alden involved a suit by employees of
the state of Maine alleging violation of the overtime provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.74 The employees originally
filed the suit in federal court, but the district court dismissed it after the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe. The employees refiled the action in Maine state court, pursuant to the Act’s provision creating concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction.75 The
Supreme Court held that the states enjoy a constitutionally indefeasible immunity from suit in their own courts without their consent.76
The Court’s decision in Alden is striking in several respects—
perhaps most significantly in its utter disavowal of the text of the
Eleventh Amendment as the source of a constitutional principle of
state sovereign immunity. For present purposes, it suffices to note
the Court’s continued—and increasingly emphatic—insistence that
the states’ dignitary interests are a central justification for the
70

Id. at 287–88 (emphasis added).
Id. at 282 (emphasis added).
72
Id. at 277 (emphasis added). Justice O’Connor, in an opinion joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, concurred in part and in the judgment, but disagreed with Justice
Kennedy’s assertion that “federal courts determining whether to exercise jurisdiction
over any suit against a state officer must engage in a case-specific analysis of a number
of concerns.” Id. at 291 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice O’Connor concluded that Justice Kennedy’s approach “unnecessarily
recharacterizes and narrows much of our Young jurisprudence.” Id. (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
73
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
74
52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2000)).
75
Alden, 527 U.S. at 711–12.
76
Id. at 712, 759–60.
71
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states’ immunity from suit. The Court began its discussion by explaining that “[t]he generation that designed and adopted our federal system considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity.”77 Accordingly, the federal system “preserves the
sovereign status of the States” by “reserv[ing] to them a substantial
portion of the Nation’s primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status.”78 The Court’s
decision refers to state dignity, or the imperative of demonstrating
“respect” or “esteem” for the states, on five other occasions in the
opinion.79
To be sure, the Court did attempt in Alden to support its extratextual conclusion with reference to policy and constitutional history and structure. In particular, the Court sought to justify its conclusion that Congress cannot authorize private suits for damages
against states by invoking the need to protect the states’ fiscal integrity80 and preserve political accountability.81 The persuasiveness

77

Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
Id. at 714 (emphasis added). The Court stated that the other principal means by
which the Constitution preserves the “sovereign status of the States” is by creating “a
system in which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people.” Id. (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919–20
(1997) (discussing The Federalist No. 15, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
79
See id. at 715 (finding that the states “are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of
sovereignty”) (emphasis added); id. at 748–49 (“The principle of sovereign immunity
preserved by constitutional design ‘thus accords the States the respect owed them as
members of the federation.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting PRASA, 506 U.S. at 146);
id. at 749 (“recognizing ‘the dignity and respect afforded a State, which the immunity
is designed to protect’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at
268); id. at 749 (“Private suits against nonconsenting States . . . present ‘the indignity
of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties,’ regardless of the forum.”) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Ayers, 123
U.S. 443, 505 (1887)); id. at 758 (“Congress must accord States the esteem due to them
as joint participants in a federal system, one beginning with the premise of sovereignty in both the central Government and the separate States.”) (emphasis added).
80
The Court argued that—
[p]rivate suits against nonconsenting States—especially suits for money damages—may threaten the financial integrity of the States. . . . [A]n unlimited congressional power to authorize suits in state court to levy upon the treasuries of
the States for compensatory damages, attorney’s fees, and even punitive damages could create staggering burdens, giving Congress a power and a leverage
over the States that is not contemplated by our constitutional design.
78
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of these rationales can be debated,82 but the Court’s mere attempt
in Alden to assert them distinguishes that decision from the Court’s
latest word on state sovereign immunity. In Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,83 the Court
apparently did not see the need to provide any justification other
than the states’ dignitary interests for the broad immunity that it
has extrapolated from the constitutional structure.84 The case involved an administrative complaint filed with the Federal Maritime
Commission against South Carolina’s port authority by the owner
of a cruise ship. The complainant alleged that the state violated
federal law in denying its ship a berth in the Port of Charleston and
sought injunctive relief and statutory reparations.85 Although only
the United States, in light of established Eleventh Amendment
doctrine, would have the authority to enforce a reparations order
against the state,86 the Court held that state sovereign immunity
barred the agency from adjudicating the claim.87

Id. at 750; see also id. at 750–51 (“A general federal power to authorize private suits
for money damages would place unwarranted strain on the States’ ability to govern in
accordance with the will of their citizens.”).
81
See id. at 751 (“When the Federal Government asserts authority over a State’s
most fundamental political processes, it strikes at the heart of the political accountability so essential to our liberty and republican form of government.”).
82
See id. at 803 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The ‘judgment creditor’ in question is not a
dunning bill collector, but a citizen whose federal rights have been violated . . . .”); id.
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“So long as the citizens’ will, expressed through state legislation, does not violate valid federal law, the strain will not be felt; and to the extent
that state action does violate federal law, the will of the citizens of the United States
already trumps that of the citizens of the State . . . .”).
83
122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002).
84
To be fair, the Court may simply have felt secure in relying on its prior justifications in Seminole Tribe and Alden. But given the consistent refusal of four Justices to
accept those decisions as binding precedent, one would expect the Court to offer as
many substantive justifications for its decisions as possible. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank
v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 699 (1999) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“I am not yet ready to adhere to the proposition of law set forth in
Seminole Tribe.”); Alden, 527 U.S. at 814 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I expect the
Court’s late essay into immunity doctrine will prove the equal of its earlier experiment in laissez-faire, the one being as unrealistic as the other, as indefensible, and
probably as fleeting.”)
85
See S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1868–69.
86
Because the Federal Maritime Commission’s orders are not self-executing, an
administrative order can be enforced only by a federal district court. See id. at 1875
(citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 1712(e), 1713(c)–(d) (1994)). Under current doctrine, such a suit
by a private party—effectively, a suit against a state in federal court to recover mone-
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The Court’s analysis of the question presented proceeded in
three steps. First, the Court dispensed with the contention that the
Eleventh Amendment limits only the “judicial”—Article III—
power, by reaffirming its prior conclusion that “the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the States extends beyond the literal text of the
Eleventh Amendment.”88 Second, given the “numerous common
features shared by administrative adjudications and judicial proceedings,”89 the Court concluded that federal agency adjudications
were “the type of proceedings from which the Framers would have
thought the States possessed immunity when they agreed to enter
the Union.”90 Third, the Court considered the “affront to a State’s
dignity . . . when an adjudication takes place in an administrative
tribunal as opposed to an Article III court,”91 and concluded that it
was at least as great as when Congress attempts to subject a state to
suit in federal court.
To be sure, the Court’s first two rationales—loosely speaking,
precedent and original intent—are conventional bases for constitutional decisionmaking. But given the consistent refusal of four Justices either to accept recent decisions as binding precedent92 or to
recognize the historical accuracy of the Court’s interpretation of
the Framers’ intent,93 one might have expected the Court to be eager to demonstrate the correctness of its view of constitutional history and structure.
The facts of the case actually put the Court in somewhat of a doctrinal bind. The United States conceded that orders of the Commistary damages—would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. A suit by the United
States to enforce the order, however, would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which does not extend to suits by the United States. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at
755.
87
S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1867–68.
88
Id. at 1871.
89
Id. at 1872.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1874.
92
See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 814 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
699 (1999) (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
93
See, e.g., S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1880 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (challenging the Court’s interpretation of the history of the ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment); Alden, 527 U.S. at 814 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s
“conception of state sovereign immunity . . . is true neither to history nor to the structure of the Constitution”).
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sion were not self-executing, and that, because of existing Eleventh
Amendment doctrine, they could be enforced only by the United
States.94 Existing doctrine permits suits by the United States against
a state in federal court,95 and the Court had already explained in
Alden that suits by the United States against a state satisfy concerns about political accountability.96 Thus, concerns about protecting the states’ fiscal integrity and ensuring political accountability
did not appear to be powerfully present in the case.
Presumably, that is where the rationale of state dignity comes in.
In response to the United States’ contention that South Carolina’s
fiscal integrity was not threatened by the adjudication before the
Commission, the Court asserted: “While state sovereign immunity
serves the important function of shielding state treasuries and thus
preserving ‘the States’ ability to govern in accordance with the will
of their citizens,’ the doctrine’s central purpose is to ‘accord[] the
States the respect owed them as’ joint sovereigns.”97 Similarly, in
response to the United States’ argument that the Commission
should, at a minimum, not be precluded from considering a private
party’s request for non-monetary relief, the Court explained that
“the primary function of sovereign immunity is not to protect State
treasuries, but to afford the States the dignity and respect due sovereign entities.”98
But the Court did not simply invoke state dignity defensively.
Quite to the contrary, the Court dedicated an entire section of its
opinion to a discussion of state dignity and the adverse effect that
permitting the adjudication to proceed would have had on that
dignity. The Court explained that the “preeminent purpose of state
sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent
with their status as sovereign entities.”99 Alluding to the Court’s

94

See supra note 86.
Such suits are not barred by either the Eleventh Amendment or any other extratextual source of state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 755.
96
See id. at 756 (“Suits brought by the United States itself require the exercise of
political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a broad delegation to private persons to sue nonconsenting States.”).
97
S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1877 (citation omitted) (quoting Alden, 527
U.S. at 750–51, and PRASA, 506 U.S. at 146).
98
Id. at 1879 (citation omitted).
99
Id. at 1874.
95

SMITH.BOOK.DOC

2003]

2/24/03 9:31 PM

States as Nations

23

prior conclusions about the states’ dignity in Seminole Tribe and
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the Court then reasoned:
Simply put, if the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to
a State’s dignity to be required to answer the complaints of private parties in federal courts, we cannot imagine that they would
have found it acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same
thing before the administrative tribunal of an agency, such as the
[Federal Maritime Commission]. . . . The affront to a State’s dignity does not lessen when an adjudication takes place in an administrative tribunal as opposed to an Article III court.100

Responding to such an assertion is difficult; indeed, measuring the
“affront” of a given action to a state’s “dignity” is an imprecise science (to say the least).101 One might wonder, for example, how to
measure the validity of Justice Thomas’s assertion, in an aside that
surely was the subject of much grumbling among federal administrative law judges, that
[o]ne, in fact, could argue that allowing a private party to haul a
State in front of such an administrative tribunal constitutes a
greater insult to a State’s dignity than requiring a State to appear
in an Article III court presided over by a judge with life tenure
nominated by the President of the United States and confirmed
by the United States Senate.102

Justice Stevens was left to complain again in dissent that “the ‘dignity’ rationale is ‘embarrassingly insufficient,’ in part because
‘Chief Justice Marshall early on laid to rest the view that the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was to protect a State’s dignity.’”103

100

Id. (citations omitted).
See Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1039 (recognizing that “[a]ppeals to dignity are
somewhat evanescent”).
102
S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. at 1874 n.11.
103
Id. at 1880 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 406–07 (1821)). Justice Stevens also relied on an impressive recent piece
of scholarship by Professor Caleb Nelson. See id. at 1880–81 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Nelson, supra note 20, at 1565–66). I discuss Professor Nelson’s work infra at
notes 414–17 and accompanying text.
101
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B. Diagnosing the Problem
As Justice Stevens’s comment suggests, the current Court has
not invented the dignity rationale. But to the extent that the term
has a historical pedigree, one must wonder why the Court has recently revived it. Not even those relatively few commentators who
have defended the Court’s recent state sovereign immunity decisions have been eager to defend the dignity rationale.104 Indeed, at
least viewed in isolation, it seems intuitively silly at best and downright strange at worst. So why has the Court not only persisted in
its invocation of state dignity, but also made the concept increasingly central to the rationale of its decisions?
Only a few commentators have hazarded an answer. Some have
summarily dismissed the references to state dignity as inappropriate anthropomorphizations devoid of any substantive or functional
content.105 Others have noted that although the language of dignity
appears to be shorthand for the relatively uncontroversial proposition that the states clearly have some special status under the Constitution, “broad notions of state dignity are difficult to square with
accepted features of constitutional tradition.”106
104

See Hill, supra note 14.
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 61 (1998) (“[T]he Court appears to
be much more concerned about preserving the dignity of the states—as if they were
natural persons that could experience hurt feelings beyond those of their residents—
than in pursuing decentralization and the other policy goals that federalism serves.”);
Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Comment: The Sovereign
Immunity “Exception,” 110 Harv. L. Rev. 102, 132 (1996) (“The idea that a state, an
utterly abstract entity, has feelings about being sued by a private party when ‘its’
highest officials are regularly so sued surely strains credulity.”); Sherry, supra note 7,
at 1127 (“Not since extending the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations has the Court so anthropomorphized an abstract entity.”); id. (arguing that
Justice Kennedy’s imagery in Alden of the federal government’s purported power
over the states brings to mind “an independent toddler dragged along by a determined parent”); cf. Caminker, supra note 7, at 82 (“It is tempting to dismiss these articulations as mere rhetorical flourishes, window dressing on federalism walls constructed from other methodological building blocks.”).
106
Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1040. Professor Daniel Meltzer explains:
Foremost among these are the power of another sovereign (the federal government) to impose unwanted duties . . . on the states, and the power of that
other sovereign to strip states of their regulatory authority via federal preemption. State dignity is also compromised by all of the alternative means of judicial
enforcement of federal duties that the [Alden] majority mentions as valid (perhaps most notably, by state subjection to injunctions entered nominally against
105
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Professor Evan Caminker has offered a more thorough—and
persuasive, if tentative—account of the Court’s recent solicitude
for state dignity.107 Professor Caminker has taken a preliminary
stab at exploring whether the “Court’s phraseology has independent justificatory significance.”108 Noting that “the Court’s references
to dignitary interests and injuries do not appear in casual and isolated snippets but, rather, are characterized as an affirmative rationale for state sovereign immunity,”109 he proposes that “the
Court’s focus on state dignity reflects an alternative approach to
constitutional interpretation, one focusing on ‘expressive harms’
wrought by governmental conduct.”110 Under this account, the
Court’s invocation of state dignity has “expressive significance by
articulating and reinforcing norms that are constitutive of a society’s very identity and self-understanding.”111 Viewed as such, “the
Court’s jurisprudence is nonconsequentialist: it protects the dignity

state officials), and by the manifold prohibitions and duties set forth in Article I
Section 10, in Article IV, and in Amendments 13–15, 19, 24 and 26 to the Constitution. . . . [T]he notion that state dignity demands some form of sovereign
immunity from federal regulation falling within those enumerated powers is
anything but axiomatic.
Id. at 1040–41. Professor Daniel Farber has suggested that “the perceived mandate to
protect the ‘dignity’ of the states from being sullied by certain kinds of litigation stems
from their unique role in republican self-government.” Farber, supra note 7, at 1136.
Recognition of that role, he argues, “has real doctrinal consequences rather than being merely a rhetorical flourish.” Id. at 1137. Professor Ann Althouse has made a related argument. She distinguishes between “normative federalism,” under which “the
states are accorded autonomy because of the good to be achieved through separate
functioning,” and the “states’ rights model” of federalism, which holds that states
“can claim their autonomy as a matter of right.” Althouse, supra note 7, at 246. Although, in her view, there are compelling reasons to enforce a doctrine of normative
federalism, the Court’s—
insistence on ‘dignity’ for the states sounds like what Younger [v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971),] explicitly disclaimed: “blind deference to ‘States Rights.’” . . .
‘Dignity’ connotes worthiness, the idea that honor and esteem are deserved. To
find dignity inherent in the state’s mere status as a state and then to design doctrine to express honor and esteem toward the state is, I think[,] to embrace the
states’ rights model. The normative model would stop to ask what the state deserves and why.
Id. at 250–51 (footnote omitted).
107
See Caminker, supra note 7.
108
Id. at 83.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 82.
111
Id. at 84.
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of states because this affirmance of the fundamental structural
commitments embedded in our constitutional system of governance matters for its own sake, not as a means to achieving some
other end.”112
After constructing this expressivist account, however, Professor
Caminker recognizes that it is ultimately “unpersuasive” because it
“fails to take account of countervailing expressive norms that the
protection of state sovereign immunity itself violates, and it reflects
an anachronistic view of [the] states’ role in our federalist system.”113 He accordingly speculates whether the Court is “employing
expressive reasoning instrumentally to inculcate values to induce
attitudinal or behavioral change.”114 There are “immediate and appreciable cost[s],” however, to such a judicial approach—specifically,
“individuals are denied compensation for injuries caused by state misconduct.”115 These costs, combined with the empirical and normative concerns associated with any instrumental justification for a
112

Id. at 85. Professor Evan Caminker recognizes that “[t]aken at face value, the
Court’s discussions of state dignity suggest that the states themselves suffer a cognizable expressive harm when their rightful dignitary status is impugned by private suits.”
Id. But such a characterization, he acknowledges, would be “surely silly. Unlike persons, states have no feelings of dignity to be protected.” Id. Instead, a “far more plausible characterization of the Court’s language does not similarly depend on pretending that states have human qualities; rather, it holds that disrespectful treatment of
states should not be tolerated because it contravenes the proper understanding of our
governmental regime.” Id.
113
Id. at 86 (emphasis omitted). For example, Professor Caminker notes that “the
particular language with which the Court proclaims the states’ entitlement to dignified
treatment appears to exalt states as having a status superior to individuals,” a view “at
odds with our foundational notion of popular sovereignty . . . .” Id. Similarly, “in the
specific context of sovereign immunity, the prioritization of states’ dignitary interests
over individuals’ competing interest in compensation for injuries caused by state
wrongdoing arguably expresses a message that individuals are subordinate to states
rather than the other way around.” Id.
114
Id. at 89 (emphasis added). On this account:
[j]udicial protection and exaltation of state dignity will encourage people to internalize, as a political norm, the importance of having strong and vibrant states
exercising significant governmental authority. This norm-internalization will
help lead to an actual revival of such state power, thus securing the . . . advantages of decentralization within the federal structure.
Id. at 89–90; see also Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of
the Anti-Commandeering Rule?, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1309 (2000) (defending the
anti-commandeering rule as outlined in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), on expressivist grounds).
115
Caminker, supra note 7, at 91.
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jurisprudential change,116 lead Professor Caminker to conclude that
“immunity doctrine cannot be persuasively justified on this instrumentalist ground.”117
Much can be said for the expressivist account as a plausible descriptive explanation of the Court’s focus on state dignity.118 Indeed, given the seemingly oxymoronic concept of state dignity, one
is tempted to find some justification for the Court’s continued reliance on it. This Article does not dispute the validity, as a descriptive matter, of the expressivist account. Instead, it suggests that,
wholly aside from any expressive rationale for the Court’s invocation of state dignity, in focusing on state dignity the Court is engaged in a much more conventional judicial enterprise, albeit one
that the Court has conducted below the radar screen.
In stressing the dignity of the states, the Court appears to have
drawn on a related, but distinct, line of cases: those concerned with
the immunity of foreign states under the law of nations.119 To be
sure, it is true, as the current Court’s majority has insisted, that the
Court in the late nineteenth century referred to state dignity in its
decisions addressing the scope of state immunity from suit.120 It is
116

Professor Caminker notes that it is doubtful that the Court could correctly predict
how people “will perceive and internalize judicial protection of states from private
damages claims,” and that, in any event, “one might worry about the practical—and
even expressive!—implications of having courts intentionally engage in social engineering.” Id. at 90–91.
117
Id. at 91.
118
But cf. Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism,
1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 142 (“[A]n intrinsic, expressive theory of federalism doctrine,
to be plausible, must presuppose some objective semantic rules for attaching ‘meanings’ to acts of federal legislation. But we know of no such rules independent of the
federalism values at stake in this area . . . . Because the anticommandeering doctrines
cannot . . . be otherwise justified on federalism grounds, the expressive story fails as
well.”).
119
One commentator recently came close to suggesting this connection between
state sovereign immunity doctrine and the law of nations. See Thomas H. Lee, Making
Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1027 (2002). Professor Thomas Lee argues that the text of the Eleventh
Amendment incorporates the law-of-nations rule of foreign state sovereign immunity.
See infra notes 158–62. Professor Lee does not, however, attempt to assess how the
Court’s current theory of state dignity conforms to this view of the Eleventh Amendment, or even to suggest that the Court’s current reliance on the notion of state dignity is in fact an attempt to rely on principles of the law of nations. Instead, Professor
Lee’s article is concerned principally with understanding the meaning of the text of
the Eleventh Amendment and its Framers’ intent.
120
See infra notes 275–86 and accompanying text.
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equally true, as Justice Stevens has observed in dissent, that Chief
Justice Marshall long ago dismissed the rationale as a justification
for the doctrine of (American) state sovereign immunity.121 But the
discussion that follows of these earlier state sovereign immunity
decisions clearly demonstrates that the rationale of state dignity
has its roots beyond its immediate context.
Before discussing those state sovereign immunity decisions, however, this Article turns to a consideration of the cases from which the
notion of state dignity appears to derive: cases concerning the law of
nations and the immunity of one nation in the courts of another. The
concept of state dignity is not alien to the jurisprudence of foreign
state sovereign immunity. To the contrary, as explained below, the
decisions applying the law of nations often refer to state dignity to
underscore the importance of courts recognizing the equal status of
the sovereign nations whose interests collide in a judicial forum. The
language of state dignity, although at first blush an inappropriate anthropomorphization, thus makes some sense in this context.
II. DOCTRINAL ORIGINS OF STATE DIGNITY
A. The Origins of Sovereign Immunity in American Jurisprudence
To appreciate the significance of the Court’s invocation of state
dignity in its state sovereign immunity cases, it is essential to understand the context from which that concept derives. As explained in
detail below, that context is the doctrine of foreign state sovereign
immunity. As a preliminary matter, however, it is important to distinguish between two related yet distinct doctrines addressing the immunity of sovereign states from suit. The first—the English commonlaw doctrine of sovereign immunity—in fact “comprises two distinct
rules.”122 One, which limited the substantive reach of the law, held that
“the King or the Crown, as the font of the law, is not bound by the
law’s provisions.”123 This rule rested on the notion that, in Black121

See infra notes 254–60 and accompanying text (discussing Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)).
122
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting);
see also Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1963) (“[T]he immunity of the sovereign from suit (sovereign
immunity) and his capacity to violate or not violate the law (‘the King can do no
wrong’) are distinct and independent concepts . . . .”).
123
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 102–03 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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stone’s words, “the king himself can do no wrong.”124 Although this
maxim suggests that the King is above the law—and, indeed, that is
the meaning the maxim came to enjoy—it “originally meant precisely
the contrary to what it later came to mean.”125 According to Professor
Louis Jaffe, the phrase originally meant that “the king must not, was
not allowed, not entitled, to do wrong.”126 As it evolved, however, “the
king can do no wrong” took on the meaning that the King was “not
only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong; he can
never mean to do an improper thing.”127 The fiction that the King can
do no wrong is, of course, entirely foreign in a system of popular sovereignty,128 and accordingly was received quite hostilely in early postratification decisions.129
The other rule of the English common law was that “the King or
Crown, as the font of justice, is not subject to suit in its own courts.”130
This doctrine, which was jurisdictional in nature, “had its origins in
the feudal system.”131 Under that system, “no lord could be sued by a
vassal in his own court, but each petty lord was subject to suit in the
courts of a higher lord. Since the King was at the apex of the feudal
pyramid, there was no higher court in which he could be sued.”132 Ac124

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *244.
Jaffe, supra note 122, at 4.
126
Id. (quoting Ludwik Ehrlich, No. XII: Proceedings Against the Crown (1216–
1377), in 6 Oxford Studies Soc. & Legal Hist. 42 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1921)); see
also 1 Blackstone, supra note 124, at *246 (“[T]he prerogative of the crown extends
not to do any injury.”).
127
1 Blackstone, supra note 124, at *246 (emphasis omitted).
128
See, e.g., The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“The history of
the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all
having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States.”);
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 n.24 (1997) (“Although we have adopted the related doctrine of sovereign immunity, the common-law fiction that [the King can do
now wrong] was rejected at the birth of the Republic.”); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,
415 (1979) (“We must, of course, reject the fiction. It was rejected by the colonists
when they declared their independence from the Crown . . . .”); Langford v. United
States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879) (“We do not understand that either in reference to
the government of the United States, or of the several States, or of any of their officers, the English maxim [the King can do no wrong] has an existence in this country.”).
129
The most important of these early decisions was Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419, 458, 471–72 (1793); see discussion infra notes 221–53 and accompanying text.
130
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 103 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
131
Hall, 440 U.S. at 414.
132
Id. at 414–15 (citing 1 Sir Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The
History of English Law: Before The Time of Edward I, at 518 (2d ed. 1899) (noting
125
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cordingly, this rule, which was well established in England as early
as the thirteenth century,133 barred individuals from bringing suit
against a sovereign in its own courts.134 This Article refers to this
doctrine as “English common-law sovereign immunity.”
A distinct, albeit related, doctrine—also part of the legal consciousness at the time of the Framing—accorded sovereign nations
immunity in the courts of other sovereigns. “This source of sovereign immunity owed less to the common law than to the law of nations.”135 Under an interpretation of the law of nations that has
changed little since the Revolutionary period, courts of one nation
generally refused to entertain actions against other sovereign nations. This doctrine was based on the “perfect equality[] and entire
independence of all distinct states.”136 Given this parity of status, it
was thought that disputes between sovereigns should be resolved
through diplomatic relations,137 or through war,138 rather than by
that the fact “that there happens to be in this world no court above [the King’s] court
is, we may say, an accident.”)).
133
See Clyde E. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 5
(1972); Jaffe, supra note 122, at 2.
134
As Professor Louis Jaffe persuasively demonstrated, however, in England the
doctrine that the “King cannot be sued without his consent . . . has not meant that the
subject was without remedy.” Jaffe, supra note 122, at 1. He explained:
From time immemorial many claims affecting the Crown could be pursued in
the regular courts if they did not take the form of a suit against the Crown. And
when it was necessary to sue the Crown eo nomine consent apparently was
given as of course. . . . Where the doctrine was in form applicable the subject
had to proceed by petition of right, a cumbersome, dilatory remedy to be sure,
but nevertheless a remedy. If the subject was the victim of illegal official action,
in many cases he could sue the King’s officers for damages. And the writs of
certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus ran against many official boards and commissions . . . .
Id.
135
James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in StateParty Cases, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 555, 582 (1994).
136
1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 21 (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
ed., 12th ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1878).
137
Under the doctrine of espousal, the remedy of an individual aggrieved by the act
of a foreign state was to appeal to his own government to seek redress through diplomatic channels. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 259–60 (1796) (Iredell, J.,
concurring).
138
See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135–46
(1812); see also discussion infra notes 176–202 and accompanying text. Early
commentators on the law of nations sometimes justified this doctrine by reference to
the distinction between the sovereign as an entity (or, in the case of a monarchy, a
person) and the individuals who were citizens or subjects of the sovereign. For
example, Emmerich de Vattel, the leading treatise writer on the law of nations in the
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forcing one sovereign to submit to the commands of another sovereign’s courts. This Article refers to this strand of sovereign immunity doctrine as “foreign state sovereign immunity.”139
The current doctrinal debate over the appropriate status of state
sovereign immunity in our constitutional system has tended to focus, at least ostensibly, on English common-law sovereign immunity. As Professor James Pfander has explained, “[t]wo schools of
thought prevail regarding the history of sovereign immunity in the
period preceding the framing and ratification of the Constitution.”140 One school believes that the states inherited common-law
sovereign immunity—which they hold to be a “fundamental precept of Anglo-American law”—following the Declaration of Independence, and that the “framers reaffirmed their immunity during
the constitutional ratification debates.”141 The other school emphasizes that “even in Great Britain, the doctrine did not establish a

Emmerich de Vattel, the leading treatise writer on the law of nations in the eighteenth century, explained that “[n]o individual, though ever so free and independent,
can be placed in competition with the sovereign; this would be to put a single person
alone upon an equality with an united multitude of his equals.” 2 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct
and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns § 35, at 209 (Northampton, Mass., Simeon Butler 4th Am. ed. 1820) (1758); see Lee, supra note 119, at 1033. Accordingly, an individual of one sovereign could not force another sovereign to be subject to suit.
139
Professor James Pfander refers to it as “law-of-nations” immunity. Pfander, supra
note 135, at 559; see also Alfred Hayes, Private Claims Against Foreign Sovereigns,
38 Harv. L. Rev. 599, 599 (1925) (“[I]mmunity of a foreign sovereign is not identical
with immunity of the local sovereign.”); Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and
Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the
Public-Lands Cases, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 867, 886 (1970) (distinguishing between “the
principles governing the amenability of a state to suit before its own courts and those
governing its amenability to suit before the courts of another sovereign”). I have chosen the term “foreign state sovereign immunity” because application of the doctrine
necessarily requires two sovereigns: the forum sovereign and the foreign sovereign
who is sued in the forum sovereign’s courts. English common-law sovereign immunity, in contrast, only contemplates one sovereign: the one that is immune from suit in
its own courts.
140
Pfander, supra note 135, at 578.
141
Id. at 578–79 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11–15 (1890)); see, e.g., Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999) (“When the Constitution was ratified, it was
well established in English law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in
its own courts . . . . Although the American people had rejected other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.”).
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complete bar to relief against either the crown or its officers,”142
and maintains that “Americans had substituted the sovereignty of
the people for the sovereignty of the crown and had secured limitations on governmental power through adoption of written constitutions.”143 Whatever the merits of these competing views, the principal point of dispute has tended to be the degree to which, or
whether, the constitutional structure incorporated English common-law sovereign immunity.
Regardless of the Court’s current view of the origins of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity—a view that is, as explained below, generally ambivalent and cryptically expressed—it makes
some sense to distinguish between those cases that involve the circumstances specific to English common-law sovereign immunity
and those that involve the circumstances specific to foreign state
sovereign immunity. Because the former generally applied only
when the sovereign was sued in its own courts, English commonlaw sovereign immunity is the logical doctrinal ancestor when an
individual sues a state in the state’s own courts144—at least when a
state is sued under a cause of action created by its own laws.145 Foreign state sovereign immunity, on the other hand, is the logical
doctrinal source when a state is sued in federal court—a court of
“another” sovereign.146

142

Pfander, supra note 135, at 580 (citing Jaffe, supra note 122, at 16–18).
Id. (citing John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889, 1896–99 (1983), and Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1438–51 (1987)); see, e.g.,
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102–04 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(discussing English common-law sovereign immunity and then arguing that
“[w]hatever the scope of sovereign immunity might have been in the Colonies, however, or during the period of Confederation, the proposal to establish a National
Government under the Constitution drafted in 1787 presented a prospect unknown to
the common law prior to the American experience”).
144
See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 715–16, 733–35, 741–42 (discussing English common
law).
145
Cf. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (“A sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends.”). Justice Holmes’s formulation of sovereign immunity is discussed infra notes 315–20 and accompanying text.
146
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69 (invoking “the much more fundamental
‘jurisprudence in all civilized nations’” (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17
(1890)); see also Scalia, supra note 139.
143
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This is not to suggest that either doctrine has any place in
American constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, the main jurisprudential debate in current state sovereign immunity decisions is over
the extent to which the states obtained (or retained) immunity
from suit upon ratification of the Constitution. Moreover, the relevance of the two doctrines of sovereign immunity is complicated by
the fact that states are not wholly sovereign entities. Thus, it is
strained to suggest that, with respect to the several states, the
courts of the United States are the courts of “another” sovereign.
But understanding the source of immunity that the states enjoy
under current doctrine is essential to assessing that doctrine.
There is some disagreement about the doctrinal origins of the
states’ immunity from suit. As suggested above and explained in
greater detail below, the current debates on the Court tend to focus, at least explicitly, on the English common law. Moreover, the
early post-ratification practice suggests that the Court saw little
place for the law-of-nations doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity in cases involving suits against the several states, although
the early Court was not particularly receptive to claims based on
the English common law, either.
But several commentators have argued that the states, at one
time or another, enjoyed foreign state sovereign immunity. For example, Professors James Pfander and Caleb Nelson147 have separately argued that the pre-ratification case of Nathan v. Virginia148
demonstrates that the states enjoyed foreign state sovereign immunity in the courts of other states under the Articles of Confederation.149 In that case, the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas
147

Professor Nelson actually suggests that it is not entirely clear that the Framers
consistently distinguished between what is referred to here as “English common-law
sovereign immunity” and “foreign state sovereign immunity,” but suggests that the
distinction is not particularly important, because “in America, sovereign immunity
operated through the same mechanism in both contexts.” Nelson, supra note 20, at
1574–75 n.70.
148
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77 (Pa. C.P. 1781).
149
See Nelson, supra note 20, at 1578–79; id. at 1577 (“[T]here was broad consensus
about the states’ immunity from suit under the Articles.”); id. at 1575 (arguing that
the dominant view among the Framers before ratification was that “courts could not
adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims against a sovereign unless the sovereign voluntarily appeared or otherwise consented to suit, because there was no other way to bring the
sovereign within a court’s power and because a court could not proceed to judgment
against defendants who were not at least constructively before it”); Pfander, supra
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dismissed an action brought against the Commonwealth of Virginia
by Simon Nathan to recover a debt that the Commonwealth allegedly owed him. Nathan sought a writ to attach some military uniforms that belonged to Virginia but were in Philadelphia. After receiving a request from Virginia, the Supreme Executive Council of
Pennsylvania ordered the sheriff not to return the writ to the court.
During argument before the court, William Bradford, Pennsylvania’s Attorney General, argued that the action should be dismissed, and the Court agreed.150 Subsequent accounts of the case
reveal Bradford’s argument that subjecting Virginia to suit would
violate the immunity of the state under the law of nations, and that
the court accepted that view.151
That the states may have enjoyed foreign state sovereign immunity in each other’s courts before ratification, however, does not
answer whether they enjoyed it after ratification. Professor Pfander
argues that although, in light of the decision in Nathan, “the framers of the Constitution considered [law-of-nations] sovereign immunity a substantial hurdle to securing state compliance with the
plan of the convention,”152 they addressed this concern by abrogating the states’ immunity through inclusion of the Original Jurisdiction Clause in Article III.153 Professor Nelson argues that whether
the Framers thought that the states enjoyed law-of-nations immunity after the ratification is a close question. Instead, he offers a
novel and sophisticated account under which the federal courts
lack subject matter jurisdiction over suits within the literal text of

note 135, at 586–87 (citing contemporaneous accounts and asserting that “[t]he disposition of Nathan in favor of law-of-nations immunity deserves to be viewed as a decisive rejection of state suability in the courts of other states”).
150
See Nathan, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 78 n.(a).
151
See id. (account of Alexander Dallas); Nelson, supra note 20, at 1579–80 n.95
(quoting Letter from Joseph Reed to Virginia Delegates (July 10, 1781), in 3 The Papers of James Madison 187 n.2 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds.,
1963)). Alexander Hamilton also apparently believed that the states’ immunity from
suit derived from the law of nations. See The Federalist No. 81, at 487–88 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Nelson, supra note 20, at 1577–78; Pfander,
supra note 135, at 581 n.99. The Supreme Court has since held that the Constitution
does not prevent one state from entertaining a suit against another state. See Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421, 426–27 (1979); discussion infra notes 259–62 and accompanying
text.
152
Pfander, supra note 135, at 587.
153
See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Pfander, supra note 135, at 560.
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the Eleventh Amendment, and the states enjoy a “personal jurisdiction” type of sovereign immunity in other suits against them.154
In contrast, then-Professor Antonin Scalia, who also recognized
the difference between what he called “‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’
sovereign immunity,”155 argued (albeit rather cursorily)156 that the
states continue to enjoy the latter as a matter of constitutional law.
According to then-Professor Scalia, “[t]he eleventh amendment to
the Constitution embodies only that ‘foreign’ immunity, protecting
the states from being sued before federal tribunals by citizens of
other states or nations.”157 Professor Thomas Lee recently provided
a more comprehensive justification for this account of the Eleventh
Amendment. Professor Lee argues that the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment is best explained as an attempt to “incorporate
into the Constitution, in recognition of the sovereign equality of
the States, the classical international law rule that only states have
rights against other states.”158 Under this view, “[t]he Amendment
is essentially just a negative formulation of the affirmative international rule, namely, a foreign citizen may not sue a sovereign
state.”159 That international rule, Professor Lee explains, was intended to protect sovereign dignity.
[Because the] atomized individual was . . . a nonentity with no
rights or duties so far as the law of nations was concerned, . . . to
recognize the rights of a citizen or subject of one state against a
foreign state . . . would imply that a fraction of the sovereignty of
one state was equal to the full sovereignty of another.160

This would “belittle the sovereign dignity of the latter state” by
“impeaching the irreducible equality and dignity” of that state in
the society of nations.161

154

See Nelson, supra note 20, at 1566.
Scalia, supra note 139, at 886.
156
Then-Professor Scalia made his observations about the states’ sovereign immunity in an article addressing judicial review of federal administrative action. Thus, he
discussed the states only briefly, by way of analogy. See id. at 886–88.
157
Id. at 886. For further consideration of then-Professor Scalia’s argument, see infra
notes 413–17 and accompanying text.
158
Lee, supra note 119, at 1028.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 1033.
161
Id. (discussing Vattel, supra note 138, at 208–09).
155
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Professor Lee’s cogent article may well “mak[e] sense of the Eleventh Amendment,” but it does not attempt to assess how the current Court’s particular theory of state dignity conforms to this view
of the Eleventh Amendment, or even suggest that the Court’s current reliance on the notion of state dignity is in fact an attempt to
rely on principles of the law of nations. To be sure, as demonstrated below, identifying customary international law as the doctrinal source of the notion of state dignity is an important first step
in understanding and assessing the Court’s current reliance on the
concept. But the real work of this project is to determine the implications for current state sovereign immunity doctrine of the Court’s
apparent invocation of the principles of customary international
law, which Professor Lee has not attempted.162
For the purposes of this Article, the important point is that English common-law sovereign immunity and foreign state sovereign
immunity historically had specific contexts for application. To help
demonstrate that proposition, this Article turns to a consideration
of the Court’s treatment of the doctrine of foreign state sovereign
immunity. It is in that doctrine that the concept of state dignity is
of paramount importance.
B. State Dignity and Foreign State Sovereign Immunity
1. The Law of Nations
As explained above, the doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity is part of the law of nations. The author of the most frequently cited eighteenth-century treatise on the law of nations,
Emmerich de Vattel, defined the law of nations as “[c]ertain max162

Professor Lee does offer two brief concluding thoughts about the implications of
his view of the Eleventh Amendment for current doctrine. Lee, supra note 119, at
1096. First, he argues that because the law of nations recognized a right to sue a state
for a violation of “fundamental law,” a U.S. citizen should be permitted to sue a state
for any constitutional violation, not just a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
Second, he concludes that, contrary to the Court’s decision in Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313 (1934), a foreign state should be permitted to sue a state in federal court.
Id. at 1096. Professor Lee does briefly criticize the Court for invoking a “boundless
principle of dignity,” noting that “the international law theory” relies on a notion of
dignity “that is based on the private citizens who constitute the State, not a dignity
that is separate from and superior to its citizens.” Id. at 1096–97. He does not, however, attempt further to analyze the implications of the Court’s reliance on the notion
of state dignity.
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ims and customs, consecrated by long use, and observed by nations
in their mutual intercourse with each other.”163 Although today the
law of nations is known as “customary international law,”164 its
definition has changed very little.165 As Professor Brad Clark has
explained, in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century the “law of nations was not ‘law’ as we usually think of it today—that is, a sovereign command . . . . Rather, . . . the law of nations was an identifiable body of rules and customs developed and
refined by a variety of nations over hundreds and, in some cases,
thousands of years.”166
At least in theory, the law of nations did not represent the decisions or interpretations of law of any one sovereign. Instead, “it existed by common practice and consent among a number of sovereigns.”167 In Blackstone’s words, because “none of [the individual
nations of the world] will acknowledge a superiority in the other,
[the law of nations] cannot be dictated by any.”168 Sovereign nations
followed the law of nations’ customary rules not out of legal compulsion, but in order to “foster peaceful coexistence and to facilitate mutually beneficial transactions among their citizens. In essence, the law of nations operated as a set of background rules that
courts applied in the absence of any binding sovereign command to
the contrary.”169 When the United States declared and achieved independence, it embraced the law of nations as did other sovereign
nations in the world.170
163

Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations § 25, at 62 (Joseph Chitty ed., Phila., T.
& J.W. Johnson & Co. 1859) (1758) (emphasis in original).
164
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102
(1987).
165
Id. § 101 (defining international law as a set of “rules and principles of general
application dealing with the conduct of states and of international organizations and
with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons,
whether natural or juridical”). Of course the content of those rules and principles has
changed substantially over time.
166
Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1279 (1996).
167
William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1517 (1984).
168
1 Blackstone, supra note 124, at *43.
169
Clark, supra note 166, at 1280.
170
Shortly after the ratification and during the same year that he argued Chisholm v.
Georgia for the plaintiff, Attorney General Edmund Randolph advised the Secretary
of State that “[t]he law of nations, although not specially adopted by the constitution
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In the early days of the Republic, the law of nations supplied
background customs and norms in three principal substantive areas:171 commercial law (“law merchant”),172 admiralty law (“law
maritime”),173 and the law governing the rights and obligations of
sovereign states (dealing with such sensitive matters of foreign relations as war, neutrality, and immunity for other nations’ ambassadors).174 Given the obvious importance of these matters, particularly to a young nation eager to be accepted by the community of
nations, U.S. courts recognized and generally enforced the law of
nations in cases before them.175

or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land. Its obligation commences and runs with the existence of a nation . . . .” 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 26, 27 (1792).
On the force of the law of nations in the United States, see generally The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .”).
171
See generally Clark, supra note 166, at 1279–84 (explaining the mechanics of the
law of nations as it was historically applied in three principle categories).
172
Clark, supra note 166, at 1281. The law merchant was a body of uniform rules designed to promote trade among nations. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 124, at *75; see
also Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842) (relying on the law of nations in
formulating federal common law for commercial transactions).
173
As Professor Brad Clark noted:
Like the law merchant, the law maritime fostered trade among nations. But the
law maritime also served to maintain peace and harmony among nations. Failure to resolve admiralty and maritime disputes satisfactorily could create tensions among nations and even lead to war. Thus, nations had a strong incentive
to adhere to accepted rules and customs.
Clark, supra note 166, at 1281 n.168 (citing W. Mitchell, Essay on the Early History of
the Law Merchant 39–78 (1904)).
174
See Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815)
(“The law of nations is the great source from which we derive those rules, respecting
belligerent and neutral rights, which are recognized by all civilized and commercial
states throughout Europe and America.”). For the argument that judicial decisions in
the three principal areas of the law of nations do not constitute impermissible “federal
judge-made law,” but rather are “consistent with, and frequently required by, the constitutional structure,” see Clark, supra note 166, at 1251.
175
See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J.) (“When the
United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement.”) (emphasis omitted).
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2. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon
Early judicial decisions in several of the substantive areas embraced by the law of nations are replete with references to sovereign dignity. The classic and foundational example is the Supreme
Court’s decision in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.176 The
case involved a claim by two American citizens, John McFaddon
and William Greetham, that they were the rightful owners of the
Exchange, a boat that they alleged was forcibly taken from them
by persons acting under the orders of Napoleon, then the Emperor
of France, and refitted as an armed public vessel of France.177 When
the ship, after “encounter[ing] great stress of weather upon the
high seas,” landed in the port of Philadelphia, McFaddon and
Greetham filed a libel action in federal district court, attaching the
vessel and seeking its return.178 Neither the French captain nor any
other French official appeared in court to defend the claim; instead, France protested the libel action through diplomatic channels. In response, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania,
on instructions of the “executive department of the government of
the United States,” appeared to urge the court to dismiss the libel.179
The district court dismissed the action, but the circuit court reversed.180 As Professor Clark notes, “[i]t is difficult to overstate the
importance of this case at the time . . . . At the time of the circuit
court’s decision, the United States was on the brink of war with
England and could hardly afford war with France as well.”181 It is
also not difficult to see how resolution of the case would directly
affect relations with France. Chief Justice Marshall described the
question presented as “whether an American citizen can assert, in
an American court, a title to an armed [French] national vessel,
found within the waters of the United States.”182
To answer that question, Chief Justice Marshall drew on background principles of the law of nations.183 He started by noting the
176

11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
Id. at 117.
178
Id. at 118.
179
Id. at 117–19.
180
Id. at 119–20.
181
Clark, supra note 166, at 1307.
182
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 135.
183
See id. at 136 (discussing the “usages and received obligations of the civilized world”).
177
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tension between the “exclusive and absolute” jurisdiction of a “nation within its own territory,” on the one hand, and the need for
“relaxation” of that power in order to promote “intercourse with
each other [and] . . . an interchange of those good offices which
humanity dictates and its wants require,” on the other.184 The Chief
Justice explained that this tension—between the “equal rights and
equal independence” of distinct sovereignties and the “common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse”185—has “given rise to
a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to wave the
exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction,
which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation.”186
By “[waiving] . . . territorial jurisdiction,” Chief Justice Marshall
meant that the forum sovereign would, in cases in which a foreign
sovereign or one of its officers was hauled before one of the forum’s courts, decline to assert authority over the foreign sovereign.
This practice was the necessary corollary of the “perfect equality
and absolute independence of sovereigns”:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade
the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence
that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication,
and will be extended to him.187

Under the principles of the law of nations, the Court reasoned, the
same result must obtain when the “person of the sovereign” (in the
case of monarchs and emperors), the minister of a sovereign (that
is, an ambassador), or the public armed ship of a friendly sovereign
entered the territory of another sovereign. In each case, Chief Justice Marshall explained, assertion of jurisdiction would be incompatible with the “dignity” of the foreign sovereign.188 Accordingly,
184

Id.
Id. at 136–37.
Id. at 137.
187
Id. (emphasis added).
188
Under the law of nations, the “person of the sovereign” was immune from “arrest
or detention within a foreign territory” because “[a] foreign sovereign is not under185
186
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the Court held, as a “principle of public law,” that “national ships
of war, entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be considered as exempted by the consent of that
power from its jurisdiction,”189 and ordered the libel dismissed.
It is clear from this recital that the Court’s references to sovereign “dignity” were intended to underscore the status of the foreign sovereign in relation to the status of the forum sovereign. It
would undermine the absolute independence of one sovereign to
submit to the authority and jurisdiction of a another sovereign;
such submission would necessarily entail some diminution of the

stood as intending to subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with his dignity,
and the dignity of his nation, and it is to avoid this subjection that the license [to enter
the foreign state’s territory] has been obtained.” Id. at 137–38 (emphasis added). The
law of nations granted immunity to foreign ministers for the same reason:
The assent of the sovereign to the very important and extensive exemptions
from territorial jurisdiction which are admitted to attach to foreign ministers, is
implied from the considerations that, without such exemption, every sovereign
would hazard his own dignity by employing a public minister abroad . . . . A
sovereign committing the interests of his nation with a foreign power, to the
care of a person whom he has selected for that purpose, cannot intend to subject his minister in any degree to that power; and therefore, a consent to receive
him, implies a consent that he shall possess those privileges which his principal
intended he should retain—privileges which are essential to the dignity of his
sovereign, and to the duties he is bound to perform.
Id. at 138–39 (emphasis added). The same considerations mandated a background
principle in favor of immunity for public armed ships. Such a ship—
constitutes a part of the military force of her nation; acts under the immediate
and direct command of the sovereign; is employed by him in national objects.
He has many and powerful motives for preventing those objects from being defeated by the interference of a foreign state. Such interference cannot take
place without affecting his power and his dignity. The implied license therefore
under which such vessel enters a friendly port, may reasonably be construed,
and it seems to the Court, ought to be construed, as containing an exemption
from the jurisdiction of the sovereign, within whose territory she claims the
rights of hospitality.
Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
189
Id. at 145–46. The Court elaborated:
[T]he Exchange, being a public armed ship, in the service of a foreign sovereign,
with whom the government of the United States is at peace, and having entered
an American port open for her reception, on the terms on which ships of war
are generally permitted to enter the ports of a friendly power, must be considered as having come into the American territory, under an implied promise,
that while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she
should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.
Id. at 147.
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foreign state’s own sovereign authority.190 Such a state of affairs
would be highly problematic, given the “equal rights and equal independence” of the two sovereigns.191 The use of the term “dignity”
to illustrate this point is not anomalous. “Dignity” connotes,
among other things, “true worth, excellence”; “[h]onourable or
high estate; degree of estimation, rank”; and “[e]levated manner;
fit stateliness”;192 a nineteenth-century dictionary also mentions
“[h]eight; importance; [and] rank.”193 Recognition of the equal dignity—that is, the equal rank and importance—of the foreign sovereign depended on the forum nation’s courts declining to assert jurisdiction over the foreign nation.194

190

The Court accordingly has referred to sovereign dignity in cases involving the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign ambassadors, who are, after all, merely representatives of the sovereign. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 116–17
(1784) (explaining that under the law of nations, “[t]he person of a public minister is
sacred and inviolable” because if “his freedom of conduct is taken away, the business
of his sovereign cannot be transacted, and his dignity and grandeur will be tarnished”). See generally Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816)
(noting that cases affecting ambassadors “affect not only our internal policy, but our
foreign relations”).
191
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136.
192
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 671 (1993); see also Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 323 (10th ed. 1993) (defining “dignity” as, inter alia, “the
quality or state of being worthy, honored or esteemed,” and “high rank, office, or position”). According to a contemporaneous dictionary, the term “dignity” had much
the same meaning in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that it has today. See 2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, Longinan Hurst, Rees & Orme, 9th ed. 1805) (unpaginated) (defining dignity as “rank of
elevation,” “[g]randeur of mien; elevation of aspect,” and “[a]dvancement; preferment; high place”).
193
The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia 1615–16 (New York, Century Co. 1899).
194
To be sure, in the early cases the Court often used the term “dignity” to describe
an attribute of an individual sovereign, such as a king or emperor. One could plausibly argue, therefore, that the term, which was used in that context to refer to the
“quality of being worthy or honourable,” The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 671 (1993), is inapposite when referring to an incorporeal sovereign entity. Indeed, many casual readers of the Court’s recent state sovereign immunity decisions
likely have had precisely that reaction, and the dissenting Justices have often made
that point. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1881
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The reasons why the majority in Chisholm concluded that the ‘dignity’ interests underlying the sovereign immunity of English Monarchs had not been inherited by the original 13 States remain valid today.”); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 802–03 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for
“assum[ing] that this ‘dignity’ is a quality easily translated from the person of the King
to the participatory abstraction of a republican State”).
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To be sure, to deny the forum nation jurisdiction over a foreign
state when an official or instrumentality of the latter enters the
former’s territory is to permit some diminution of the forum nation’s sovereignty. The Court in The Schooner Exchange addressed
that problem by finding, in the absence of a legislative indication to
the contrary, an implied exemption for the foreign sovereign from
the forum sovereign’s jurisdiction. But precisely because of the
need to preserve the equal status of the forum sovereign, the Court
made clear that this immunity is merely a background principle of
the law of nations, subject to abrogation by an explicit act of ConThis critique is valid as far as it goes; Justice Souter surely is correct to argue that
the notion of “‘royal dignity,’” which (according to Blackstone) served to “‘distinguish the prince from his subjects’” and signified the monarch’s “great and transcendent nature,” is wholly “inimical to the republican conception, which rests on the understanding of its citizens precisely that the government is not above them, but of
them, its actions being governed by law just like their own.” Id. at 802 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 Blackstone, supra note 124, at *241). But Chief Justice Marshall
(and subsequent voices on the Court) did not purport to limit the notion of sovereign
dignity to monarchs. See, e.g, Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1943)
(“This case involves the dignity and rights of a friendly sovereign state . . . .”); United
States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875) (“One nation treats with the citizens of
another only through their government. A sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts
without his consent. His own dignity, as well as the dignity of the nation he represents,
prevents his appearance to answer a suit against him in the courts of another sovereignty, except in performance of his obligations, by treaty or otherwise, voluntarily
assumed.”). In The Schooner Exchange itself, the Court spoke of the “dignity and the
independence of a nation,” and the Court has often referred to the sovereign dignity
of the United States, which surely does not vest sovereign authority in any one individual. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145 (emphasis added); see, e.g., United States v. Bank of
N.Y. & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 480–81 (1936); Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S.
169, 178 (1903); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 220 (1901) (McKenna, J., dissenting)
(“All powers of government, placed in harmony under the Constitution; the rights
and liberties of every citizen secured—put to no hazard of loss or impairment; the
power of the nation also secured in its great station, enabled to move with strength
and dignity and effect among the other nations of the earth to such purpose as it may
undertake or to such destiny as it may be called.”). Similarly, when Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson famously sought an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court on
various matters arising under “the laws of nature and nations,” Letter from Thomas
Jefferson, Secretary of State, to Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices (July 18,
1793), in 3 The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 486, 486 (Henry P.
Johnston ed., Burt Franklin 1970) (1890–93), the Justices responded by acknowledging the importance of the questions “to the preservation of the rights, peace, and dignity of the United States,” but declined to decide them because of the separation of
powers. Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington
(Aug. 8, 1793), in 3 The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, supra, at 488,
488–89 (emphasis added).
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gress. As Chief Justice Marshall explained, “[w]ithout doubt, the
sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication . . . .”195 But, because in the arena of foreign relations the
courts’ role is necessarily limited,196 the Court made clear that it
would not lightly infer congressional intent to extend jurisdiction
over foreign nations: “until such power be exerted in a manner not
to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as having
imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would be
a breach of faith to exercise.”197
In other words, Congress has power to override a background
principle of the law of nations; but given the judiciary’s limited role
in foreign relations and the damage to harmonious relations that
likely would result from a judicial declaration that a foreign nation
is amenable to suit, the courts will refrain from questioning the
immunity of foreign nations without a clear statement from Congress. Chief Justice Marshall explained that this principle of judicial non-intervention in matters of foreign affairs recognizes the—
general inability of the judicial power to enforce its decisions in
cases of this description, from the consideration, that the sovereign power of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs
committed by a sovereign, that the questions to which such

195

The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.
The Constitution vests control over foreign relations in Congress and the President, not the courts. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427–28
(1964); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (“Governmental power
over internal affairs is distributed between the national government and the several
states. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government.”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 320–22 (1936). Congress has the power, among other things, to “declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; to “raise and support Armies,” id. art.
I, § 8, cl. 12; to “provide and maintain a Navy,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13; to “regulate commerce with foreign Nations,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; and to “lay and collect . . . Duties,
Imports and Excises,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The President “shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States,” id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, and has the power
(subject to Senate confirmation) to “make Treaties” and “nominate . . . [and] appoint
Ambassadors [and] other public Ministers and Consuls,” id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This constitutional allocation of authority is intended in part to ensure that the courts do not
“imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.”
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918).
197
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.
196
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wrongs give birth are rather questions of policy than of law, that
they are for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion . . . .198

The courts’ refusal to entertain a suit against a foreign sovereign
absent an explicit conferral of jurisdiction from Congress is one
manifestation of the “political question” doctrine.199
198

Id.
As Professor Laurence Tribe has explained, the political question “doctrine” is
really a collection of distinct theories about the role of the Court “with regard to the
other branches of the government.” Tribe, supra note 52, § 3-13, at 366. Under the
“doctrine,” the Court declines to adjudicate a matter that is more properly left for decision by the political branches. According to Justice Brennan:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although
each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
The Court has long treated many questions implicating U.S. relations with foreign
nations as akin to political questions, not amenable to judicial resolution, at least absent authorization from Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 610, 634 (1818) (noting that when a foreign nation is in the midst of civil war,
questions regarding which faction constitutes the nation’s legitimate government “are
generally rather political than legal in their character. They belong more properly to
those . . . who can place the nation in such a position with respect to foreign powers as
to their own judgment shall appear wise; to whom are entrusted all its foreign relations . . . .”); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815) (stating that when and
how to retaliate against a foreign nation “is for the consideration of the government
not of its Courts”); Armitz Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128–29
(1814) (“When war breaks out, the question, what shall be done with enemy property
in our country, is a question rather of policy than of law. The rule which we apply to
the property of our enemy, will be applied by him to the property of our citizens. Like
all other questions of policy it is proper for the consideration of a department which
can modify it at will; and for the consideration of a department which can pursue only
the law as it is written. It is proper for the consideration of the legislature, not of the
executive or judiciary.”).
The act of state doctrine, which holds that because “[e]very sovereign state is bound
to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, . . . the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within
its own territory,” is another variant of the political question doctrine in the context of
199
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This principle of judicial nonintervention in cases involving foreign states’ sovereign immunity sheds light on the Court’s references to sovereign dignity. Because Congress (the “sovereign
power of the nation”) has authority to open the courts to suits
against foreign nations, it follows that sovereign dignity (in the
meaning of the law of nations) is not necessarily (or at least not
impermissibly) offended by suit in another sovereign’s courts.
Rather, the Court made a slightly more subtle point: The “perfect
equality and absolute independence of sovereigns”—that is to say,
the equal dignity of distinct sovereignties—requires that an assertion of jurisdiction by one sovereign over another be made by the
“sovereign power of the nation [that] is alone competent” to do
so.200 In the United States, because such power does not rest in the
courts, but rather is vested in the political branches,201 it would be
inconsistent with the sovereign status of a foreign state—and thus

foreign relations. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); see id. (“Redress
of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.”); see also First Nat’l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972) (plurality opinion) (stating
that both the act of state and foreign state sovereign immunity doctrines are “judicially created to effectuate general notions of comity among nations and among the
respective branches of the Federal Government”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (“[The act of state doctrine] arises out of the basic
relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers . . . . The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the
Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.”).
200
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137, 146.
201
In The Schooner Exchange, Attorney General Pinkney, appearing for the United
States, urged that “the executive department . . . alone represents the sovereignty of
the nation in its intercourse with other nations.” Id. at 132. In Armitz Brown, however, the Court suggested that the exercise of sovereign prerogatives “is proper for
the consideration of the legislature, not of the executive or judiciary.” 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) at 129. The Court today finds the question a bit more complicated. Compare
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. at 768 (plurality opinion) (concluding that “where
the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary responsibility for the conduct of
foreign affairs, expressly represents to the Court that application of the act of state
doctrine would not advance the interests of American foreign policy, that doctrine
should not be applied by the courts”), with id. at 787–88 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a statement from the Executive Branch is insufficient to confer jurisdiction
over a foreign state for an act of that state within its territory).
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degrading to its dignity—for a court to assert jurisdiction over it
without permission from Congress.202
3. The Schooner Exchange’s Legacy
The Court has consistently adhered to The Schooner Exchange
Court’s understanding of the meaning of sovereign dignity in the
foreign state sovereign immunity context.203 Moreover, although
the Court in The Schooner Exchange announced a cautious rule of
construction for deciding whether Congress has intended to confer
jurisdiction over foreign states,204 its suggestion that Congress possesses the power to override the law of nations (as long as it speaks
unmistakably) has been confirmed by an unbroken line of subsequent precedent.205 Of particular importance here, the Court has
202

The Court has suggested that to do so would also be degrading to the political
branches of the United States. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882)
(“[T]he judicial department of this government follows the action of the political
branch, and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.”).
203
See, e.g., Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (“[T]he judicial seizure of a vessel of a friendly foreign state is so serious a challenge to its dignity, and
may so affect our friendly relations with it, that courts are required to accept and follow the executive determination that the vessel is immune.”); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 354 (1822) (noting the “general proposition” that “all
persons and property within the territorial jurisdiction of a sovereign, are amenable to
the jurisdiction of himself or his Courts: and that the exceptions to this rule are such
only as by common usage, and public policy, have been allowed, in order to preserve
the peace and harmony of nations, and to regulate their intercourse in a manner best
suited to their dignity and rights”); L’Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238, 256 (1816)
(holding that if a district court could exercise jurisdiction over libel claim for seized
French private armed ship, “it would have detracted from the dignity and equality of
sovereign states, by reducing one to the condition of a suitor in the courts of another”) (emphasis added).
204
In Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, Chief Justice Marshall first announced the basic principle that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). See generally Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International
Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1103, 1135–52
(1990) (describing The Schooner Charming Betsy and the important implications of its
holding). In The Schooner Exchange, the Court applied this canon of construction to a
foreign state’s sovereign immunity under the law of nations. See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at
135–36.
205
See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 610–11 (1992); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1989); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486, 493–98 (1983) (holding that Congress had authority to pass the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: “[F]oreign
sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States,
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recognized Congress’s authority to abrogate foreign states’ law-ofnations sovereign immunity.
Although the Court acknowledged at least as long ago as The
Schooner Exchange that Congress possesses authority to subject
foreign states to suit in courts in the United States, Congress did
not exercise that power until 1976. Indeed, until at least the early
twentieth century, Congress’s silence led to the general conclusion
that the sovereign immunity of foreign states was without exception. As trade and other commercial activities increased after the
turn of the century—both among states and between states and
private parties—however, persons aggrieved by the conduct of foreign states began to argue that those states should not enjoy immunity for that activity.206 In 1926, the Supreme Court rejected this
argument, reaffirming that, in the absence of a contrary indication
from Congress, a foreign state and its property are immune from

and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution.”); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro,
271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (“The decision in The Exchange . . . cannot be taken as excluding merchant ships held and used by a government from the principles there announced. On the contrary, if such ships come within those principles, they must be
held to have the same immunity as war ships, in the absence of a treaty or statute of the
United States evincing a different purpose.”) (emphasis added); The Marianna Flora,
24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40 (1826) (stating that although congressional departures from
the law of nations may adversely affect foreign relations, “whatever may be the responsibility incurred by the nation to foreign powers, in executing such laws, there can
be no doubt, that Courts of justice are bound to obey and administer them”); La
Amistad de Rues, 18 U.S. 385, 389–91 (1820) (noting that the “general law of nations”
provides that “whenever a capture is made by any belligerent in violation of our neutrality, if the prize come voluntarily within our jurisdiction, it shall be restored to the
original owners . . . . Until Congress shall choose to prescribe a different rule, this
Court will, in cases of this nature, confine itself to the exercise of the simple authority
to decree restitution, and decline all inquires into question of damages for asserted
wrongs”); see also Louis Henkin, International Law As Law in the United States, 82
Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1568 (1984) (“[E]very State has the power—I do not say the legal
right—to denounce or breach its treaties, or to violate obligations of customary international law. The Constitution does not allude to such power, but it is inconceivable
that the Constitution intended to make it impossible or impermissible—
unconstitutional—for the United States to violate a treaty or other international obligation.”).
206
See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States ch. 5,
subch. A, Intro. Note, at 391 (1987). Most of the arguments for an exception to the
general rule of immunity were based on the assertion that “immunity deprived private
parties that dealt with a state of their judicial remedies, and gave states an unfair advantage in competition with private commercial enterprise.” Id.
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the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in all cases.207 During that same year,
however, some European and other nations signed an international
agreement declaring that state-owned merchant vessels, and the
nations that owned them, were subject to suit under the same rules
of liability as similarly situated private parties.208
After the Second World War demonstrated some of the defects
of a system built on the absolute immunity of sovereign states,
momentum developed to apply a “restrictive” principle of immunity, which would deny immunity at least for suits arising out of
commercial transactions.209 In the 1950s, the U.S. Department of
State adopted the restrictive theory of foreign state sovereign immunity, and made “suggestions” of immunity to U.S. courts based
on that theory.210 In order to provide clearer standards for the rec207

See Berizzi Brothers, 271 U.S. at 576. Berizzi Brothers involved the question
“whether a ship owned and possessed by a foreign government, and operated by it in
the carriage of merchandise for hire, is immune from arrest under process based on a
libel in rem by a private suitor in a federal district court exercising admiralty jurisdiction.” Id. at 570. The Court noted that The Schooner Exchange had involved an
armed vessel of a foreign nation, as opposed to a commercial vessel, but concluded
that—
the principles are applicable alike to all ships held and used by a government
for a public purpose, and that when, for the purpose of advancing the trade of
its people or providing revenue for its treasury, a government acquires, mans
and operates ships in the carrying trade, they are public ships in the same sense
that war ships are.
Id. at 574. The Court made clear, however, that it would reach a different conclusion
if there were “a treaty or statute of the United States evincing a different purpose.”
Id.
208
See Convention for the Verification of Certain Rules Relating to the Immunity of
State-owned Vessels, April 10, 1926, art. I, 176 L.N.T.S. 199; Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States ch. 5, subch. A, Intro. Note at 391
(1987) (citing 2 Hackworth Digest of International Law 463 (1941)).
209
See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States ch. 5,
subch. A, Intro. Note, at 391–92 (1987).
210
The Executive Branch’s practice of urging the courts to grant immunity to foreign
sovereigns began at least as early as The Schooner Exchange, in which the Attorney
General urged the Court to recognize France’s immunity. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117–18. In 1943, the Court ruled in Ex Parte Republic of
Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), that “courts are required to accept and follow” such a suggestion of immunity by the Executive, to avoid “embarrass[ing] the latter by assuming
an antagonistic jurisdiction.” Id. at 588 (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209
(1882)); see also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (“[It is a]
guiding principle in determining [a court’s] . . . jurisdiction . . . that the courts should
not so act as to embarrass the executive arm.”). In 1952, Jack B. Tate, the Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, set forth the Department’s adoption of the
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ognition of foreign state sovereign immunity,211 Congress in 1976
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which codified the
restrictive theory of immunity.212
The Act confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts over
civil actions against foreign states,213 and abrogates immunity under
various circumstances, including when the challenged conduct is
“commercial” rather than public.214 The Act is vague on certain important points—including what constitutes commercial activity215—
but for our purposes the particulars of practice under the Act are
less crucial than the principle demonstrated by the Act: Congress
can—at least as a matter of U.S. law216—regulate and abrogate the
immunity to which foreign states are otherwise entitled in U.S.
courts, their sovereign dignity notwithstanding. The Supreme Court
expressly held as much when it upheld the constitutionality of the
Act.217
restrictive theory of immunity in a letter to the Acting Attorney General. See Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–15 (1976) (quoting
Jack B. Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to
Foreign Governments, 26 Dep’t St. Bull. 984, 985 (1952)). The quoted statement,
which came to be known as the “Tate Letter,” served as the basis for suggestions of
immunity until the 1970s. See Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law
353 (2d ed. 1993).
211
See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000) (“Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States in conformity with
the principles set forth in this chapter.”).
212
Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611 (2000)).
213
28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2000).
214
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000). The Act makes immunity the default, subject to
the exceptions identified in the Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000) (“Subject to existing
international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States and of the States except as provided [in the Act].”).
215
See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2000) (“A ‘commercial activity’ means either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The
commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of
the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose.”).
216
It is an open question whether international law—in the sense of a body of laws
to which all sovereign nations are subject—permits one nation to abrogate the immunity of another nation. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act—like the decision in
The Schooner Exchange—must be viewed ultimately as U.S. law, albeit the United
States’ interpretation of international law.
217
See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491–97 (1983). Professor James Pfander and then-Professor Antonin Scalia have suggested that, under the
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III. DOCTRINAL INTERMINGLING
The concept of state dignity thus has a well-established meaning
in the context of foreign state sovereign immunity. The Court’s recent reliance on state dignity as a basis for decision in its state sovereign immunity cases can plausibly be seen as drawing on the foreign state sovereign immunity cases. In fact, the Court’s recent
state sovereign immunity cases are not novel in their references to
state dignity, although their suggestion that the states’ dignity is the
primary justification for the states’ broad immunity is new. During
the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court periodically referred to the states’ dignity in state sovereign immunity
cases. In addition, in that period the Court occasionally made explicit, albeit cryptic, references in its state sovereign immunity decisions to customary international law. A review of the cases reveals
that reliance on the state dignity rationale has tended to coincide
with broader efforts by the Court to restrict federal power in the
American conception of the law of nations at the time of the framing, a sovereign’s
immunity from suit in another sovereign’s courts was not defeasible by the forum sovereign. See Pfander, supra note 135, at 582 n.102; Scalia, supra note 139, at 886. Both
draw this conclusion from Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77 (Pa. C.P. 1781).
As the discussion above makes clear, The Schooner Exchange and its progeny appear to refute this claim. See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146 (“Without doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication [of immunity].”); see also
supra notes 176–202 and accompanying text. Regardless of the understanding of the
law of nations elsewhere, the U.S. courts’ interpretation of the law of nations has been
consistently clear on the authority of the legislature to permit suits in its own courts
against foreign sovereigns. See Clark, supra note 166, at 1283 (“Because the law of
nations did not appear to consist of sovereign commands, the courts of one sovereign
had no authority to bind those of another as to the proper content of that law. Rather,
the courts of each sovereign considered themselves free to exercise independent
judgment in cases arising under the law of nations.”). As explained above, although it
surely is correct that courts would not entertain an action by an individual against a
foreign sovereign without a clear statement from the legislature abrogating immunity,
the U.S. courts’ interpretation of the law of nations is quite clear on the authority of
the legislature to permit such suits. Professor Pfander presumably would have no
quibble with the bottom line—that Congress can subject the states to suit in federal
court—because he concludes that the Original Jurisdiction Clause of the Constitution,
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, amounted to a constitutional abrogation of the states’
law-of-nations immunity. See Pfander, supra note 135, at 558–62. Justice Scalia, however, has argued that the states’ law-of-nations immunity survived the framing. See
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[T]he States entered
the federal system with their sovereignty intact . . . .”). This makes his (I think erroneous) view about the absolute nature of law-of-nations immunity all the more problematic. See infra notes 403–04 and accompanying text.
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name of state autonomy; the current focus on state dignity is consistent with that trend.
A. The Early Cases: Evaluating the Pathology
The case most consistently cited by the modern Court for the
proposition that “[t]he very object and purpose of the 11th
Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to
the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private
parties” is In re Ayers,218 which the Court decided in 1887. Judicial
invocations of state dignity in this context in fact date back at least
to 1857, when the Court decided Beers v. Arkansas.219 But for the
first sixty-five years after the ratification, the Court either eschewed or affirmatively rejected arguments based on state dignity
in its state sovereign immunity decisions.
1. Chisholm v. Georgia
Any consideration of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity
must begin with the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v.
Georgia.220 The suit arose out of a contract for war supplies between a South Carolina merchant and the State of Georgia. The
merchant’s executor sued Georgia in the United States Supreme
Court, invoking Article III’s grant of original jurisdiction to that
Court over “Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State.”221 Georgia “presented to the Court a written remonstrance and protestation . . . against the exercise of jurisdiction in
the cause,” but “declined taking any part in arguing the question”
before the Court.222 Accordingly, the Court heard only from Edmund
Randolph, one of the Framers of the Constitution, the Attorney
General of the United States, and counsel for the plaintiff. Because
of Randolph’s role in the framing—and because the ink on the
218

123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) (emphasis added).
61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857).
220
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
221
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 cl. 1; Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 450 (opinion of Blair,
J.).
222
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419. The remonstrance was actually a resolution that
the Georgia House of Representatives passed after Chisholm filed his suit in the Supreme Court. See 5 Documentary History of the Supreme Court 132 (Maeva Marcus
ed., 1994).
219
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Constitution had not yet dried when the Court heard argument in
Chisholm—his argument to the Court merits thorough consideration here.
Randolph’s argument that a state was subject to a damages action in federal court turned principally on the language of Article
III,223 which appeared plainly to embrace disputes to which a state
was a party. But for support, Randolph relied on “the relation in
which the States stand to the Federal Government,”224 on the “law
of nations, on the subject of suing sovereigns,”225 and on the fact
that there would not be any “embarrassment attending the mode
of executing a decree against a State.”226 In other words, Randolph
argued that the novel American theory of sovereignty left no place
for “sovereign immunity”; that, in any event, the practice in other
nations was to permit certain suits against the sovereign; and that
the nature of the Union depended on the states heeding the judgments of the Supreme Court.
As to the first point, Randolph maintained that the states simply
did not enjoy the status of full sovereigns. Under the Constitution,
power was derived from the people: the “States are in fact assemblages of these individuals who are liable to process. The limitations, which the Federal Government is admitted to impose upon
their powers, are diminutions of sovereignty, at least equal to the
making of them defendants.”227 As to the second point, Randolph
insisted that the practices in other nations demonstrated two
things. First, sovereign nations were not subject to suit in their own
courts without their consent;228 but the only relevant entity with the
status of “nation” (and thus sovereign immunity) was the United
States—the “head of [the] confederacy”—as opposed to the
states—its “inferior members.”229 Accordingly, the United States

223

Article III, § 2 provides in relevant part:
The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies between two or more
States; – between a State and Citizens of another State; . . . and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
224
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 423.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id. at 425.
229
Id.
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could not involuntarily be subjected to suit in its own courts.230 Second, Randolph argued that the appropriate analogy for suits
against the states was the practice in other nations that took the
form of union or confederation, and that in those systems, the
courts of the union generally could hear disputes against its members.231
As Professor Laurence Tribe has noted, the “precise holding of
Chisholm is obscured by the fact that each Justice in the majority
wrote his own opinion.”232 Chief Justice Jay and Justices Blair,
Cushing, and Wilson agreed that Georgia was amenable to suit.
Justice Iredell dissented, ostensibly on the ground that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not authorize the Supreme Court to hear such
suits.233 The four Justices in the majority relied chiefly on the plain
language of Article III and Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of
1789.234 The Justices rejected Georgia’s apparent argument that the
230

Id. Randolph acknowledged the English common-law practices of “petitions of
right, monstrans de droit, and . . . process in the Exchequer,” but explained that these
devices were “widely remote from an involuntary subjection” to suit. Id. (second emphasis added).
231
Id. at 424–25 (describing practice in the “Germanic Empire,” where “both the
Imperial Chamber, and the Aulic Council hear and determine the complaints of individuals against the Princes”) (emphasis omitted). It is clear from Randolph’s argument here that, in referring to the “law of nations,” he was describing not what we today call customary international law but rather the domestic law of other nations. As
to that issue, Randolph noted that there was some question “whether one Prince
found within the territory of another, may be sued for a contract,” but asserted that
“where the effects, or property, of one Prince are rested in the dominions of another,
the proprietor Prince may be summoned before a tribunal of that other.” Id. at 425
(emphasis omitted). In any event, Randolph argued that although “each State has its
separate territory, in one sense, the whole is that of the United States, in another. The
jurisdiction of this Court reaches to Georgia, as well as to Philadelphia.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
232
Tribe, supra note 52, § 3-25, at 521.
233
Justice Iredell’s principal argument was that Congress gave the Supreme Court
remedial powers according to “the principles and usages of law,” and that commonlaw sovereign immunity was one such general principle of law. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) at 434–36 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Justice Iredell did, however, opine, in what he
readily confessed was dicta, that the Constitution did not authorize Congress to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity. Id. at 449–50.
234
Section 13 provided:
[T]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a
civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and
except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter
case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction.
Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789).
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Court should read those provisions narrowly to accommodate the
state’s sovereignty, concluding instead that, whatever immunity
from suit full sovereign nations enjoy, the constitutional plan necessarily deprived the American states of sovereignty in the customary sense of that word under the law of nations.
For example, Justice Wilson, in a strongly pronationalist opinion, expressly declared that the immunity of sovereigns under the
law of nations was inapposite because the American states were
not co-equal sovereigns with the United States or with other nations of the world: “As to the purposes of the Union, . . . Georgia is
NOT a sovereign State”;235 therefore, “[f]rom the law of nations little or no illustration of this subject can be expected. By that law the
several States and Governments spread over our globe, are considered as forming a society, not a NATION.”236 Justice Blair made
the same point in his separate opinion.237 And although Justice Iredell thought that the “Conventional Law of Nations” was applicable to the case as a background principle, he found Randolph’s
comparisons to the practices in other confederations inapposite,
The majority Justices rejected Georgia’s apparent argument that the language of
Article III and the Judiciary Act should be construed to confer jurisdiction only when
a state was a plaintiff, and not when a state was a defendant. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.) (“A dispute between A. and B. is surely a dispute
between B. and A. Both cases, I have no doubt, were intended . . . .”); id. at 466 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“Causes, and not parties to causes, are weighed by justice, in her
equal scales: On the former solely, her attention is fixed: To the latter, she is, as she is
painted, blind.”) (emphasis omitted); id. at 467 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (“It may be
suggested that it could not be intended to subject a State to be a Defendant, because
it would effect the sovereignty of States. If that be the case, what shall we do with the
immediate preceding clause; ‘controversies between two or more States,’ where a
State must of necessity be Defendant?”) (emphasis omitted); id. at 476 (opinion of
Jay, C.J.) (“If the Constitution really meant to extend these powers only to those controversies in which a State might be Plaintiff, to the exclusion of those in which citizens had demands against a State, it is inconceivable that it should have attempted to
convey that meaning in words, not only so incompetent, but also repugnant to
it . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
235
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 457 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
236
Id. at 453 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
237
See id. at 452 (opinion of Blair, J.) (“When sovereigns are sued in their own
Courts, such a method [that is, proceeding by petition only upon consent of the sovereign] may have been established as the most respectful form of demand; but we are
not now in a State-Court; and if sovereignty be an exemption from suit in any other
than the sovereign’s own Courts, it follows that when a State, by adopting the Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United States, she has,
in that respect, given up her right of sovereignty.”) (emphasis omitted).
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reasoning that “unquestionably the people of the United States
had a right to form what kind of union, and upon what terms they
pleased, without reference to any former examples.”238 He accordingly did not rest his conclusion that Georgia was not amenable to
suit on principles of customary international law.
To the extent that dignity was a relevant consideration in the decision, the Justices seemed principally concerned with the dignity
of the people. Justice Wilson, for example, elaborated on his view
of the novel American idea of popular sovereignty by explaining
that “[a] State; useful and valuable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity derives all its
acquired importance.”239 Chief Justice Jay made a similar point, “It
is remarkable that in establishing [the Constitution], the people exercised their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty, and
conscious of the plenitude of it, they declared with becoming dignity, ‘We the people of the United States, do ordain and establish
this Constitution.’”240
This is not to say that the notion of state dignity was entirely foreign to the Court. Justice Blair acknowledged, for example, that
securing the state’s appearance before the Court was a delicate
matter, and he observed that “[a] judgment by default, in the present stage of the business, and writ of enquiry of damages, would
be too precipitate in any case, and too incompatible with the dignity of a State in this.”241 But other than Justice Blair’s understandable concern that Georgia have an adequate opportunity to defend
238

Id. at 449 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Justices Blair and Cushing agreed with this interpretive approach. See id. at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.) (“The Constitution of the
United States is the only fountain from which I shall draw.”) (emphasis omitted); id.
at 466 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (“The point turns not upon the law or practice of England . . . nor upon the law of any other country whatever; but upon the Constitution
established by the people of the United States.”) (emphasis omitted).
239
Id. at 455 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 456 (opinion of
Wilson, J.) (“If the dignity of each [man] singly is undiminished; the dignity of all jointly
must be unimpaired. A State, like a merchant, makes a contract. A dishonest State, like
a dishonest merchant, wilfully refuses to discharge it: The latter is amenable to a Court
of Justice: Upon general principles of right, shall the former when summoned to answer
the fair demands of its creditor, be permitted, proteus-like, to assume a new appearance,
and to insult him and justice, by declaring I am a SOVEREIGN State? Surely not.”).
240
Id. at 470–71 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (emphasis omitted).
241
Id. at 452–53 (opinion of Blair, J.) (emphasis added). He thought it better first to
“warn the State of the meditated consequence of a refusal to appear.” Id. at 453
(opinion of Blair, J.).
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the merits of the suit, the Justices were not particularly receptive to
the position of the Georgia legislature that only immunity from
Chisholm’s suit was consistent with the state’s sovereign dignity.242
The majority Justices’ hostility to Georgia’s argument stemmed
from their views on the contrast between the American and English conceptions of sovereignty. Justice Wilson described the feudal
origins of the English common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity,
which vested in the King “jurisdiction over others,” but “excluded
all others from jurisdiction over him. With regard to him, there was
no superior power; and, consequently, on feudal principles, no
right of jurisdiction.”243 Justice Wilson recognized that this doctrine,
which relied for its force on the notion that the King enjoyed complete “superiority of power,”244 was a particularly unappealing
analogy for a doctrine in the United States—
Suffice it, at present to say, that another principle, very different
in its nature and operations, forms, in my judgment, the basis of
sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the pure
source of equality and justice must be founded on the
CONSENT of those, whose obedience they require. The sover245
eign, when traced to his source, must be found in the man.

242

See, e.g., id. at 450–51 (opinion of Blair, J.) (responding to argument that the
“dignity of a State” requires interpretation of the federal courts’ jurisdictional grant
over controversies between a state and citizens of another state to be limited to cases
in which the state is a plaintiff); id. at 472 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (“Will it be said, that
the fifty odd thousand citizens in Delaware being associated under a State Government, stand in a rank superior to the forty odd thousand of Philadelphia, associated
under their charter, that although it may become the latter to meet an individual on
an equal footing in a Court of Justice, yet that such a procedure would not comport
with the dignity of the former?”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 423 (statement of
E. Randolph) (responding to argument that executing a decree against the state
would result in “embarrassment”); id. at 425 (statement of E. Randolph) (denying
that there would be any “degradation” of Georgia’s sovereignty to “submit to the Supreme Judiciary of the United States”) (emphasis omitted).
243
Id. at 458 (opinion of Wilson, J.). As Justice Iredell explained, a remedy was
available against the King only upon his permission, “[t]he remedy, in the language of
Blackstone, being a matter of grace, and not on compulsion.” Id. at 444 (opinion of
Iredell, J.) (emphasis omitted).
244
Id. at 458 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
245
Id. (opinion of Wilson, J.); see also id. at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (emphasis
omitted) (“No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on
the people . . . .”).
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Chief Justice Jay echoed this conception of government power,
noting that whereas in Europe the “Princes have personal powers,
dignities, and pre-eminences, our rulers have none but official; nor
do they partake in the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens.”246 To the Chisholm Justices, the
concept of state sovereign dignity was alien to the founding principle of popular sovereignty.
It is now familiar—and undisputed—history that the Chisholm
decision prompted the proposal and ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment.247 But that simple statement of historical fact is perhaps the only point of agreement between the Supreme Court’s
current majority of five on state sovereign immunity matters and

246

Id. at 472 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (emphasis omitted). Chief Justice Jay’s observation is particularly significant, for our purposes, for its use of the term “dignities” in its
specific legal sense. “A dignity, in the English law, is the right to bear a title of nobility or honor.” Stewart Rapalje & Robert L. Lawrence, A Dictionary of American and
English Law 388 (N.J., Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1883). “Dignities are either for life,
such as knighthood, or of inheritance, such as baronetcies and ordinary peerages.” Id.
“Dignities” are “a species of incorporeal hereditaments, in which a person may have a
property or estate.” Alexander M. Burrill, A New Law Dictionary & Glossary 377
(N.Y., John S. Voorhies 1850). Such titles are flatly inconsistent with the American
conception of sovereignty, and they accordingly are expressly prohibited by the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the
United States; And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall,
without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or
Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”); id. art. I, § 10,
cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . grant any Title of Nobility.”); see also John Bouvier, Law
Dictionary 531 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1886) (“Dignities. In English
Law. Titles of honor. They are considered as incorporeal hereditaments. The genius
of our government forbids their admission into the republic.”).
The Court recognized this particular meaning of the term in other early decisions.
See, e.g., Cassell v. Carroll, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 134, 153–56 n.(a) (1826) (“[T]he king
cannot devise the lands and revenues allotted for the support of his royal dignity . . . .
Anciently, when the king made a duke, and gave possessions to him, they were so annexed to the dignity as not to be transferrable without a preceding act of Parliament. . . . [I]f the king creates a duke, and gives him 20 pounds a year for the maintenance of his dignity, he cannot give it to another, because it is not incident to his
dignity. Many things, of a special nature, are unalienable. Dignities are so, because
they are personal, and in the blood.”).
247
See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (“[Chisholm] created such a
shock of surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the States.”); William A.
Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics,
56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1261, 1264–75 (1989); Nelson, supra note 20, at 1602–08.
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its four dissenters. Indeed, much of the current debate on the
Court about state sovereign immunity doctrine is over the correctness of the Chisholm Justices’ conceptions of the nature of sovereignty and their interpretations of the Framers’ original intent with
respect to the issue.248 This Article is less concerned with the correctness of Chisholm,249 however, than with what its five opinions
reveal about the two distinct doctrines of sovereign immunity.
The discussion above reveals that all five of the Chisholm Justices apparently believed that the principle of sovereign immunity
that Georgia advocated derived from the English common-law
rule, with which they were clearly familiar.250 They were quick to
discount any arguments drawn from the law of nations. Indeed,
given the view held by the four majority Justices of the states’ surrender of sovereignty at the founding, it is unsurprising that they
thought that the answer could draw no help from the law of nations, which confers immunity only if the sovereign that is sued is
“equal in respect to” the sovereign in whose courts the action was
brought.251 Even Justice Iredell, who acknowledged that the “Conventional Law of Nations” might be relevant to the interpretive

248

Compare Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1870
(2002) (“We have since acknowledged that the Chisholm decision was erroneous.”),
and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721 (1999) (describing as “unsupportable” the argument that “the Chisholm decision was a correct interpretation of the constitutional
design and that the Eleventh Amendment represented a deviation from the original
understanding”), with id. at 790 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The significance of Chisholm is its indication that in 1788 and 1791 it was not generally assumed (indeed,
hardly assumed at all) that a State’s sovereign immunity from suit in its own courts
was an inherent, and not merely a common law, advantage.”).
249
Professor Akhil Reed Amar has persuasively argued that the Chisholm Court’s
only error was in concluding that a cause of action in assumpsit could properly lie
against the state:
Having established the Court’s power to entertain the case (and the suability of
Georgia in a jurisdictional sense), the majority proceeded to opine that a cause
of action in assumpsit would properly lie (and that the state was properly suable
in the substantive sense) notwithstanding any immunity from assumpsit liability
under state law. Under the common law of Georgia and, apparently, every
other state, no cause of action lay for a breach of contract by the state itself. At
common law, such contracts, though perhaps morally binding, were not legally
enforceable.
Amar, supra note 20, at 1469.
250
See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 458, 460 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 437–44
(opinion of Iredell, J.); id. at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
251
Kent, supra note 136, at 21.
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task confronting the Court,252 limited his argument in favor of the
existence of immunity to “principles and usages of law” inherited
from English common-law sovereign immunity.253
2. The Marshall Court
After the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, the Marshall
Court tended to dispense with references to the English common
law, relying instead on the language and purpose of the Amendment, as well as the constitutional structure, in deciding the scope
of the states’ immunity from suit. And although the Court did not
typically discuss the law of nations as a source of the states’ immunity from suit, the Court effectively rejected such a claim by insisting that the states’ relationship to the United States was different
than that of a foreign state to the United States.
For example, in Cohens v. Virginia,254 which addressed (among
other things) whether the Eleventh Amendment bars jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to review the disposition of a federal ques-

252

Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449.
Id. at 434. Justice Iredell reasoned:
The only principles of law . . . that can be regarded, are those common to all the
States. I know of none such . . . but those that are derived from what is properly
termed ‘the common law,’ a law which I presume is the ground-work of the laws
in every State in the Union, and which I consider, so far as it is applicable to the
peculiar circumstances of the country, and where no special act of Legislation
controuls [sic] it, to be in force in each State, as it existed in England, (unaltered
by any statute) at the time of the first settlement of the country. . . . No other
part of the common law of England, it appears to me, can have any reference to
this subject, but that part of it which prescribes remedies against the crown.
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 435 (emphasis omitted). Professor Lee has argued that
Justice Iredell understood instinctively and maintained consistently that the best way
to protect this special status—the sovereign dignity of the States—was to forge an
absolute identity between the sovereignty of the States and the more general,
inviolable principle of sovereignty as it was understood in the laws and political
theories of nations. Lee, supra note 119, at 1082. I do not dispute Professor Lee’s
conclusion that Justice Iredell’s “life project” was to resist “any encroachment on
formal legal distinctions that accorded special respect for sovereign states, foreign or
domestic,” and that “he sought to design the doctrine in a way that brooked no
distinction between the two types of sovereigns.” Id. at 1082–83. But to say that
Justice Iredell found an analogy to the prerogatives of sovereignty under the law of
nations helpful in the task of creating protections for state autonomy is not to say that
he believed that the states actually were wholly independent sovereigns within the
meaning of international law. See discussion infra notes 390–417 and accompanying
254
text.19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
253

SMITH.BOOK.DOC

2003]

2/24/03 9:31 PM

States as Nations

61

tion by a state court in a suit initiated by the state, Virginia relied
on the “general proposition, that a sovereign independent State is
not suable, except by its own consent.”255 Chief Justice Marshall rejected Virginia’s reference to background principles by noting that
the Constitution, particularly the Supremacy Clause,256 “marks, with
lines too strong to be mistaken, the characteristic distinction between the government of the Union, and those of the States. The
general government, though limited as to its objects, is supreme
with respect to those objects.”257
The Court then concluded that the Eleventh Amendment did
not preclude its review of the state court’s resolution of a federal
question. Virginia argued that exercising jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the state’s dignity, but the Court rejected that view
of the Amendment—
That [the Eleventh Amendment’s] motive was not to maintain
the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the nation,
may be inferred from the terms of the amendment. It does not
comprehend controversies between two or more States, or between a State and a foreign State. The jurisdiction of the Court
still extends to these cases: and in these a State may still be sued.
We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some other cause than
the dignity of a State.258

The Eleventh Amendment, the Court explained, was proposed and
ratified to maintain the financial integrity of the states—
It is a part of our history, that, at the adoption of the constitution,
all the States were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that
these debts might be prosecuted in the federal Courts, formed a
very serious objection to that instrument. Suits were instituted;
and the Court maintained its jurisdiction. The alarm was general;
and, to quiet the apprehensions that were so extensively entertained, this amendment was proposed in Congress, and adopted
255

Id. at 380.
U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 381; see also id. at 414 (“These States are constituent parts of the United States. They are members of one great empire—for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate.”).
258
Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
256
257
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by the State legislatures . . . . Those who were inhibited from
commencing a suit against a State, or from prosecuting one
which might be commenced before the adoption of the amendment, were persons who might probably be its creditors.259

In the Court’s view, whatever immunity the states might have enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution had been displaced
by the limited scheme of immunity suggested by the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment.
The Court’s treatment of Virginia’s arguments makes clear,
moreover, that the Court did not believe that after the ratification
the states enjoyed any of the immunity that the law of nations reserved for full sovereigns. This view is particularly notable in light
of the oft-cited pre-ratification state court decision in Nathan v.
Virginia, which appeared to hold that the states (again, before the
ratification) enjoyed law-of-nations immunity in the courts of other
(sovereign) states.260 Furthermore, Chief Justice Marshall’s subsequent opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States261 demonstrates the Court’s belief that the Eleventh Amendment—or the
Constitution itself, as modified by the Eleventh Amendment—

259

Id. In the Court’s view, this reading of the Eleventh Amendment answered the
question why jurisdiction remained over controversies between states and sister states
or foreign states. “There was not much reason to fear that foreign or sister States
would be creditors to any considerable amount, and there was reason to retain the
jurisdiction of the Court in those cases, because it might be essential to the preservation of peace. The amendment, therefore, extended to suits commenced or prosecuted by individuals, but not to those brought by States.” Id. at 406–07. Although virtually all of Chief Justice Marshall’s pronouncements have tended to take on the
character of gospel, it is worth noting that the Court’s entire discussion of the Eleventh Amendment in Cohens is arguably dicta, in light of its subsequent conclusion
that because the suit was between Virginia and one of its own citizens, it did not fall
within the plain language of the Amendment. See id. at 412; cf. Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state
brought by a citizen of that state). In classic Marshall fashion, the Court in Cohens ultimately affirmed the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court, which sustained Virginia’s authority to punish a person for selling lottery tickets in Virginia even though
Congress had authorized their sale in the District of Columbia, but not before expounding on the Court’s powers of review. See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 444–47.
260
Nathan v. Virginia, 1 Dall. 77 n.(a) (Pa. C.P. 1781); see discussion supra notes
148–51 and accompanying text.
261
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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displaced the English common law as a source of immunity from
suit.262
B. Echoes of the Law of Nations
Notwithstanding the relative clarity of Cohens and Osborn with
respect to the place of the law of nations in state sovereign immunity jurisprudence, the Court in the mid-nineteenth century suggested for the first time that the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit had roots in the law of nations after all. From the
mid-nineteenth century until the Court’s decision in Monaco v.
Mississippi263 in 1934, the Court often appeared to draw as much on
the doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity in announcing the
states’ constitutional immunities from suit as it did on the doctrine
of English common-law sovereign immunity. And the Court’s principal means of invoking the law of nations was rhetorical—by referring to the imperative to protect the “dignity” of the states.
In Beers v. Arkansas, for example, a holder of bonds issued by
Arkansas sued in state court to recover interest on the bonds.264 After the suit was filed, the state by statute added a condition to an
earlier statutory waiver of immunity from suits to collect on the
bonds.265 The plaintiff failed to comply with the condition, and the
state court dismissed the action.266 The plaintiff claimed in the Su262

In Osborn, the Court was confronted with the question whether a suit against an
officer of a state was a suit against the state within the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. at 851. In holding that the Court’s jurisdiction turned solely on
whether the state was a party of record, the Court stated—
If this question were to be determined on the authority of English decisions, it
is believed that no case can be adduced, where any person has been considered
as a party, who is not made so in the record. But the Court will not review those
decisions, because it is thought a question growing out of the constitution of the
United States, requires rather an attentive consideration of the words of that instrument, than of the decisions of analogous questions by the Courts of any
other country.
Id. at 851. The Court thus rejected the suggestion that the American doctrine of state
sovereign immunity had incorporated, at least in full, the doctrine as it existed under
the English common law. The Court subsequently departed from Osborn’s “party of
record” rule in In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 447 (1887), as discussed infra notes 277–86
and accompanying text.
263
292 U.S. 313 (1934).
264
61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 527–28 (1857).
265
Id. at 528.
266
Id. at 528–29.
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preme Court that the state’s limitation of its prior waiver of sovereign immunity violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.267
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taney, held that the
state can control the conditions on which it waives immunity. The
Court could have rested on the ground that, because in an action
based on state law in the state’s own courts the state can assert absolute immunity, the state a fortiori can effect a partial waiver.268 But
the Court painted with a broader brush, explaining that—
It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in
any other, without its consent and permission; but it may, if it
thinks proper, waive this privilege, and permit itself to be made a
defendant in a suit by individuals, or by another State. And as
this permission is altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty, it follows that it may prescribe the terms and conditions
on which it consents to be sued, and the manner in which the suit
shall be conducted, and may withdraw its consent whenever it
may suppose that justice to the public requires it.269

The Beers Court’s reference to the law of nations270 is striking not
simply because it appeared to depart from the early post-ratification
view of the origin of the states’ immunity from suit. Putting aside
for a moment the Court’s implication that Arkansas is sufficiently
sovereign to be considered a “state” under customary international
law, the logical source of Arkansas’s immunity in the suit would
have been the English common law. Because Beers involved a suit

267

U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”); Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 529.
268
This would have been a particularly straightforward rationale in light of the
Court’s conclusion that “[t]here is evidently nothing in the decision, nor in the act of
the Assembly under which it was made, which in any degree impairs the obligation of
the contract.” Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 530.
269
Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
270
There is no doubt that the Court intended to invoke the law of nations, as opposed to the English common law. Not only did the Court use the familiar reference
to the law of “all civilized nations,” id. at 559; see, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) (describing “the immunity which all
civilized nations allow to foreign ministers”), but the Court also suggested that the
states’ immunity extends to suits brought in the other sovereign’s courts. Id. This was
the domain of the law of nations. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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in the defendant state’s own courts, the law of nations was simply
inapposite.271
But viewed in context, the Court’s reference to the law of nations is not particularly surprising. In 1857, the nation was on the
brink of Civil War, in part because of profound disagreements over
the degree to which the states retained sovereign authority within
their borders.272 Given the general receptivity during this period of
the Court to states’ rights arguments, its implicit suggestion in Beers
that the states are the natural heirs of the law of “all civilized nations” is hardly surprising.273
Indeed, the ebb and flow of references to state dignity in state
sovereign immunity cases correlates relatively neatly with shifting
views about the appropriate balance between federal and state
power.274 Accordingly, in the late nineteenth century, when the Court
began to grapple with the implications for federal power of an increasingly national economy,275 the Court continued to invoke the
dignity rationale in expanding the states’ immunity from suit.276 In
271

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Indeed, in the same term that it decided Beers, the Court issued its now-infamous
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), which helped to precipitate the Civil War. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics 192–94, 206–08 (1978); Carl B. Swisher, Roger B.
Taney 495–523 (1935).
273
See also Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1868) (“Every government has an inherent right to protect itself against suits . . . . The principle is fundamental, [and] applies to every sovereign power . . . .”).
274
See generally Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez,
1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125 (tracking changing judicial interpretations of constitutional
federalism over time to better understand changing views of the proper balance between federal and state power).
275
Compare United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1895) (holding that
Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate “manufacturing”),
with Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 353–54 (1914) (holding that Congress had authority to empower the Interstate Commerce Commission to
set rates on an intrastate rail route).
276
In United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), the Supreme Court appeared (for the
time being) to revert to the Marshall Court’s understanding that both common-law
and law-of-nations notions of sovereign immunity were foreign to our constitutional
structure. The case involved a suit by descendants of General Robert E. Lee against
two federal officers to recover possession of the former Lee estate, which the federal
government had taken and used as a national cemetery. Id. at 197–99. As this recital
reveals, Lee did not involve a suit against a state, but rather raised a question about
the scope of the immunity of the United States and its officers. The Court’s view of
the place of sovereign dignity in defining that immunity is nonetheless revealing.
272
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re Ayers,277 which the current Court has repeatedly cited as support
for its dignity rationale, was one in a series of cases leading up to
Ex Parte Young278 in which the Court sought to balance federalism
interests with the interest in ensuring that state violations of constitutional rights do not go without a remedy.279 Ayers was a suit by
holders of interest coupons on bonds issued by Virginia who were
concerned that certain actions of the state’s Attorney General
would render their coupons worthless.280 They sued the Attorney
The Court noted that any sovereign immunity of the government is “derived from
the laws and practices of our English ancestors.” Id. at 205. Like the Marshall (and
Chisholm) Court before it, however, the Court disavowed any place for such practices
here, because of the “vast difference in the essential character of the two governments
as regards the source and the depositories of power.” Id. at 208. The Court then rejected the United States’ claim that its sovereign dignity mandated dismissal of the
suit. The Court first rejected the argument to the extent that it relied on the notion of
royal dignity. See id. (noting that in England “the monarch is looked upon with too
much reverence to be subjected to the demands of the law as ordinary persons are,”
because the “crown remains the fountain of honor, and the surroundings which give
dignity and majesty to its possessor are cherished and enforced all the more strictly
because of the loss of real power in the government”). The Court responded that
“[u]nder our system the people, who are [in England] called subjects, are the sovereign . . . . The citizen here knows no person, however near to those in power, or however powerful himself, to whom he need yield the rights which the law secures to him
when it is well administered.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Nor was the law-of-nations doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity applicable; that doctrine requires a foreign
sovereign, and, in any event, leaves interactions with such a foreign state to the political branches. Id. at 209. Accordingly, the Court could not say “that [the dignity of] the
government is degraded by appearing as a defendant in the courts of its own creation,” where “it is constantly appearing as a party in such courts, and submitting its
rights as against the citizen to their judgment.” Id. at 206. Because “[n]o officer of the
law may set that law at defiance with impunity,” the Court permitted the suit against
the officer to proceed. Id. at 220. In dissent, Justice Gray invoked the law of nations,
relying on the “fundamental maxim, that the sovereign cannot be sued.” Id. at 226
(Gray, J., dissenting); see id. at 227 (Gray, J., dissenting) (“The principle is fundamental, applies to every sovereign power, and, but for the protection which it affords, the
government would be unable to perform the various duties for which it was created.”)
(quoting Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1868)).
277
123 U.S. 443 (1887).
278
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
279
See Tribe, supra note 52, § 3-27, at 555–56.
280
See Ayers, 123 U.S. at 446–50. The state, concerned about counterfeit interest
coupons, had passed a statute that required persons seeking to use such state bond
coupons to pay taxes to “prove affirmatively that the coupons tendered by them are
the State’s coupons and not counterfeit and spurious coupons, the burden of proving
the same being placed upon the tax-payer and the coupon being taken to be prima
facie spurious and counterfeit.” Id. at 447–48. Another statute required that such persons “shall produce the bond from which the coupon so tendered by him was cut.” Id.
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General to enjoin him from taking such actions, alleging that his
action would violate the Contracts Clause.281 The principal question
before the Supreme Court was whether the suit, which was filed
against an officer of the state, should be considered a suit against
the state itself.
The Court held that Virginia was the real party in interest, and
thus that the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.282 The
Court reasoned that “[w]hether [Virginia] is the actual party, in the
sense of the prohibition of the Constitution, must be determined by
a consideration of the nature of the case as presented on the whole
record.”283 Because the “relief sought is against the defendants, not
in their individual, but in their representative capacity as officers of
the State of Virginia,” the Court concluded that the state was the
real party in interest.284 The Court stated, in language that has become vogue at the current Court—
The very object and purpose of the 11th Amendment were to
prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process
of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties. It was
thought to be neither becoming nor convenient that the several
States of the Union, invested with that large residuum of sovereignty which had not been delegated to the United States, should
be summoned as defendants to answer the complaints of private
persons, whether citizens of other States or aliens, or that the
course of their public policy and the administration of their public affairs should be subject to and controlled by the mandates of
judicial tribunals without their consent, and in favor of individual
interests.285

at 448. The Attorney General was alleged to be preparing to file suits against persons
who had paid taxes with coupons without complying with the statutes, in order to
condemn such coupons as spurious. Id. at 449–50.
281
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see Ayers, 123 U.S. at 450 (discussing the plaintiffs’
argument that a refusal to recognize state-issued bond coupons as valid payment of
property taxes violates the Contracts Clause).
282
Ayers, 123 U.S. at 507–08.
283
Id. at 492.
284
Id. at 497.
285
Id. at 505 (emphasis added). The Court continued—
To secure the manifest purposes of the constitutional exemption guaranteed by
the 11th Amendment requires that it should be interpreted, not literally and too
narrowly, but fairly, and with such breadth and largeness as effectually to ac-
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The Court’s reference to the state’s dignity plainly was intended
to underscore the importance of ensuring that the Eleventh
Amendment is not evaded by suits that are filed against officers
but that nonetheless are, in effect, against the state. Because the relief that the plaintiffs sought in every meaningful sense would run
against the state, the Court concluded that the suit was barred.286

complish the substance of its purpose. In this spirit it must be held to cover, not
only suits brought against a State by name, but those also against its officers,
agents, and representatives, where the State, though not named as such, is, nevertheless, the only real party against which alone in fact the relief is asked, and
against which the judgment or decree effectively operates.
Id. at 505–06. The Court insisted, however, that suits against state officers in their official capacities do not violate the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 506 (“But this is
not intended in any way to impinge upon the principle which justifies suits against individual defendants . . . .”). This doctrine remained in flux until the Court’s decision in
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
286
Cf. PRASA, 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993); see also discussion supra notes 25–46 and
accompanying text. When the Court finally held in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits to enjoin state officers from
violating federal law, Justice Harlan invoked the notion of state dignity in dissent. In a
reversal of his position in Ayers, see Ayers, 123 U.S. at 515–16 (Harlan, J., dissenting),
Justice Harlan protested that “[t]he preservation of the dignity and sovereignty of the
States, within the limits of their constitutional powers, is of the last importance, and
vital to the preservation of our system of government.” Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at
182–83 (emphasis added). It is important, however, to appreciate the context in which
Justice Harlan invoked such language. The doctrinal battle in Ayers and Young was as
much about substantive due process as it was about federalism; the majority in Young
sought to subject states to suit in large part as a means of ensuring that challenges to
state economic regulation could be heard by the courts. For Justice Harlan, shielding
the states from suit was a means of limiting the force of that (ultimately misguided)
doctrine. See Sherry, supra note 7, at 1129–30.
Similarly, Professor Sherry suggests that Justice Bradley saw the expansion of state
immunity in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (discussed infra notes 287–89 and
accompanying text), as a way to stem the tide of decisions seemingly granting “personhood” to corporations and permitting them to challenge otherwise valid state economic regulations under the Fourteenth Amendment. Sherry, supra note 7, at 1128–
29. Today, however, “the personifiers have switched sides. It is Justice Bradley’s opinion in Hans that gives the most comfort to those who would protect the states from
assaults on their dignity.” Id. at 1130.
Nevertheless, although the Court’s trend during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was to suggest that state sovereign immunity had roots in the law of
nations, Young itself represented a significant detour from that approach. Indeed, the
Court’s decision in Young is in many ways the doctrinal heir to the English commonlaw rule of state sovereign immunity. Young’s rule echoes “the venerable commonlaw practice of permitting suit against officers of the Crown despite the King’s immunity from suit.” Tribe, supra note 52, at 557; see Jaffe, supra note 122, at 9.
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Three years after the Court decided Ayers, the Court held in
Hans v. Louisiana287 that the Eleventh Amendment, notwithstanding its plain language, barred a suit against a state by its own citizens. The decision is second only to Chisholm in the amount of debate that it has produced.288 For present purposes, however, it suffices
to note that this decision, in which the Court renounced reliance on
the text of the Eleventh Amendment as its principal means of giving content to state sovereign immunity doctrine, invoked Chief
Justice Taney’s reference in Beers to the immunity enjoyed by sovereign states under the law of nations.289
In Ex Parte New York,290 which extended the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits in admiralty, the Court used language similarly
consistent with foreign state sovereign immunity: “That a State may
not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence.”291 Likewise, in the Court’s decision in Monaco v. Mississippi,292 which held that notwithstanding the language of Article III
and the Eleventh Amendment the states are immune from suits by
287

134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
Compare Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68–70 (1996) (“[The dissent’s] undocumented and highly speculative extralegal explanation of the decision in
Hans is a disservice to the Court’s traditional method of adjudication . . . . Hans—with
a much closer vantage point than the dissent—recognized that the decision in Chisholm was contrary to the well-understood meaning of the Constitution.”), with id. at
117 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“A critical examination of [Hans] will show that it was
wrongly decided, as virtually every recent commentator has concluded. It follows that
the Court’s further step today of constitutionalizing Hans’s rule against abrogation by
Congress compounds and immensely magnifies the century-old mistake of Hans itself
and takes its place with other historic examples of textually untethered elevations of
judicially derived rules to the status of inviolable constitutional law.”).
289
Hans, 134 U.S. at 17 (“It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other,
without its consent and permission . . . .”) (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 527, 529 (1857)). As Professor Thomas Lee has observed, the Hans Court’s solicitude for state autonomy, like the reaction to Chisholm, might be explained by the
fact that “the southern States confronted daunting war debts in the wake of another
rebellion, though of different cause and result.” Lee, supra note 119, at 1043 (citing
Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., The Contract Clause of the Constitution 94 (1938)).
290
256 U.S. 490 (1921).
291
Id. at 497 (emphasis added). As in Beers, the Court invoked the law of nations in
a second, implicit way—by suggesting that the states “enjoy the prerogatives of sovereignty to the extent of being exempt from litigation at the suit of individuals in all
other judicial tribunals.” Id. at 503 (emphasis added); see supra note 270 and accompanying text.
292
292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
288
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foreign states,293 the Court’s rationale was based in part on a suggestion that states enjoy a sovereignty comparable to that of foreign nations. Because under the law of nations foreign states enjoy
immunity from suit by American states in U.S. courts, the Court
asserted that the American states should enjoy a reciprocal privilege.294 Such reciprocity would make sense only upon the assumption that the states are akin, for purposes of immunity, to fully sovereign nations. The Court’s reference to the immunity of foreign
states was, to be fair, merely one fleeting reference in a decision
that relied principally on the “postulate” that “[the] States of the
Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune
from suits, without their consent, save where there has been ‘a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.’”295 But it
was consistent with the Court’s approach, since Beers, of invoking
principles of foreign state sovereign immunity from the law of nations to justify the immunity of the several states.
This forceful defense of state sovereignty in Monaco should come
as no surprise. The Court issued the decision in 1934, when the
federal government was asserting its powers in bold new ways and
the Court was defiantly resisting those efforts.296 A mere three
293

Article III extends jurisdiction to “Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment divests federal court jurisdiction over
suits against states commenced or prosecuted by “Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State,” it does not purport to bar jurisdiction over suits by foreign states themselves.
See U.S. Const. amend XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by . . . Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). For an argument
that Monaco was incorrectly decided, see Lee, supra note 119, at 1088–92.
294
Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330. To be sure, the Court did recognize the difference between the states’ peculiar form of quasi-sovereignty and the sovereignty of foreign
states. The Court suggested that the federal government’s primacy in international
relations argues in favor of state immunity from suits by foreign states, on the theory
that “a controversy growing out of the action of a State, which involves a matter of
national concern and which is said to affect injuriously the interests of a foreign State,
or a dispute arising from conflicting claims of a State of the Union and a foreign State
as to territorial boundaries,” ought to be addressed by action of the federal government alone. Id. at 331. But the Court’s suggestion of reciprocal privileges between
American states and foreign states belies this concession.
295
Id. at 322–23 (quoting The Federalist No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)) (footnote
omitted).
296
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521, 551
(1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933); R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
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years later, however, the Court had accepted an expansive view of
federal power and the concomitant limits that such a view implied
for state autonomy.297 It should also come as no surprise that the
Court’s reliance on the customary international law doctrine of
foreign state sovereign immunity—and, more specifically, the Court’s
invocations of state dignity—waned in state sovereign immunity
cases in the sixty years following Monaco.298 During the years of the
Warren Court, the Court rarely made arguments based on dignity
in the cause of states’ rights.299
Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 340, 374 (1935) (invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act
of 1934).
297
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30–38 (1937) (holding the
National Labor Relations Act constitutional); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 583, 585, 593 (1937) (upholding a national employment tax in the Social
Security Act).
298
Indeed, even shortly after deciding Monaco, the Court began to retreat from the
notion that state dignity required judicial protection. In United States v. California,
297 U.S. 175 (1936), for example, the Court upheld Congress’s power to authorize the
United States to recover a penalty from a state for violation, in its capacity as the operator of a railroad, of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The Court stated—
The suggestion that it should be assumed that Congress did not intend to subject a sovereign state to the inconvenience and loss of dignity involved in a trial
in a district court is not persuasive when weighed against the complete appropriateness of the court and venue selected for the trial of issues growing out of
the particular activity in which the state has chosen to engage.
Id. at 188–89 (emphasis added). And in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937), in which the Court held that Social Security Act provisions imposing a tax on
employers did not exceed Congress’s power or violate state autonomy, even Justice
Sutherland’s dissent suggested that state dignity was not a relevant concern. He argued—
By these various provisions of the act, the federal agencies are authorized to
supervise and hamper the administrative powers of the state to a degree which
not only does not comport with the dignity of a quasi-sovereign state—a matter
with which we are not judicially concerned—but which denies to it that supremacy and freedom from external interference in respect of its affairs which the
Constitution contemplates—a matter of very definite judicial concern.
Id. at 613–14 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice McReynolds did
invoke the dignity of the states, but his claim fell on deaf ears. See id. at 606 (McReynolds,
J., dissenting) (“If the time shall ever arrive when, for an object appealing, however
strongly, to our sympathies, the dignity of the States shall bow to the dictation of Congress by conforming their legislation thereto, when the power and majesty and honor
of those who created shall become subordinate to the thing of their creation, I but
feebly utter my apprehensions when I express my firm conviction that we shall see
‘the beginning of the end.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting 5 James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 247–51 (1897)).
299
Indeed, when the Warren Court did ascribe dignity to a sovereign, it tended to be
with a very different connotation. In Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 4 (1956),
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C. Nevada v. Hall: Setting the Record Straight?
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Court was divided over the
appropriate balance between the interest in protecting states from
costly suits300 and the need to ensure state compliance with federal
law.301 As a result, state sovereign immunity doctrine experienced
some growing pains. In this period, however, the Court rarely suggested—through rhetorical clues or otherwise—that the states’
immunity from suit (whether constitutionally indefeasible or subject to abrogation by Congress) had its origins in the law-of-nations
doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity. Indeed, in Nevada v.
Hall,302 the Court explicitly recognized the distinction between English common-law immunity and foreign state sovereign immunity.
Hall involved a tort suit in California state court by a California

an appeal from a criminal conviction in federal court, the Solicitor General of the
United States informed the Court that a government witness apparently had given
false testimony. The Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, declaring that “[t]he dignity of the United States Government will not permit the conviction of any person on tainted testimony.” Id. at 9; cf. Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4
Pet.) 410, 436–37 (1830) (holding that a state could not enforce a promissory note
against a citizen because the state statute on which it was based purported to authorize the state to “emit bills of credit” in violation of the Constitution: “In the argument,
we have been reminded by one side of the dignity of a sovereign state; of the humiliation of her submitting herself to this tribunal; of the dangers which may result from
inflicting a wound on that dignity: by the other, of the still superior dignity of the people of the United States; who have spoken their will, in terms which we cannot misunderstand.”).
300
See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238–40 (1985) (applying a strict clear statement rule); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from
enjoining state officers from violating state law); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673
(1974) (holding that state participation in a federal program was not sufficient to signify state consent to suit in federal court); Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284–85 (1973) (holding that the
Court will not presume congressional intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity without a clear statement).
301
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to abrogate
the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976) (holding that Congress has authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity to ensure compliance with the
Amendment); Employees, 411 U.S. at 283 (recognizing Congress’s power to bring
“the States to heel, in the sense of lifting their immunity from suit in a federal court”).
302
440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979).
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citizen against the State of Nevada under California law.303 Nevada
claimed that it was entitled to immunity from suit in the courts of
another state, but the Supreme Court rejected Nevada’s argument.304
The Court explained that “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity
is an amalgam of two quite different concepts, one applicable to
suits in the sovereign’s own courts and the other to suits in the
courts of another sovereign.”305 The former doctrine had its roots in
the English common law and “rested primarily on the structure of
the feudal system and secondarily on a fiction that the King could
do no wrong.”306 That doctrine did not apply to the case at bar,
however, because Nevada, to the extent that it was a full sovereign
within the meaning of the doctrine, was being sued in another sovereign’s courts. A claim of immunity under those circumstances,
the Court explained, could be answered only by reference to the
“common usage among nations in which every sovereign was understood to have waived its exclusive territorial jurisdiction over
visiting sovereigns, or their representatives, in certain classes of
cases.”307 Even “if California and Nevada were independent and
completely sovereign nations”—a proposition that the Court refused to accept308—California would enjoy the power to subject
Nevada to suit in its own courts, just as Congress has authority to
subject foreign states to suit in the courts of the United States.309
This is because any decision of one sovereign to grant immunity in
its courts to another sovereign ultimately is a “voluntary decision
of the [former] to respect the dignity of the [latter] as a matter of
comity.”310

303

Id. at 411–12.
Id. at 426–27.
305
Id. at 414.
306
Id. at 414–15; see supra notes 122–34 and accompanying text.
307
Id. at 417 (citing The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,
136 (1812)).
308
Id.; see id. at 425 (discussing constitutional provisions that place “specific limitation[s] on the sovereignty of the several States,” and that “[c]ollectively . . . demonstrate that ours is not a union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns”); see also infra
notes 311–13 and accompanying text.
309
See Hall, 440 U.S. at 417 (citing The Schooner Exchange); id. at 417 n.13 (drawing
an analogy to the rule of restrictive immunity under the law of nations).
310
Id. at 416.
304
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In concluding that California could authorize a suit against Nevada in California courts, the Court explicitly relied on Chief Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the law of nations in The Schooner
Exchange.311 As explained in greater detail below, however, the Court
did not suggest that customary international law norms applied of
their own force to the relations among the several states. Instead,
the Court borrowed the notion of comity from international law
because the relationship among the states, which are equal in status
in most constitutionally relevant ways, resembles the relationship
among co-equal sovereigns on the world stage.312
As demonstrated below, the relationship between the states and
the federal government differs in important ways from the relationship among sovereign nations. It is perhaps for this reason that
the Court’s state sovereign immunity cases since Hall have not
read that decision to suggest that the states’ immunity derives from
the law of nations; instead, the Court has steadfastly insisted that
the states’ immunity derives from the English common law, and
has even cited Hall for that proposition.313
In his dissent in Alden, Justice Souter recognized the Court’s
“occasional seduction” with what he called the “natural law view,”
but insisted that the Court had consistently adhered to the English
common-law approach.314 By “natural law view,” Justice Souter was

311

Id. at 417.
See id. at 417 & nn.12–13.
313
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999) (“Although the American
people had rejected other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the
Constitution was drafted and ratified.”) (emphasis added); cf. id. at 715 (“When the
Constitution was ratified, it was well established in English law that the Crown could
not be sued without consent in its own courts.”) (citing Hall, 440 U.S. at 414). The
Court had an opportunity during the October 2002 Term to revisit the decision in
Hall. See Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, No. 35549, 2002 LEXIS 57 (Nev. Apr. 4,
2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 409 (2002) (No. 02-42).
314
Alden, 527 U.S. at 795 n.30 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Beers v. Arkansas, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857)); Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126
(1868); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13, 17 (1890); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996)); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 130 n.26 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that the Court’s reference to Hans’s reliance on the “jurisprudence in all civilized nations” could be taken as an abandonment of the “common-law roots” of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, but arguing that Hans
itself was, at bottom, based on the common-law view of immunity) (citations omitted).
312
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referring to Justice Holmes’s famous description of sovereign immunity, under which immunity may be invoked “only by the sovereign that is the source of the right upon which suit is brought.”315
Justice Holmes believed that sovereign dignity was an empty notion,316 and his general approach to the issue of sovereign immunity
was one of skepticism. But his reconceptualization of sovereign
immunity has much to commend it; among other things, it is
(unlike the Court’s current approach)317 perfectly consistent with
popular sovereignty,318 and it accounts for the consistent approach
315

Alden, 527 U.S. at 796 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Kawananakoa v. Polybank,
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)) (“A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.”).
316
See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 202 U.S. 598, 599–600 (1906) (Holmes, J.). In that
case, Missouri sued Illinois under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to restrain
the discharge of sewage from Chicago into an artificial canal that ran into the Mississippi. Id. After the suit was dismissed, Illinois sought costs. Id. Missouri challenged
the authority of the court to grant such costs, but Justice Holmes tersely dismissed the
state’s assertion: “[I]t is said that it is inconsistent with the dignity of a sovereign State
to ask for costs . . . . So far as the dignity of the State is concerned, that is its own affair.” Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
317
See Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1044 (noting that the majority in Alden “makes no
reference to the sovereignty of the people as a whole”).
318
If the citizens of a state believe that the state’s resources are better spent on, say,
education than on paying judgments in lawsuits arising under the state’s own laws,
there is no reason why they cannot permit the state to declare its immunity from suit.
And if the perception grows that the state government is acting “above the law,”
there is nothing to prevent the citizens from urging their representatives to waive the
government’s immunity from suit. Justice Holmes’s view is not particularly problematic even when a non-citizen has a grievance with the state. A non-citizen deals with
the state on the terms announced by the state, and if he dislikes those terms (for example, immunity from suit for failure to pay interest on a bond), he can decline to
contract. And if the out-of-state citizen’s claim is under a different source of law—for
instance, a claim that the state violated the Constitution—then Justice Holmes’s theory of immunity would not bar the claim.
Professor Caleb Nelson makes a related argument. See Nelson, supra note 20, at
1584. He maintains that although “sovereignty rests ultimately in the people and not
in any government . . . , this fact does not compel the conclusion that governments
must be amenable to suit by individuals.” Id. He explains:
Under the theory of popular sovereignty, after all, individuals who sue a state
are not really seeking the government’s money or resources; instead, they are
seeking money or resources that the people as a whole have gathered for use in
carrying out the people’s business. Suits against a state need not be regarded as
suits against an impersonal (and therefore nonsovereign) government, but can
instead be seen as suits against the sovereign people of the state in their collective capacity.
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under the law of nations of permitting the sovereign authority of
one nation—at least with a clear statement—to subject a foreign
sovereign to suit in its own courts.319 Whether one accepts Justice
Holmes’s formulation or the more conventional formulation in the
cases arising under customary international law,320 Justice Souter’s
point was that the Court has, despite periodic indications to the
contrary, not seriously attempted to dispute that the English common law serves as the foundation of its current state sovereign immunity doctrine.321
IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL AMBIVALENCE
But although the Court has not explicitly disagreed with the view
that its modern state sovereign immunity decisions derive from the

Id. Professor Nelson’s argument encounters difficulties, however, when the individual
who sues the state does so under a cause of action created by the United States to enforce an obligation imposed by the United States—or, in Professor Nelson’s formulation, “the sovereign people of the [United States] in their collective capacity”—on the
state. Id.
319
Justice Holmes’s view is consistent with the law-of-nations approach first announced in this country in The Schooner Exchange. As explained above, that case acknowledged the power of Congress (as the repository of sovereign authority) to subject foreign states to suit in our courts. See supra notes 176–205 and accompanying
text; see also The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146
(1812). When Congress exercises that power, the foreign state is not “the source of
the right upon which suit is brought.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 796 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citing Kawananakoa, 205 U.S. at 353).
320
See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137 (“One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest
character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign
rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory
only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to
his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by
implication, and will be extended to him.”) (emphasis added).
321
Justice Souter argued in Alden that it ultimately does not matter whether the
Court anchors its current doctrine in the English common law or in natural law—
There is no escape from the trap of Holmes’s logic save recourse to the argument that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not the rationally necessary or
inherent immunity of the civilians, but the historically contingent, and to a degree illogical, immunity of the common law. But if the Court admits that the
source of sovereign immunity is the common law, it must also admit that the
common law doctrine could be changed by Congress acting under the Commerce Clause. It is not for me to say which way the Court should turn; but in either case it is clear that Alden’s suit should go forward.
Alden, 527 U.S. at 798 (Souter, J., dissenting).

SMITH.BOOK.DOC

2003]

2/24/03 9:31 PM

States as Nations

77

English common law,322 the Court’s recent elevation of state dignity
as a basis for its state sovereign immunity doctrine suggests that,
whatever the Court might say about the doctrine’s common-law
roots, it is looking elsewhere for doctrinal support. The Court’s
rhetorical clues suggest that it is drawing support from the doctrine
of foreign state sovereign immunity and the law of nations.
To be sure, the Court has not explicitly or avowedly relied on
customary international law in its state sovereign immunity decisions, and the Court has not explicitly analogized the immunity enjoyed by the (several) states to the immunity of sovereign nations
in the courts of other nations. But, as explained above, “state dignity” is a legal term of art that our courts have used since the
founding, and it has a particular implication in the context in which
it has conventionally been used. Absent some indication from the
Court that its use of the concept in the state sovereign immunity
cases is intended to mean something else, it is fair to assume that
the Court has borrowed the concept from its original context.
It is, of course, impossible to know precisely what the Court intends when it relies on the concept of state dignity in the state sovereign immunity cases. It is entirely possible, for example, that the
322

See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 (explaining the legacy of the English common law for
the Framers) (citing 1 Blackstone, supra note 124, at *234–35, regarding the “prerogatives of the Crown”); Alden, 527 U.S. at 715–16 (“Although the American people had
rejected other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could
not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was
drafted and ratified.”); id. at 733 (“Although the sovereign immunity of the States derives at least in part from the common-law tradition, the structure and history of the
Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional design.”); id.
at 734–35 (“The dissent has offered no evidence that the Founders believed sovereign
immunity extended only to cases where the sovereign was the source of the right asserted. No such limitation existed on sovereign immunity in England, where sovereign
immunity was predicated on a different theory altogether.”); id. at 741–42 (describing
English common-law rule, and its impact on the ratification debates); 1 Pollock &
Maitland, supra note 132, at 518. To be fair, because Alden involved a suit against a
state in its own courts, the English common law was the doctrinally appropriate
source of whatever immunity the state enjoyed. But the Court has not attempted,
since Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 417–18 (1979), to draw any distinction based on
the court in which the state is sued. Instead, the Court has insisted that the historical
origins of the doctrine are largely irrelevant, because the states’ immunity is now fixed
in the constitutional structure. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 n.4 (1999) (“[S]tate sovereign immunity, unlike
foreign sovereign immunity, is a constitutional doctrine that is meant to be both immutable by Congress and resistant to trends.”).
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references to state dignity are merely loose talk, rhetorical flourishes intended to underscore the fundamental point that “the states
matter”—that is, that the states’ status (or “dignity”) in our constitutional system means that they cannot be treated as ordinary defendants.323 Professor Daniel Farber has suggested, for example,
that the Court’s focus on the states’ dignity is simply a means (albeit a crude one) to underscore the states’ “unique role in republican self-government.”324 If this is the sense in which the Court has
used the notion of state dignity, then it is a slender reed on which
to rest current state sovereign immunity doctrine, and it is a particularly unsatisfying response to the substantial historical and textual evidence that scholars have offered to demonstrate that the
states’ constitutional immunity from suit was in fact intended to be
much more limited than that recognized by current doctrine.325
It is fair, for several reasons, to assume that the persistent references to state dignity in fact mean much more. First, as explained
above, a historical survey of the Court’s state sovereign immunity
doctrine reveals periodic waves of judicial interest in the notion of
state dignity. Second, the increasing centrality of the concept of
state dignity in the state sovereign immunity decisions naturally
will lead commentators to question the meaning and content of the
concept. Third, “state dignity” has a well-established meaning in
the related context of foreign state sovereign immunity, a meaning
with which one can assume the Court is familiar. Fourth and most
important, the Court has said that the fundamental inquiry in the
state sovereign immunity cases, as in other federalism cases, is to
determine precisely what “attributes of sovereignty” the states retained at the ratification. The Court has attempted to answer this
question by invoking a concept—“state dignity”—that has a well323

Indeed, other than a few cryptic references to international law in this context,
the Court has not purported to rely explicitly on foreign state sovereign immunity
doctrine as support for its state sovereign immunity doctrine. See Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (arguing that Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890), “found its roots not solely in the common law of England, but in the much
more fundamental ‘jurisprudence in all civilized nations’”) (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at
17) (citation omitted)).
324
Farber, supra note 7, at 1136. Under this view, the states’ virtually categorical
immunity from private suits resembles other recently identified categorical rules of
federalism, such as the anti-commandeering principle. See Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
325
See sources cited supra note 20.
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established doctrinal meaning and that serves to delimit the “attributes of sovereignty” of fully sovereign nations. In light of these
considerations, it is difficult to understand the Court’s reliance on
state dignity as anything other than a conscious attempt to draw on
the international law doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity
to support state sovereign immunity doctrine.326 At a minimum, if
the Court is not attempting to invoke the doctrine of foreign state
sovereign immunity, the burden is on the Court to demonstrate
that “state dignity” means something different in this context than
it does in the context in which it developed.
In any event, the Court’s recent elevation of the notion of state
dignity as a basis for decision has made more imperative a critical
assessment of the appropriateness of relying on a notion drawn
from the law of nations to justify an expansive doctrine of state
sovereign immunity. In addition, the centrality of the concept of
state dignity to the current doctrine invites an inquiry into the doctrinal implications of importing the concept from the doctrine of
foreign state sovereign immunity.
This Article has so far demonstrated that the concept of state
dignity is not alien to cases governing the immunity of foreign states
in U.S. courts, and that the notion of state dignity has a particular
meaning in that context. As explained above,327 the Court invokes
sovereign dignity in those cases to underscore two important
points. First, for one sovereign to entertain a suit against another
sovereign inevitably diminishes the sovereign authority of the latter, and thus (contrary to the presumptive “equal rights and equal
independence” of the two sovereigns328) suggests that the latter’s
status is inferior to the former’s. Second, the presumptive equal
status of distinct sovereigns requires that an assertion of jurisdiction by one over another be made by the “sovereign power of the
326

Ultimately, it does not matter whether the Court has purposefully sought to import wholesale into state sovereign immunity doctrine the particular notion of state
dignity that is central to foreign state sovereign immunity doctrine. If in relying on
state dignity the Court means to suggest something other than what the notion has
long meant in its original context, the burden is on the Court to explain what precisely
the notion means in the domestic context. Until the Court suggests that an American
state’s dignity is sui generis, it is appropriate to consider whether the customary international law notion of state dignity is apposite in the domestic context.
327
See supra notes 190–202 and accompanying text.
328
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
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nation [that] is alone competent” to do so, and not by a court that
has no authority in the field of foreign relations.329
The current Court’s reliance on the notion of state dignity suggests that it, like the Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is borrowing from foreign state sovereign immunity
doctrine. But in light of the Court’s recent elevation of state dignity
as a rationale for its expansion of state sovereign immunity doctrine, one might wonder why the Court has refused to disavow the
English common law as the source for its expansive view of state
sovereign immunity and expressly embrace the law of nations from
which the concept of sovereign dignity derives. Indeed, one would
expect the Court to be eager to distance itself from a doctrine
originally premised on the notion that the “King can do no wrong.”
The answer, I suggest here, is two-fold. First, although the Court’s
anti-federalist majority has not been shy about promoting the view
that the states retain a significant degree of sovereign authority, it
would be another thing altogether to suggest that the states stand
in a relationship to the federal government comparable to that enjoyed by foreign sovereign nations. Second, even assuming that the
Court’s (implicit) analogy of the several states to “wholly independent sovereigns”330 is appropriate, the consequences of that analogy
would directly contradict the Court’s most recent pronouncements
on the scope of the states’ sovereign immunity.
A. American States as Foreign States
At first blush, there is nothing particularly striking about the
Court’s apparent reliance in its state sovereign immunity doctrine
on the notion of state dignity drawn from the related doctrine of
foreign state sovereign immunity. Indeed, the Court has often borrowed principles of international law to govern relations among the
states. For example, the Court has long borrowed principles from
the law of nations to resolve disputes between states. Article III of
the Constitution creates jurisdiction over disputes “between two or
more States,”331 and gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction

329

Id. at 146.
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 425 (1979).
331
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
330
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of disputes in which a “State shall be a Party.”332 The Court has often exercised this authority to resolve disputes between states,
most frequently border disputes and controversies over the apportionment of water from interstate waterways. In deciding such
cases, the Court’s guiding principle has been to ensure the states’
“equality of right”333—“a principle inferred from the constitutional
structure and borrowed from background assumptions of the law
of nations.”334
The Supreme Court has explained that because the “several
states are of equal dignity and authority, and [because] the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others[,] . . . the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity.”335 Because this
constitutionally compelled336 relationship among the states so closely

332

Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Alexander Hamilton argued that the reasoning behind this
grant of original jurisdiction was that “[i]n cases in which a State might happen to be a
party, it would ill suit its dignity to be turned over to an inferior tribunal.” The Federalist No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65–66 (1979) (stating that the Framers gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases involving states in order to “match[] the
dignity of the parties to the status of the court”).
333
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931).
334
Clark, supra note 166, at 1323.
335
Brown v. Fletcher, 210 U.S. 82, 89 (1908) (emphasis added) (quoting Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877)); see also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907)
(“Neither State can legislate for or impose its own policy on the other.”).
336
The Constitution’s treatment of the states as co-equals is most evident in its guarantee of equal representation in the Senate. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one vote.”);
id. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in
the Senate.”). Other constitutional provisions underscore this principle. See, e.g., id.
art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of
any other State . . . .”). The Court has often recognized the constitutional equality of
the states. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) (“[T]he constitutional equality
of the States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the
Republic was organized.”).
This principle is the basis of the Court’s “equal footing” doctrine—that is, the requirement that new states be admitted to the union on an “equal footing” with existing states. See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845) (“When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, she
succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which
Georgia possessed at the date of the cession . . . .”).
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parallels the relationships among sovereign nations,337 the Court
has drawn, in resolving interstate disputes, on principles from the
law of nations.338 Specifically, the Court has sought to implement, in
the words of customary international law doctrine, the “absolute
equality” of the states.339
It is unsurprising that the Court has looked to the law of nations
to resolve disputes between states. Congress is largely divested of
authority to resolve such disputes through ordinary legislation,340
337

See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (“Every sovereign State is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory.”); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 136 (1812) (“The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. . . . Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external
source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction . . . .”).
338
See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146–47 (1902) (“Sitting, as it were, as an
international, as well as a domestic tribunal, we apply Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand . . . .”).
339
For example, in resolving a dispute between New Jersey and Delaware over the
location of the boundary between the two states in the Delaware Bay and River, the
Court invoked the principle of the ‘Thalweg’—that is, the strongest current and the
track used by boats in their course down the waterway—to resolve the issue. See New
Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 379 (1934). The Court thus drew the boundary
through the “middle of the main channel,” not “by the geographical centre, half way
between the banks.” Id.; see also Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516 U.S. 22, 24–25 (1995)
(recounting the use of the rule of ‘Thalweg’ in previous boundary dispute cases between Louisiana and Mississippi).
340
See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 84 (1907) (“[E]arly drafts of the Constitution [made] . . . provision . . . that the Senate should have exclusive power to regulate
the manner of deciding [certain] disputes and controversies between the States. . . . As
finally adopted, the Constitution omits all provisions for the Senate taking cognizance
of disputes between the States and leaves [that authority] to the Supreme Court.”). In
fact, as Professor Brad Clark explains:
[T]he Constitution established two alternative and exclusive means of resolving
controversies between states. First, the states themselves may voluntarily enter
into an “Agreement or Compact” to resolve their differences, but only with
“the Consent of Congress.” Second, the states may seek judicial resolution of
their disputes by invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Clark, supra note 166, at 1325–26. This is not to say that the Executive Branch has no
role in interstate disputes. In Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854), which
involved a border dispute between Florida and Georgia, the United States sought
leave to intervene to protect land that had “been considered and treated heretofore as
public domain of the United States.” Id. at 479. The states contended that permitting
the United States to intervene was inconsistent with Article III’s grant of original jurisdiction over controversies in which a state is party. Id. at 493. The Court disagreed,
noting that the intervention of the United States is not “derogatory to the dignity of
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and the law of any one state would be an obviously inappropriate
basis on which to decide a dispute between states. More important,
as a matter of constitutional structure, the states stand as equals in
their relations inter se. This, of course, is the same relationship that
international law contemplates among sovereigns. Accordingly, the
Court has looked to background principles of the law of nations in
resolving disputes between states.341 This does not mean, however,
that the states are otherwise comparable to foreign nations. Nor do
the Court’s references to state dignity in this context somehow
suggest that the states ought to be treated as akin to wholly independent sovereigns within the meaning of the law of nations. Instead, the Court has intended its references to the states’ “equal
. . . power, dignity and authority”342 to demonstrate that the states
enjoy equal status with respect to each other, not with respect to
the United States or any other foreign nation.343
the litigating States, or any impeachment of their good faith. It merely carries into effect [the Interstate Compact Clause], which was adopted by the States for their general safety.” Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
341
That the Court has drawn on rules from customary international law does not
mean that international law actually applies of its own force to controversies between
states. Accordingly, the Court in Kansas v. Colorado (with self-conscious hyperbole)
described its role “as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic tribunal.” 206
U.S. at 48; see also id. at 97 (“International law is no alien in this tribunal.”). It made
clear, however, that the law it applied to the states’ dispute was properly characterized as “interstate common law,” not international law. Id. at 98.
342
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566–68 (1911) (discussing the “equal footing” doctrine: “‘This Union’ was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority, each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution itself.”).
343
Professor Thomas Lee argues that Article III’s provision of Supreme Court original jurisdiction only in cases affecting ambassadors and those in which states are parties “makes perfect sense from an international law perspective, if one were to equate
the sovereign dignity of the States with that of nation-states.” Lee, supra note 119, at
1059–60. I fail to see how this conclusion follows from the premise. The Framers gave
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases involving states to “match[] the
dignity of the parties to the status of the court.” California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59,
65–66 (1979); accord The Federalist No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). In this context, it seems plain that the term dignity merely describes the special status that states enjoy in our constitutional system. Whatever one
thinks about the degree to which the states retain sovereignty, they surely retain some
privileged status in the Constitution, and easy recourse to the highest court in the land
is one recognition of that status. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. But it is settled
that it is up to Congress to decide whether to make that jurisdiction exclusive or instead to confer such jurisdiction on the lower federal courts, and the permissible
manner in which Congress has exercised that power is instructive. See Bors v. Pre-
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Before the mid-twentieth century, this theory of interstate relations that the Court borrowed from the law of nations also served
as the foundation of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. In Pennoyer v. Neff, the Court held that a state court could enter a binding judgment against an unconsenting nonresident defendant only
if he had been served with process within the forum state.344 The
Court based its theory of personal jurisdiction on “two wellestablished principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an
independent State over persons and property.”345 First, “every State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory.”346 Second, “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its

ston, 111 U.S. 252, 256–58 (1884). Congress has conferred on the Supreme Court
“original but not exclusive jurisdiction” of “[a]ll actions or proceedings by a State
against the citizens of another State or against aliens” and “[a]ll actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, or vice consuls of foreign
states are parties,” 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2002) (emphasis added), whereas it has conferred exclusive original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court only of “controversies between two or more States,” id. § 1251(a). This underscores the Supreme Court’s
unique role as arbiter of interstate disputes, given the equal status of the states. But it
hardly suggests that the states are equal in status to foreign nations; indeed, it appears
to suggest the opposite.
This is not to say that I necessarily disagree with Professor Lee’s conclusion that
disputes among co-equal states are “analytically indistinguishable from international
disputes.” Lee, supra note 119, at 1067. The relationship of one state to other states is
indeed comparable to the relationship of one nation to another, but the important
point is that these parallels do not lead to the step that the Court has taken—that the
states somehow are equal in status to foreign nations. Professor Lee thus may well be
correct that the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment “looked to international law for
insight into how to protect the sovereign dignity of States involved in interstate and
international disputes,” but that does not mean that the Eleventh Amendment elevates the status of the states to that of foreign nation. Id.; see also id. at 1031 (same);
id. at 1030 (arguing that international law was an analogy and did not govern when
states could be sued, a matter governed by domestic law).
344
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
345
Id. at 722. The Court made clear that “public law” referred to the law of nations:
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent,
many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now
vested in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained
and limited by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are
applicable to them.
Id.
346
Id.
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territory.”347 The Court acknowledged that the states are not “in
every respect independent” as are sovereign states within the meaning of the law of nations.348 But principles drawn from the law of
nations nevertheless were apposite, the Court explained, because
the relationship of the states with each other was analytically indistinguishable from the relationships among sovereign nations. Because “[t]he several States are of equal dignity and authority[,] . . .
the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all
others.”349
The Pennoyer Court’s theory of the territorial limitations on the
authority of state courts has, of course, been replaced by a more
expansive theory of personal jurisdiction based on the contacts of
the defendant with the forum state.350 But the Pennoyer Court’s
view of the necessary limitations on state authority imposed by the
federal system retains some vitality in modern personal jurisdiction
analysis.351 Indeed, because it is not uncommon for several states to
have equally compelling interests in providing a forum for the resolution of a single controversy, there must be some basis for determining when one of those states can assert jurisdiction over the
controversy, effectively excluding the other states from doing the
same.352 In other words, the presumptively equal claim of several
347

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
350
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).
351
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (arguing that physical presence alone is a sufficient basis for state-court jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1980) (“[W]e have never accepted the
proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we,
and remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution. . . . The sovereignty of each State . . . implied a limitation on the sovereignty of
all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of
the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 251 (1958) (“[The requirement of minimum contacts is] more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. [It is] a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States.”).
352
For example, consider the facts in World-Wide Volkswagen. The plaintiffs, originally New York residents, purchased a car from one of the defendants in New York,
decided to move to Arizona, and on the way were involved in a car accident in Oklahoma that caused their car to ignite. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288–89. The
plaintiffs brought a products liability action, claiming that the car was defectively designed. Id. Arizona (the plaintiffs’ new state of residence), New York (the defendant’s
348
349
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states to adjudicatory authority requires some means of limiting
the authority of any one over matters in which other states have an
adjudicatory interest. This state of affairs calls to mind the relationship among nations,353 and it thus is unsurprising that the Pennoyer
Court’s reasoning and rhetoric closely tracked that of Chief Justice
Marshall in The Schooner Exchange.354
For the same reason, the Court invoked the notion of state dignity in addressing whether one state enjoys constitutional immunity from suit in another state’s courts under the forum state’s laws.
As discussed above, the Court held in Nevada v. Hall355 that a state
does not enjoy such immunity. In reaching that conclusion, the
Court relied explicitly on the notion of comity in The Schooner Exchange.356 The Court explained that Nevada’s claim of immunity
could be answered only by reference to the “common usage among
nations in which every sovereign was understood to have waived its
exclusive territorial jurisdiction over visiting sovereigns, or their
representatives, in certain classes of cases.”357 And as the Court had
made clear in The Schooner Exchange, under well-established
principles of international law, the decision of one sovereign to
grant immunity in its courts to another sovereign ultimately is a
state of residence and the site of the sale of the allegedly defective car), and Oklahoma (the site of the accident) all had an interest in the resolution of the dispute. The
Court held that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction over the New York car dealer and the
regional distributor, in part because any other conclusion would provide no basis for
reconciling the competing interests of these states in adjudicating the controversy. Id.
at 293–94.
353
Indeed, the Court in Pennoyer also invoked principles of comity under the law of
nations to support its view of the territorial limitations on the authority of state
courts. 95 U.S. at 722 (“And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle,
that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is
allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.”).
354
See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Compare Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722 (“The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independence of one implies
the exclusion of power from all others.”), with The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) at 136 (“The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution
of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.”).
355
440 U.S. 410, 426–27 (1979). See supra notes 300–21 and accompanying text.
356
Hall, 440 U.S. at 417.
357
Id. at 416–17 (citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136).
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“voluntary decision of the [former] to respect the dignity of the
[latter] as a matter of comity.”358
As with the federal common law of disputes between states359
and the (now largely defunct) territorial view of personal jurisdiction, the Court relied on principles of international law to resolve
claims of interstate immunity because the relationship among the
several states resembles the relationship among sovereign nations
on the world stage. It is clear from the Court’s decision in Hall,
however, that it did not view the states as sovereigns within the
meaning of the law of nations. The Court premised its conclusion
that Nevada did not enjoy immunity from suit in California’s courts
in part on the Constitution’s “limitation on the sovereignty of the
several States.”360 Because of those limitations, the Court explained,
“ours is not a union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns.”361 Customary international law norms provided a useful rule of decision
not because the states were subject to international law as “wholly
independent sovereign[]” nations, but rather because the states’ coequal constitutional status—that is, the equal dignity of the
states—resembles the relationship among wholly independent sovereign nations.
It makes sense to borrow norms of customary international law
to resolve conflicts among the states because the states’ co-equal
status is analytically indistinct from the relationship among sovereign nations. The three contexts discussed above—inter-state border disputes, personal jurisdiction, and inter-state immunity—
implicate the states’ co-equal status, and thus are usefully and logically resolved by reference to law-of-nations notions of sovereign
authority and comity.

358

Id. at 416.
See generally Clark, supra note 166 (noting that the structural equality of the
states under the Constitution allows the Court simply to borrow the international legal doctrine of absolute equality of sovereign nations when resolving disputes between states).
360
Hall, 440 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added) (citing Fugitives Clause, U.S. Const. art.
IV, § 2, cl. 2; Privileges and Immunities Clause, id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1). The Court also
noted that, under the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the states lack
power to impose discriminatory taxes. Hall, 440 U.S. at 425 (citing U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8). Finally, the Court was careful to note that, as a historical matter, immunity applied to “truly independent sovereign[s].” Hall, 440 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added).
361
Id. at 425.
359
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The Court’s reliance on state dignity in its state sovereign immunity decisions, however, appears to suggest that the states stand in
the same relationship to the federal government as do foreign states.
The rule of The Schooner Exchange is that a foreign state’s equality of status on the world stage presumptively bars a suit by an individual asserting a claim against the foreign state in a U.S. court
under U.S. law. By referring to the dignity of the states to justify
the rule that the states are immune from suits by individuals asserting claims under federal law, the Court has effectively suggested
that the states enjoy equality of status with the United States. In
other words, the Court’s implicit suggestion in relying on the states’
dignity is that the states are analogous to independent sovereigns
within the meaning of customary international law.
The Court’s decision in Hall provides a useful illustration of this
point. Although the Court in Hall discussed a state’s imperative vel
non to respect the “dignity” of a co-equal state, the Court’s reasoning does not suggest that the states enjoy law-of-nations immunity
from suits authorized under federal law. Indeed, it is a non sequitur
to suggest that because the relationship among the several states
resembles the relationship among sovereign nations, the states
stand in equal dignity—in the sense of customary international law
doctrine—to the federal government. California and Nevada may
enjoy constitutional equality of status, as do France and Britain
under customary international law; but both California’s and Nevada’s sovereignty is subordinate in constitutionally meaningful
ways to the authority of the federal government. California can
subject Nevada to suit in a California court for much the same reason that Britain can (if it chooses) subject France to suit in a British
court. Any other rule would suggest that California and France
lack sovereign authority within their own borders and over matters
otherwise within the scope of their sovereign powers. There is no
governing international charter that provides a Supremacy Clause
upon which France can rely to defeat an assertion of jurisdiction in
a British court; the Constitution envisions a similar equality of right
among the several states.362
362

Hall could be read, to be sure, to suggest (though not decide) that the states’ immunity from suits in federal court finds its roots in the law of nations, not the English
common law. The Court’s discussion of that latter source of immunity is limited to
“suits in the sovereign’s own courts,” whereas the former source of immunity is impli-
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In relying on state dignity in the state sovereign immunity cases,
the Court has opened another front in the continuing battle over
the appropriate status of the states, the issue that most divides the
current Court. Notwithstanding the risk of oversimplifying what
Justice O’Connor has described as “our oldest question of constitutional law,”363 the fundamental dispute has been over the degree to
which the states retained sovereignty after the ratification.364 As
Professor Akhil Amar has described the fault line, the battle is between those who view the Constitution as a “federal compact among
cated in “suits in the courts of another sovereign.” Id. at 414. If one views a suit
against a state in a federal court as a suit in the court of “another sovereign,” then the
Court’s decision in Hall appears to support the proposition that the states’ immunity
from suit in federal courts—that is, the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity—
derives from the doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity.
This view of Hall, however, appears wrong for two reasons. First, the decision
makes clear that the Court did not view the states as sovereigns within the meaning of
the law of nations. The Court premised its conclusion that Nevada did not enjoy
immunity from suit in California’s courts in part on the Constitution’s “limitation on
the sovereignty of the several States.” Id. at 425 (emphasis added) (citing Fugitives
Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; Privileges and Immunities Clause, id. art. IV, § 2,
cl. 1). The Court also noted that, under the Court’s interpretation of the Commerce
Clause, the states lack power to impose discriminatory taxes. Id. at 425 (citing U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8). Finally, the Court was careful to note that, as a historical matter,
immunity applied to “truly independent sovereign[s].” Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
Because of these limitations, “ours is not a union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns.” Id. at 425. Second, as discussed above, the Court’s most recent cases on state
sovereign immunity have steadfastly insisted that the states’ immunity derives from
the English common law, and have even cited Hall for that proposition. See, e.g.,
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999) (“Although the American people had
rejected other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could
not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was
drafted and ratified.”) (emphasis added); cf. id. at 715 (“When the Constitution was
ratified, it was well established in English law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in its own courts.”) (citing Hall, 440 U.S. at 414).
363
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
364
Compare U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“The ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of
the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of
the Nation as a whole.”), and Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779
(1991) (stating that the states entered the Union “with their sovereignty intact”), and
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“‘[U]nder our federal system, the
States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject
only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause.’”) (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt,
493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)), with Alden, 527 U.S. at 812 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“A
State is not the sovereign when a federal claim is pressed against it . . . .”), and Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985) (“[T]he sovereignty of
the States is limited by the Constitution itself.”).
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thirteen sovereign principals” and those who view the Constitution
not as “an inter-sovereign compact or treaty, but a supreme statute
deriving from the supreme sovereign legislature—the People of the
nation.”365 The current Court has consistently divided over which
view is correct.366 This debate has spawned a rich literature,367 and
there is no need to dwell at length on this general question here. It
is, however, worth noting that state sovereign immunity doctrine
has, at least since the Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,
been but one battle in a larger war over the status of the states.
Yet the Court’s reliance on the notion of state dignity—a concept that defines the prerogatives of sovereignty of wholly sovereign nations—is in many ways more striking than other assertions
of state autonomy in the Court’s recent federalism revival. Whatever one can say about the sovereign prerogatives retained by the
states at the ratification—and, indeed, there is much debate with

365

Amar, supra note 20, at 1452.
For the quintessential example of this debate, compare U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801 (1995) (“As we have frequently noted, ‘[t]he States unquestionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign authority. They do so, however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original
powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.’”) (quoting Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)), and U.S.
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 837–38 (describing “the Framers’ understanding that Members of Congress are . . . not merely delegates appointed by separate, sovereign States;
they occupy offices that are integral and essential components of a single National
Government”), with id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The ultimate source of the
Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the
consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.”).
367
There is not enough room to chronicle here the countless worthy contributions to
the literature. What follows is merely a representative sample of recent works from
which I have benefitted. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue (1995);
Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York,
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71; Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 135 (2001); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Tex. L. Rev.
1321 (2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist
Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 429, 431 (2002); Barry Friedman,
Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 317 (1997); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000);
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev.
125; Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903 (1994).
366
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respect to that question368—the states indisputably did not remain
(or become) full sovereigns within the meaning of the law of nations after the ratification: “When the United States broke from
Great Britain, it was not a foregone conclusion that the immunity
enjoyed by sovereign nations should be accorded to each of the
states. . . . [T]he [thirteen] individual states were not exactly thirteen separate countries.”369 The Declaration of Independence itself
suggested something more in the nature of a confederation.370 As
Professor Jack Rakove explains, under the Articles of Confederation, the states were not “nation-states in the conventional sense,
fully empowered to confront the nations of Europe as equal sovereigns.”371

368

Compare Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (“[T]he founding document ‘specifically recognizes the States as sovereign entities.’”) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 71 n.15 (1996)), and Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779 (“[T]he States entered
the federal system with their sovereignty intact . . . .”), with Alden, 527 U.S. at 800
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“The State of Maine is not sovereign with respect to the national objectives of the FLSA.”), and Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 150 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]e surely did not mean [in Blatchford] that [the states] entered that system with the sovereignty they would have claimed if each State had assumed
independent existence in the community of nations, for even the Articles of Confederation allowed for less than that.”), and id. at 153–54 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
ratification demonstrated that state governments were subject to a superior regime of
law in a judicial system established, not by the State, but by the people through a specific delegation of their sovereign power to a National Government that was paramount within its delegated sphere.”).
369
Nelson, supra note 20, at 1576. But cf. Pfander, supra note 135, at 584 (“During
the period that preceded the framing, the states regarded themselves and one another
as sovereign states within the meaning of the law of nations . . . .”).
370
See The Declaration of Independence para. 32 (U.S. 1776) (stating that the members of the Continental Congress issued the document as “Representatives of the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in General Congress, Assembled”).
371
Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49
Stan. L. Rev. 1031, 1043 (1997). Under the Articles, many powers implicit in the nature of sovereignty—including the power to enter treaties and to “determin[e] on
peace and war”—were committed to “[t]he United States in Congress assembled,” as
opposed to the individual states. Articles of Confederation of 1871, art. IX, cl. 2; see
Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism 192–
94, 235–36 (1993) (arguing that, given the states’ lack of authority over foreign affairs,
the states were not sovereign). To be sure, in practice the United States under the Articles of Confederation “was not much more than the ‘United Nations’ is in 1987: a
mutual treaty conveniently dishonored on all sides.” Amar, supra note 20, at 1448.
Indeed, Professor Gordon Wood argues that the Articles contemplated an arrangement whereby, in the words of Emmerich de Vattel, “sovereign and independent
States” could “unite [to form] a perpetual confederacy” without “ceasing to be a per-
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Whatever doubt there may have been of the states’ sovereign
status under the Articles372 was eliminated upon ratification of the
Constitution, when the states “ceded important portions of their
sovereignty to the federal government.”373 The Constitution, among
other things, specifically divested the states of the traditional sovereign powers of diplomacy,374 power over monetary policy,375 and
the power to impose tariffs on imports and exports;376 imposed
upon the states affirmative obligations with respect to citizens of
other states;377 and provided that state law would yield to federal
law when the two conflict.378 As a result of these important restrictions on state sovereignty, “[a] State of the United States is not a
state under international law.”379 Indeed, at a minimum, to qualify
as a “state” under the meaning of international law, the entity must

fect State.” Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, at
354–55 (1969) (quoting Vattel, supra note 163, at 12).
372
Notwithstanding such doubts about the degree to which the states were sovereign
before the ratification, several commentators have argued that the states had sovereign immunity under the Articles. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 20, at 1577–78;
Pfander, supra note 135, at 584; see also supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text.
373
Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1325 (1996).
374
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation; [or] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal . . . .”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3
(“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or
in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”).
375
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make
any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts . . . .”).
376
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports . . . .”).
377
See, e.g., id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
378
Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). A number of Amendments to
the Constitution, of course, also limited the sovereignty of the states. E.g., id. amends.
XIII–XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
379
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 201
cmt. g (1987). The Restatement provides in full: “A State of the United States is not a
state under international law since under the Constitution of the United States foreign relations are the exclusive responsibility of the Federal Government.” Id.
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“engage[] in, or ha[ve] the capacity to engage in, formal relations
with other such entities.”380
Accordingly, although there is room for debate over precisely
how much autonomy the states enjoy,381 the states plainly are not
fully independent sovereigns in the sense of the word under customary international law.382 Indeed, even a proponent of the most
extreme anti-federalist view must concede that, under our constitutional structure, the states have ceded a significant amount of
power traditionally enjoyed by sovereign nations—most funda-

380

Id. § 201 (“Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory
and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”).
381
According to Professor Daniel Meltzer, it is possible to deduce three principal
views of the status that the states attained after ratification. The nationalist view
stresses that “the separate colonies acted collectively through the Declaration of Independence and the Continental Congress” and holds that “neither before nor after
Independence were the states fully sovereign in the classic sense . . . .” Meltzer, supra
note 11, at 1042–43 n.131. The transformative nationalist view holds that “while the
Articles of Confederation were a traditional federation that preserved state sovereignty, the Constitution represented a novel reordering of affairs, in which the sovereign people designed a new national government that was supreme over the states but
whose powers were limited in important respects.” Id. Finally, the state-oriented view
maintains that “the states not only became sovereign entities during Independence
and remained so during the Confederation period, but also that they preserved their
political sovereignty even when the Constitution was ratified, except insofar as they
delegated limited powers to the national government.” Id. Although “[h]istory rarely
falls into [such] neat models,” id. (citing Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty Part 1, 2 Green Bag 2d 35, 39 (1998)), it is fair to describe Justice Wilson’s
opinion in Chisholm as illustrative of the nationalist view, see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.), Chief Justice John Marshall as a
proponent of the transformative nationalist view, see, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326–28 (1819), and at least Justices Thomas, O’Connor, and
Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, as proponents of the state-oriented view, see U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845–49 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
382
See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 201
cmt. g (1987) (“A State of the United States is not a state under international law
since under the Constitution of the United States foreign relations are the exclusive
responsibility of the Federal Government.”); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright,
299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (“[S]ince the states severally never possessed international
powers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass of state powers but
obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other source.”); 2 Joseph
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 626 (photo. reprint
1991) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (“[T]he states can exercise no powers
whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national government,
which the constitution does not delegate to them. . . . No state can say, that it has reserved, what it never possessed.”); see supra notes 379–80 and accompanying text.
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mentally, the authority to engage in relations with foreign nations.383 The Court’s reliance on state dignity, therefore, has taken
the Court even farther down the anti-federalist path than it has
gone in other recent skirmishes over the appropriate balance between federal and state power.
The Court’s analogy to foreign sovereign immunity therefore
fails on its own terms. Although there is room for debate over precisely how much autonomy the states enjoy, they plainly are not
co-equal sovereigns with the United States (or any other foreign
state). The French government surely is not bound by U.S. federal
law, “any Thing in [France’s] Constitution or Laws . . . to the Contrary notwithstanding.”384 Yet by drawing on the doctrine of foreign
state sovereign immunity—again, implicitly through invocation of
the notion of state dignity—the Court suggests that the states enjoy
sovereignty as does France.385
383

For example, Thomas Jefferson—who rarely has been accused of being a forceful
proponent of the nationalist view of federalism—considered it “‘indispensably necessary that with respect to everything external we be one nation firmly hooped together.’” Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution 46 (1937) (citing a letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison dated Oct. 8, 1786). Madison agreed, arguing that “[i]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to
other nations.” The Federalist No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Jefferson’s and Madison’s agreement is not surprising given the ultimately disastrous state of affairs under the Articles of Confederation, which effectively permitted the states “by their conduct [to] provoke war without controul.” James Madison,
Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
384
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Under evolving conceptions of the obligations arising
under international law, there may well be substantial limits on the ability of even
fully sovereign nations to take certain actions. See generally Laurence R. Helfer &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,
107 Yale L.J. 273 (1997) (exploring the effectiveness of European supranational tribunals’ ability to convince domestic governments to enforce their judgments). But
such principles merely define the upper limit of the prerogatives of sovereignty; they
do not purport to convert entities that enjoy something less than complete sovereignty
into sovereign nations for the purposes of international law.
385
The other context in which the Court has suggested that the states stand in equal
dignity to the federal government is inter-governmental taxation. See McCallen Co. v.
Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, 628 (1929) (“Not only may the power to tax be exercised
oppressively, but for one government—state or national—to lay a tax upon the instrumentalities or securities of the other is derogatory to the latter’s dignity, subversive of its powers, and repugnant to its paramount authority.”); see also id. at 637
(Stone, J., dissenting) (“[O]nly considerations of public policy of weight, which appear
to be here wholly wanting, would justify overturning a principle so long established. It
has survived a great war, financed by the sale of government obligations; and it has
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Reliance on “state dignity” is particularly inapposite in the context of state sovereign immunity when one considers the connotation of that term in the law-of-nations context. In the latter context,
the Court refers to state dignity as a shorthand description of the
relationship in which a foreign sovereign stands to the United
States, and to underscore that our relations with foreign nations
ought to be conducted not by courts—which do not have constitutional authority to engage in foreign relations with co-equal sovereigns—but rather by the political branches, which can deal as
equals with other nations on the international stage. Neither of
these rationales has any application to the relationship between the
United States and the several states. As to the first—the natural
corollary of the proposition that foreign states and the United
States have “equal rights and equal independence”386—the states
plainly do not stand in the same relationship to the United States
as do foreign states; instead, they must yield, even in their own re-

never even been suggested that in any practical way it has impaired either the dignity
or credit of the national government.”). The Court has long held that states lack authority directly to tax the federal government. See Tribe, supra note 52, at 1222. The
Court has also suggested that the federal government cannot levy a tax that falls only
upon the states. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575–76 (1946). This
structural principle, however, is premised on the theory that the Constitution contemplates the continued existence of both the states and the federal government. Because
“[a]n unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy,” the constitutional structure requires a prohibition on at least some inter-governmental taxation.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819).
In any event, the Court has suggested that the “dignity” of the United States is not
impermissibly affronted by requiring it to litigate in the courts of one of the several
states. In United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 470 (1936), the
United States sued banks that held certain Russian insurance funds, claiming that
they were the owners of the funds as a result of an assignment made by the Russian
government upon its recognition by the United States. Id. State courts simultaneously
were conducting in rem proceedings over the same funds. Id. The Court held that the
state courts had jurisdiction to dispose of the funds, and that the United States ought
to intervene in those suits: “In intervening for the presentation of its claim, the United
States would be an actor—voluntarily asserting what it deemed to be its rights—and
not a defendant. We cannot see that there would be impairment of any rights the
United States may possess or any sacrifice to its proper dignity as a sovereign, if it
prosecuted its claim in the appropriate forum where the funds are held.” Id. at 480–81
(emphasis added). If it does not offend the dignity of the United States to be forced to
litigate in the state courts, it is difficult to see how it can offend the dignity of a state—
which, after all, is constitutionally bound by federal law—to be forced to litigate in
federal court.
386
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
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spective territories, to the federal government whenever it exercises one of its enumerated powers.387 As to the second, although
the courts will, as a matter of comity, refrain from intervening in
certain disputes involving states,388 the Constitution explicitly envisions an exclusive role for the Court as an arbiter of disputes between states.389
B. Doctrinal Consequences of Viewing American States
as Foreign States
The Court’s implicit equation of the several states with foreign
states in their relationship to the United States would be largely a
matter of academic interest if no consequences flowed from the
comparison.390 But there are important doctrinal consequences of
the Court’s importation of the principles of foreign state sovereign
immunity to the jurisprudence of state sovereign immunity, although the Court has thus far demonstrated a disconcerting tendency to refuse to take the bitter with the sweet. By relying on the
states’ dignity—and thus by invoking the doctrine of foreign state
sovereign immunity—the Court has presumably intended to bolster its arguments elsewhere391 about the status of the states in our
constitutional system. But if in fact the states ought to be treated,
for purposes of immunity doctrine, as wholly independent sover387

See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44, 45 (1971).
389
See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907);
Pfander, supra note 135, at 597.
390
Of course, even if no doctrinal consequences flowed from the Court’s invocation
of state dignity, both the nonconsequentialist and the instrumental expressivist accounts of the doctrine would still be apposite. Under the nonconsequentialist view,
the Court’s repeated references would be intended to affirm that “the fundamental
structural commitments embedded in our constitutional system of governance matters
for its own sake, not as a means to achieving some other end.” Caminker, supra note
7, at 85. Under the instrumental view, the Court hopes that
[j]udicial protection and exaltation of state dignity will encourage people to internalize, as a political norm, the importance of having strong and vibrant states
exercising significant governmental authority. This norm-internalization will
help lead to an actual revival of such state power, thus securing the . . . advantages of decentralization within the federal structure.
Id. at 89–90. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.
391
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991).
388
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eigns—that is, as entities that possess “equal rights and equal independence” with respect to the United States—then the consequence ought to be that Congress can, with a clear statement of intent, abrogate the states’ presumptive immunity, at least in federal
court.
This conclusion flows directly from the cases that the Court has
echoed in invoking the status and dignity of the states. As explained above, Congress has power to override a background principle of the law of nations, and the Court has confirmed this principle in the context of foreign state sovereign immunity.392 To be sure,
to preserve their limited role in foreign relations and in recognition
of the damage to harmonious relations that could result from a judicial declaration that a foreign nation is amenable to suit, the
courts will refrain from finding that a foreign nation is subject to
suit unless Congress has clearly abrogated the nation’s presumptive
immunity.393 This self-imposed limitation on judicial power in the
context of foreign state sovereign immunity is a means of preserving the exclusive authority of the political branches over the field
of foreign relations. Of course, unlike some other political questions,394 the courts’ reluctance to intervene in the area of foreign
state sovereign immunity does not amount to an ironclad rule of
non-justiciability; the courts will entertain suits against foreign
states as long as the political branches395 clearly have authorized it.
392

See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486, 491–98 (1983);
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812) (“Without
doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication . . . .”).
393
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146 (“[U]ntil such power be exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as
having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would be a breach of
faith to exercise.”); cf. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 443 (1989) (holding that “the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this country”).
394
See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (holding that the Constitution commits to the Senate the power to try impeachments, and thus that an impeached federal judge’s claim that the Senate’s use of a committee to hear testimony
and gather evidence in his impeachment trial was not justiciable).
395
Although the power to abrogate foreign states’ sovereign immunity is largely
Congress’s to exercise, the Court has deferred to statements of the Executive Branch
about whether the related act of state doctrine should apply in a given case. See First
Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) (plurality opinion) (concluding that “where the Executive Branch, charged as it is with primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly represents to the Court that
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But the presumption against justiciability is strong enough, with its
long historical lineage, that courts proceed with utmost caution.396
Once the clear statement test is satisfied, however, it is established
that the courts may entertain private suits against a foreign nation.
Notwithstanding the Court’s recent importation of foreign state
sovereign immunity doctrine to state sovereign immunity doctrine,
the Court has expressly invoked the ground of non-justiciability
only once in a state sovereign immunity case. And that case—
Monaco v. Mississippi397—actually involved a conflict with a foreign
state, making judicial reluctance to intervene arguably appropriate.
In suggesting that a foreign state’s suit against Mississippi was not
of “a justiciable character,”398 the Court relied on the potential that
such a case could “involve international questions in relation to
which the United States has a sovereign prerogative.”399 Unlike in
the foreign state sovereign immunity cases, however, the Court did
not hold that Congress could exercise its “sovereign prerogative”
by permitting a suit by a foreign state against one of the several
states. Other than this context-specific invocation of federal primacy in the field of foreign relations, the Court has steadfastly refused to acknowledge the implications of relying on the foreign
state sovereign immunity cases.
Simply put, if the Court is prepared to treat the states as wholly
independent sovereigns with respect to sovereign immunity, then
the Court ought to be prepared to recognize Congress’s power to
abrogate that immunity, as it does when wholly independent sovereigns are sued in U.S. courts. This assuredly is not the current
doctrine. The Court has, to the contrary, expressly held that Con-

application of the act of state doctrine would not advance the interests of American
foreign policy, that doctrine should not be applied by the courts”). But see id. at 788–
89 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a statement from the Executive Branch is
insufficient to confer jurisdiction over a foreign state for an act of that state within its
territory). For more on the act of state doctrine, see supra note 199.
396
Indeed, even after Congress expressly abrogated foreign states’ sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court held that because jurisdiction depends on the existence of an
exception to the general rule of foreign state sovereign immunity, the court must determine whether the state is entitled to immunity even if the foreign state has not entered an appearance in the suit. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493–94 n.20.
397
292 U.S. 313 (1934).
398
Id. at 322.
399
Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
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gress lacks authority under Article I to abrogate the states’ immunity, either from suit in federal court400 or state court.401
An analogy to foreign state sovereign immunity clearly should
lead to the conclusion that Congress can subject the states to suit in
federal court. In the analogy, the state stands in the position that
the foreign state would, and it is clear that Congress can subject
foreign states to suit in our courts. Whether Congress can subject
states to suit under a federal cause of action in their own courts
raises slightly different considerations than the question whether
Congress can subject states to suit under federal law in federal
court. If in fact the source of the states’ immunity from suit is the
law of nations, then Congress arguably lacks authority to subject
states to suit in their own courts. By analogy, Congress surely could
not authorize a suit against Spain in Spanish courts under a U.S.
cause of action.402 But this analogy proves too much. The United
States stands in a vastly different relation to the several states than
it does to Spain, or to any other foreign nation. Unlike Spain, the
states are bound to abide by federal law, “any Thing in [their] Constitution or Laws . . . to the Contrary notwithstanding.”403 On the
Court’s own terms, therefore, it should not be an affront to the
states’ “dignity” to be subject to suit in state court under a federal
cause of action, because the states do not enjoy a status equal to
the United States on the world stage.404
In effect, the Court has accorded the states more sovereign prerogatives than it has extended to wholly independent sovereigns.
Although it has, through repeated invocations of state dignity, implicitly relied on notions of sovereignty drawn from the law of nations, the Court has in fact provided protections to the states that
dramatically exceed those now available to those states that truly
400

See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996).
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
See id. at 735 (“[I]t strains credibility to imagine that the King could have been
sued in his own court on, say, a French cause of action.”).
403
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
404
See, e.g., Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239,
255 (1905) (“The exercise by the Circuit Courts of the United States of the jurisdiction . . . conferred upon them is pursuant to the Supreme Law of the Land, and will
not, in any proper sense, entrench upon the dignity, authority or autonomy of the
States; for each State, by accepting the Constitution, has agreed that the courts of the
United States may exert whatever judicial power can be constitutionally conferred
upon them.”) (emphasis added).
401
402
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are sovereign under customary international law. This is a peculiar
place for the doctrine to rest. As discussed above, there is a strong
argument that it is inappropriate to treat American states as equal
in status to foreign sovereigns in the first place; it is certainly inappropriate to treat them as superior sovereigns.405
Yet current doctrine does just that. Consider Nevada v. Hall
once again. Under that decision, one state has authority to subject
another state to suit in the former state’s courts under the former
state’s law. In effect, each state has power to abrogate the immunity from suit of every other state;406 and this state of affairs exists
because the states’ relationship among themselves resembles the
relationship among sovereign nations. Congress, however, lacks
similar authority to abrogate the states’ immunity from suit. In
405

In fact, the Court’s tendency to treat states as even more sovereign than sovereign nations is not limited to the context of state sovereign immunity. In the antitrust
context, a person engaging in otherwise anticompetitive behavior is immune from liability if his actions were supervised by one of the several states and if the state had a
clear intent to displace competition. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,
504 U.S. 621, 634–35 (1992); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988); Cal. Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). The adequate supervision test is a corollary of the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51
(1943), which held that the federal antitrust laws apply only to action by private parties and not action by state legislatures or administrative bodies.
A person cannot avoid antitrust liability on the ground that his conduct was supervised by a foreign state, in contrast, unless he can demonstrate that the foreign state
actually compelled him to take the challenged action. See Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706 (1962). In other words, a United States
court can grant antitrust relief against a private party if he has been merely authorized
or permitted by a foreign state to take the anticompetitive action. In fairness, the
Court has had some difficulty at the margins in determining when an American state
has adequately supervised private action for antitrust immunity to attach. It is clear,
however, that an American state need not compel a private party to take an anticompetitive action for that action to be immune from the federal antitrust laws. See, e.g.,
S. Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 66 (1985). Therefore, a
state has greater leeway to immunize certain actions from antitrust liability than does
a foreign state.
406
Of course, Hall held precisely that states do not have “immunity” from suits under other states’ laws in other states’ courts. 404 U.S. 410, 425–27 (1979). But one can
expect, at a minimum, that the Court would be reluctant to conclude that one state
has subjected its sister states to suit absent a clear statement of intent. Cf. Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (applying a strict clear statement
principle to a federal-law suit against a state in federal court). Accordingly, it is fair to
assume that even though the states do not enjoy constitutionally indefeasible immunity
from suit in another state’s courts under the forum state’s law, they are presumptively
immune from such suits.
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other words, California has authority to subject Nevada to suit in a
California court under California law, but (putting aside several increasingly narrow exceptions) Congress lacks the power to subject
Nevada to suit in any court under federal law. Under current doctrine, the states have more authority with respect to each other
than the federal government has with respect to the states. This is,
to say the least, a bizarre state of doctrinal affairs.
Equally bizarre, Congress has undisputed power to subject a
wholly sovereign nation to suit in U.S. courts but lacks authority to
subject what Justice Sutherland—certainly no great fan of federal
power—called a “quasi-sovereign state” to suit.407 In fairness, one
could plausibly argue that because disputes involving states arise
much more frequently in our courts than disputes involving foreign
nations, a rule of special deference to the states is warranted. Although there is some initial appeal to suggesting that the states
ought to enjoy a more preferred status in our courts than do foreign states, this argument does not explain why the states deserve
to be elevated in status with respect to the federal government—
which is precisely what according a constitutionally indefeasible
immunity from suit does. In any event, it is the Court that has anchored its doctrine to the notion of the equal dignity of sovereigns;
and, as explained above, it is difficult to see how the states can be
considered, for purposes of enforcement of federal law, to be of
equal status to the United States.
To be sure, the Framers (to use Justice Kennedy’s elegant phrasing) “split the atom of sovereignty,”408 and in so doing limited the
sovereignty not only of the states but also of the federal government. One could plausibly argue, based on this division of sovereignty, that the federal government lacks the authority to abrogate
the states’ immunity from suit even though it enjoys that authority
with respect to foreign nations. The argument would progress as
follows: The United States retains plenary “external sovereignty,”
the authority to conduct foreign affairs and relations with other
sovereign nations of the world. However, “internal sovereignty,”
the right to regulate conduct within the relevant territory, was di407

Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 613–14 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
408
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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vided among the several states and the federal government. The
power at issue in foreign state sovereign immunity cases—
Congress’s authority to subject foreign states to suit in U.S. courts
for violations of federal or international law—is a function of external sovereignty. Because the federal government’s power over
external affairs is plenary, Congress must enjoy the power to abrogate the immunity of foreign states. In contrast, the power at issue
in state sovereign immunity cases—Congress’s authority to subject
the states to suit for violations of federal law—is a function of internal sovereignty. To ensure that Congress does not displace the
states’ constitutional role over matters internal, the Court should
conclude that Congress lacks the power to abrogate the states’ immunity from suit.
There is certainly some ostensible appeal to this argument, although of course justifying it with reference to constitutional text,
history, and structure is another matter altogether. There are,
however, two principal problems with the argument. First, if Congress has the authority to impose substantive obligations (such as
the requirement to pay a minimum wage) on the states,409 it is difficult to see why Congress should not also have the authority to create a remedy for when the state fails to fulfill its obligation. Second, and more important for our purposes, the Court has sought to
justify its anti-abrogation rule by invoking the states’ dignity. As
we have seen, the conventional notion of state dignity, drawn from
the foreign state sovereign immunity cases, does not imply a power
to resist suit when the forum sovereign has clearly authorized suit.
The Court has not attempted to explain why the (several) states’
status compels an indefeasible immunity from suit.
Some of the dissenters on the current Court have recently suggested that foreign state sovereign immunity provides a useful example of how the states’ immunity ought to be handled.410 They
409

See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555–56 (1985).
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board, Justice Stevens suggested that, given the increased role that states now play in
the commercial marketplace, “[i]n future cases, it may . . . be appropriate to limit the
coverage of state sovereign immunity by treating the commercial enterprises of the
States like the commercial activities of foreign sovereigns under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.” 527 U.S. 666, 692 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer made a similar point. See id. at 699 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that
Congress has declined to accord immunity to foreign states when they act as market
410
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have not, however, suggested that the Court has in fact been picking and choosing from that doctrine, adopting the facets that support its claims about immunity—specifically, the notion that states
and the United States enjoy “equal rights” and “equal independence”—and rejecting those that do not—the important consequence that Congress has authority to abrogate sovereign states’
immunity.
The Court’s response presumably would track Justice Scalia’s retort in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board411 to Justice Breyer’s suggestion that
state sovereign immunity doctrine should follow the example set by
Congress in the Foreign State Sovereign Immunity Act. According
to Justice Scalia, such a “proposal ignores the fact that state sovereign immunity, unlike foreign sovereign immunity, is a constitutional doctrine that is meant to be both immutable by Congress and
resistant to trends.”412 But this response attacks a straw man. If in
fact (as then-Professor Scalia argued) the states retained law-ofnations immunity at ratification,413 then that immunity—even as a
constitutional matter—ought to be no less subject to abrogation after ratification than it was before. Otherwise, Justice Scalia is left
to suggest that the immunity codified (albeit implicitly) in the Constitution is something profoundly more potent than what the states
enjoyed before ratification. This turns the transfer of sovereign
powers that occurred at the ratification on its head. In ratifying the
participants: “In doing so, Congress followed the modern trend, which spread rapidly
after the Second World War, regarding foreign state sovereign immunity. . . . Indeed,
given the widely accepted view among modern nations that when a State engages in
ordinary commercial activity sovereign immunity has no significant role to play, . . .
today’s holding . . . creates [a] legal anomaly.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); id. at 700 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The precedents that offer important legal
support for the doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . all focus upon a critically different
question, namely, whether courts, acting without legislative support, can abrogate
state sovereign immunity, not whether Congress, acting legislatively, can do so.”). In
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, Justice Stevens invoked The Schooner Exchange
Court’s view of the defeasibility of sovereign immunity under the law of nations. 528
U.S. 62, 97 n.6 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Under the traditional view, the sovereign immunity defense was recognized only as a matter of comity when asserted in the
courts of another sovereign, rather than as a limitation on the jurisdiction of that forum.”) (citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136).
411
527 U.S. 666 (1999).
412
Id. at 686 n.4.
413
See Scalia, supra note 139, at 886–88.
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Constitution, the states agreed to cede a significant degree of sovereignty to the United States. Even if we assume that the states believed that they would retain law-of-nations immunity after the
ratification, it is difficult to fathom that they believed that they
would be gaining a new and more potent form of immunity, one
that is resistant to abrogation by another sovereign in that sovereign’s courts, and one that is not even (nor ever has been) enjoyed
by wholly independent sovereign nations.
To be sure, Justice Scalia may well be correct that the Framers
believed that the states’ pre-ratification immunity from suit derived
not from the English common law, but from the law of nations.
According to a persuasive recent article by Professor Caleb Nelson, the Framers, including such prominent federalists as James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Marshall, believed that
before the ratification the states enjoyed immunity under general
principles of the law of nations.414 They also generally agreed that
Article III would not itself abrogate the “states’ protections against
being haled into court by individuals”; instead, they believed that
“the content of those protections was not set by anything in the
Constitution,”415 but rather was determined by the general law of
nations.416 If the law of nations was understood at the time of the
ratification to be subject to abrogation by the forum sovereign—as
the Court in The Schooner Exchange clearly believed—then Justice
Scalia’s view is plainly wrong. And even if one assumes that the
Framers did not understand law-of-nations immunity to be subject
to abrogation, their decision to leave for the states only the protections afforded by the law of nations—as opposed to some broader,
unchanging set of immunities frozen into the Constitution itself—
means that changes in foreign state sovereign immunity under the

414

Nelson, supra note 20, at 1574–1602 (citing Nathan v. Virginia, 1 Dall. 77 (Pa. C.P.
1781)).
415
Id. at 1621.
416
Id. at 1577–78 (citing The Federalist No. 81, at 487–88 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); id. at 1592 (citing James Madison, Comments at the
Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 The Documentary History
of the Ratification of the Constitution 1412, 1414 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1993)); id. at 1593 (citing John Marshall, Comments at the Debates of
the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 1433 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
1993)).
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law of nations should directly affect the scope of the states’ immunity from suit. As Professor Nelson explains, “[w]e could readily
agree that Article III does not abrogate whatever protections the
general law gives sovereign states, but we could maintain that those
protections themselves have changed in important ways since the
days of Madison and Marshall.”417 Under this view, as the scope of
foreign state sovereign immunity has become increasingly restricted,
so has the states’ (background) immunity from suit.
C. Contextual Implications
These doctrinal consequences of a direct comparison to the doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity perhaps help explain why
the Court has thus far not been willing to make the comparison explicitly, but instead has relied on cryptic references to state dignity.
But by making (what are in the eyes of even the most avid Court
watchers) mysterious references to state dignity, the Court leaves
itself open to the charge that it values the dignity of the states over
the dignity of individuals. Indeed, one cannot help but be struck by
the fact that in those contexts in which dignity is intuitively a singularly relevant consideration, the Court has consistently subordinated those dignity considerations to other interests.
Consider, for example, the law of procedural due process. Although the Court in its seminal decision in Goldberg v. Kelly418 appeared to suggest that an individual’s dignitary interests are an important consideration in determining whether a hearing is required
when a state seeks to deprive him of an important benefit without
according him an opportunity to challenge the deprivation in per-

417

Nelson, supra note 20, at 1621.
397 U.S. 254 (1970). There is an extensive literature on the appropriate role of
individual dignitary interests in procedural due process doctrine. See, e.g., William J.
Brennan, Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,” 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 3
(1988); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 885 (1981); Jerry L. Mashaw, Dignitary Process: A Political
Psychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 433 (1987); William
H. Simon, The Rule of Law and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56
Brook. L. Rev. 777 (1990); see also Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process:
Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 Geo. L.J.
887, 939 (1999) (describing process-based metric for court rulemaking, which is based
on the view that litigants have a “participation right” that “derives from the state’s
obligation to respect the dignity and autonomy of persons affected by adjudication”).
418
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son, the Court has since clarified that the inquiry into what process
is due turns principally on the degree to which such process is necessary to reach an accurate result, regardless of the individual’s
dignitary and participatory interests.419 Under the Court’s current
doctrine, therefore, a state’s dignity is a “preeminent” consideration in deciding whether an individual who alleges that the state
violated his federal rights can seek redress in court, but the individual’s dignity is beside the point when a state deprives the individual of a valuable benefit.
This is, to say the least, an odd place for the doctrine to come to
rest. In fairness, the Court has insisted that the protections it announces for state autonomy are intended ultimately for the sake of
the individual;420 but it is difficult to take this contention seriously
when the Court is dismissive of claims based on individual dignity.
Whatever expressive value there may be in the Court’s invocation
of state dignity in its state sovereign immunity decisions surely
must be balanced against the contextual implications of those invocations: The Court is at risk of announcing that it cares about states
qua states, even at the expense of individual dignity.421
CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that although the notion of state dignity at first seems oxymoronic, it in fact has a particular legal connotation that, in context, is perfectly sensible. In its recent state
sovereign immunity decisions, however, the Court has imported
419

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In Mathews, the Court explained
that the inquiry whether more process is due involves a balancing test that weighs
“the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id.
420
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.”); cf. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 681–82 (1999) (analogizing the waiver of a state’s right not to be sued to “other
constitutionally protected privileges,” such as the right to a jury) (emphasis omitted).
421
Cf. Caminker, supra note 7, at 87 (“Dignity assumes hierarchy, and the hierarchical relationships between persons and states embedded within the doctrine of sovereign immunity runs precisely counter to the hierarchy entailed by the distinctively
American principle of popular sovereignty.”).
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the concept to a context in which it is largely inapposite. In the
context of foreign state sovereign immunity, state “dignity” connotes a parity of status that appears to be absent in the context of
state sovereign immunity. More important, the Court has refused
to accept the consequences that ought to flow from its suggestion
that the states stand in relation to the United States much as do
foreign nations: If the states truly enjoyed equal dignity with the
federal government, the latter would have authority to abrogate
the immunity of the former, at least in its own courts, just as it has
that power with respect to foreign nations.
Because the Court has not been willing explicitly to rely in the
state sovereign immunity cases on principles of the law of nations,
this account is susceptible to the critique that it constructs a straw
man—the Court’s reliance on the law of nations—that it then tears
down. But the idea of state dignity is not new, and it is not alien to
the Court’s jurisprudence. When the Court invokes it, it is the
Court that is embracing the connotations of the term, and the
Court that has naturally conjured up the comparison between state
sovereign immunity and foreign state sovereign immunity. Yet the
Court’s assertion about state dignity ultimately bears no relationship to the doctrinal and historical meaning of that phrase, and the
Court has not provided an adequate justification for why the sovereign status of the several states ought to entail broader immunity
than that implied by the sovereign status of wholly sovereign nations.
To wage an important battle over the appropriate status of the
states in relation to the federal government through implicit rhetorical links, moreover, demeans the arguments of history, structure, and policy that ought to animate the discussion over federalism. As long as the Court refuses explicitly to ground its state
sovereign immunity doctrine in the principles of customary international law, it remains vulnerable to the charge that it values the
dignity of the states over the dignity of individuals. Justice Brennan
would indeed be disappointed.

